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AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

DAVID  JAYNE  HILL 


BOOKS  BY  DAVID  JAYNE  HILL 

A  History  of  Diplomacy  in  the  Inter- 
national Development  of  Europe 

Vol.  I. — The  Struggle  for  Universal  Empire. 
With  $  Colored  Maps,  Chronological  Tables, 
List  of  Treaties  and  Index.   Pp.  XXII-48 1 . 

Vol.  II.— The  Establishment  of  Territorial 
Sovereignty.  With  4  Colored  Maps, 
Tables,  etc.     Pp.  XXIV-688. 

Vol.  III. — The  Diplomacy  of  the  Age  of  Ab- 
solutism. With  5  Colored  Maps,  Tables, 
etc.    Pp.  XXVI-706. 

World  Organization  as  Affected  by  the 
Nature  of  the  Modern  State.  Pp.  IX- 
214. 

[Translated  also  into  French  and  German] 

The  People's  Government 
Pp.  X-288 

Americanism — What  It  Is 
Pp.  XV-283 

[Translated  also  into  French] 

The  Rebuilding  of  Europe 
Pp.  XII-289 

[Translated  also  into  French] 

Impressions  of  the  Kaiser 
Pp.  XII-266 

Present  Problems  in  Foreign  Policy 
Pp.  XII-361 


AMERICAN 
WORLD    POLICIES 


BY 

DAVID   JAYNE    HILL 

AUTHOR  OF  "A  HISTORY  OF  DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT     OF      EUROPE,"      "AMERICANISM — 

WHAT    IT    IS,"    "PRESENT    PROBLEMS 

IN  FOREIGN  POLICY,"eTC. 


NEW   ^SSW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


COPYRIGHT,  I92O, 
BY   GEORGE    H.  DORAN   COMPANY 


PRINTED   IN   THE    UNITED  STATES   OF  AMERICA 


PREFACE 


College 
Library    > 

JX 


American  participation  in  an  attempt  to  reorganize 
the  international  relations  of  the  entire  world  with  the 
expectation  of  permanent  peace  by  means  of  a  punitive 
treaty  requiring  military  force  to  execute  it  presents  the 
most  serious  problem  that  has  ever  arisen  in  connection 
with  the  foreign  affairs  of  our  country. 

That  there  should  be  a  more  real  and  effective  asso- 
ciation of  nations  for  maintaining  the  peace  of  the  world 
than  has  ever  hitherto  existed  is  a  proposition  that  re- 
ceives almost  universal  assent.  The  general  idea  of  a 
"League  of  Nations"  has,  therefore,  been  widely  ac- 
cepted and  urgently  advocated.  It  has,  however,  escaped 
the  attention  of  many  persons  that  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  prepared  at  Paris  as  the  first  Part 
of  the  Peace  of  Versailles  is  not  a  "general  association 
of  nations"  of  a  pacific  character  to  secure  international 
justice,  but  a  limited  defensive  alliance  for  the  protec- 
tion of  existing  possessions,  regardless  of  the  manner 
in  which  they  were  acquired  by  their  rulers,  wholly  in- 
different to  the  wishes  of  the  populations  thus  held  in 
subjection,  and  controlled  by  a  small  group  of  Great 
Powers  whose  supremacy  is  based  solely  upon  their  mag- 
nitude and  military  strength. 

It  hardly  needs  to  be  stated  that  a  league  of  this  char- 
acter does  not  embody  the  American  conception  of  what 
such  an  association  should  be.  Obviously,  it  not  only 
repudiates  the  ideas  underlying  our  traditional  foreign 

vii 


1&60120 


viii  PREFACE 

policy  as  a  nation  but  presents  a  contradiction  of  the 
fundamental  principles  upon  which  our  Government  is 
based. 

The  chapters  contained  in  this  volume  are  designed  to 
show  by  a  careful  examination  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  in  what  respects  it  falls  short  of  or 
contradicts  the  ideals  of  government  and  of  international 
comity  cherished  by  the  American  people,  to  explain  the 
manner  in  which  this  proposed  League  has  been  brought 
into  existence,  and  to  give  an  account  of  the  efforts 
made  in  the  United  States  to  promote  a  better  interna- 
tional association  without  involving  the  American  people 
in  the  abandonment  of  their  most  cherished  conceptions 
regarding  the  nature  of  their  own  Government  and  its 
normal  and  beneficent  relations  to  the  other  goverments 
of  the  civilized  world. 

The  victory  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  in  the 
Great  War  presented  an  opportunity  for  the  improve- 
ment of  international  relations  which  had  never  before 
existed,  but  it  was  an  error  to  believe  that  the  victors 
were  the  only  nations  concerned  in  the  future  peace  of 
the  world  and  that  its  conditions  should  be  imposed  by 
them  as  a  consequence  of  their  victory.  The  punitive 
peace  and  the  permanent  organization  of  peace  were  not 
only  different  but  widely  divergent  undertakings.  The 
former  was  necessarily  based  on  superior  military  force, 
but  to  reorganize  the  world  on  the  basis  of  superior 
military  force  rather  than  on  the  basis  of  the  inherent 
rights  of  nations  was  to  contradict  the  purpose  for  which 
the  war  was  alleged  to  have  been  fought  by  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers,  and  to  substitute  for  the  military 
imperialism  they  had  overthrown  the  preponderant  mili- 
tary authority  of  a  small  group  of  Great  Powers. 


PREFACE  ix 

If  the  world  is  to  be  internationally  reconstructed,  it 
will  have  to  be  on  different  lines.  For  the  enforcement 
of  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  status  quo  without  revision 
there  must  be  substituted  the  enforcement  of  peace  by 
conformity  to  International  Law  as  a  body  of  just  and 
equal  rules  for  the  conduct  of  nations  in  their  relations 
with  one  another. 

It  is,  of  course,  claimed  that  this  substitution  was  in- 
tended. However  that  may  be,  the  assertion  is  not  sus- 
tained by  evidence,  and  the  substitution  has  been  neither 
accomplished,  declared,  nor  promised. 

Still,  there  is  ground  for  hope  in  the  fact  that  even 
the  possibility  of  such  a  substitution  is  asserted  by  the 
friends  of  the  League.  This  opens  the  door  for  a  re- 
vision of  the  Covenant  and  for  a  change  of  its  center 
of  gravity.  It  is  on  this  ground,  and  on  this  ground 
only,  that  the  advocates  of  Americanizing  the  Covenant 
can  found  a  sufficient  reason  for  accepting  the  League, 
and  not  rejecting  it  outright. 

Should  it  be  the  good  fortune  of  this  volume  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  those  who  are  friendly  to  the  League 
of  Nations,  especially  of  those  belonging  to  the  Allied 
Powers  in  Europe,  it  is  hoped  that  they  may  find  in  it 
a  satisfactory  statement  of  the  reluctance  felt  in  the 
United  States  by  those  who  are  deeply  interested  in  the 
peace  of  the  world  to  accept  without  change  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  as  it  was  prepared  at  Paris  under  the 
pressure  of  more  immediate  interests. 

It  is  of  the  highest  importance  to  future  good  under- 
standing that  the  attitude  of  those  who  have  dissented 
from  the  terms  of  the  League  should  be  rightly  com- 
prehended. The  objections  raised  do  not  spring  from  in- 
difference regarding  the  future  of  other,  even  the  most 


x  PREFACE 

remote,  parts  of  the  world.  There  is  no  lack  in  the  United 
States  of  generous  purposes  or  of  willingness  to  join  in 
executing  them.  Let  those  who  may  be  disposed  to  pre- 
judge the  American  attitude  be  assured  that  the  heart  of 
America  is  right. 

But  it  is  necessary  also  that  from  its  own  point  of 
view  the  mind  of  America  should  be  clear.  We  have, 
therefore,  to  ask  ourselves,  first  of  all,  how  are  the  fun- 
damental principles  upon  which  our  national  life  has  been 
built,  and  which  have  given  us  peace  and  prosperity, 
to  be  affected  by  the  proposals  embodied  in  a  project  that 
was  conceived  in  camera  rather  than  arrived  at  by  open 
discussion,  and  which  without  argument,  and  even  with- 
out explicit  reference  to  our  national  traditions,  peremp- 
torily brushes  them  aside  as  no  longer  of  importance? 

When  we  speak  of  "Americanizing"  the  Treaty  of 
Peace,  we  do  not  mean  by  that  expression  to  suggest 
any  change  that  would  afford  the  United  States  any  kind 
of  advantage  over  any  other  nation.  What  we  mean  by  it 
is  a  rex.isal  to  participate  in  any  compact  that  would  de- 
stroy or  pervert  our  national  character  by  subjecting  our 
action  to  a  control  not  in  harmony  with  our  principles  as 
a  nation. 

The  problems  of  our  national  life  have  been  solved, 
and  successfully  solved,  by  our  institutions.  We  cannot, 
therefore,  wisely  abandon  or  subordinate  them.  Our 
whole  value  to  the  rest  of  the  world  depends  upon  the 
unity,  the  efficiency,  and  the  prestige  which  these  insti- 
tutions have  given  us.  Other  nations  turn  to  us  now 
because  of  what  those  institutions  and  the  principles 
on  which  they  are  based  have  done  for  us.  Without 
them  we  should  in  a  short  time  become  a  negligible  quan- 
tity.    It  is  timely  for  our  friends  in  England,  Canada, 


PREFACE  xi 

Australia,  and  elsewhere  to  know  that  the  best  service 
we  can  render  them  is  to  continue  to  be  ourselves,  as 
they  also  wish  to  be  themselves;  for  there  can  be  no  ef- 
fective international  spirit  except  as  there  are  strong  na- 
tions that  are  ready  and  determined  to  respect  the  rights 
of  others  because  they  are  able  to  defend  their  own. 

I  wish  to  acknowledge  the  generous  permission  of  the 
editor  of  the  North  American  Review  to  make  use  in 
this  volume  of  articles  which  have  appeared  in  its  pages. 
The  seventh  chapter  was  originally  delivered  as  an  ad- 
dress before  the  American  Bar  Association. 

For  convenience  of  reference  some  important  docu- 
ments have  been  appended  to  the  text  of  this  volume, 
supplementing  those  printed  in  the  author's  previous  book 
on  "Present  Problems  in  Foreign  Policy." 

David  Jayne  Hill. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PACK 

I    Disillusionment  Regarding  the  League  ...  15 

II    The  Un-American  Character  of  the  League     .  36 

III  The  President's  Hostility  to  the  Senate     .     .  65 

IV  The  Struggle  of  the  Senate  for  its  Prerogatives  89 

V  The  Eclipse  of  Peace  Through  the  League      .  in 
VI    The  Covenant  or  the  Constitution?  .     .     .     .  130 

VII    The  Nations  and  the  Law 145 

VIII    The  Solemn  Referendum 168 

Epilogue 188 

DOCUMENTS 

I    President  Wilson's  "Points" 199 

II    Correspondence  Regarding  the  Armistice     .     .  203 

III  The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations     .     .  218 

IV  Ex-Senator  Root's  Letter  to  Senator  Lodge    .  233 

V  The  Senate's  Reservations  of  November  19, 19 19  241 
VI    The  President's  Letter  to  Senator  Hitchcock    .  246 

VII    The  Swiss  Reservation  of  Neutrality     ...  247 

VIII    The  Senate's  Reservations  of  March  19,  1920  249 

Index 255 


Xlll 


AMERICAN 
WORLD  POLICIES 


DISILLUSIONMENT    REGARDING    THE    LEAGUE 

Considered  vaguely  and  abstractly,  the  expression  a 
"League  of  Nations"  seems  not  only  innocent  but  promis- 
ing of  great  and  desirable  results.  The  prejudice  thus 
created  in  its  favor,  coupled  with  possibilities,  predictions, 
and  promises  regarding  the  suppression  of  war  and  the 
permanent  establishment  of  peace,  has  won  for  those  who 
have  proposed,  and  are  now  urging  the  nation  to  accept, 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  elaborated  at 
Paris  a  widespread,  an  earnest,  and  without  doubt  a  sin- 
cerely conscientious  following  of  adherents. 

That  the  enthusiasts  of  this  persuasion  should  resent 
opposition  to  this  proposal  is  not  unnatural.  To  them 
any  criticism  of  it  is  like  assailing  virtue  or  denying  the 
precepts  of  religion.  Unable  to  perceive  any  other  ex- 
cuse for  opposition,  they  are  easily  induced  to  set  down 
even  the  moderate  critics  of  so  holy  an  enterprise  as 
either  blind  bigots,  narrow  chauvinists,  or  selfish  par- 
tisans. 

If  the  faith  of  these  advocates  of  a  League  of  Nations 
were  well  grounded,  if  the  plans  proposed  were  likely 
to  be  really  effective,  if  peace  were  the  one  great  and  only 

15 


16     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

object  to  be  attained,  and  above  all  if  the  nations  entering 
into  the  compact  were  in  fact  sincere  to  a  point  of  self- 
forget  fulness,  as  it  is  desired  and  expected  that  the  Amer- 
ican people  will  be,  an  honest  man  and  a  true  patriot 
would  not  only  hesitate  to  oppose  such  a  league  but  he 
would  feel  that  his  conscience  compelled  him  to  approve 
and  support  it. 

Quite  unexpectedly  the  curtain  has  been  partly  lifted 
upon  the  scene  of  the  Conference  at  Paris,  and  some  of 
its  secret  aims  and  motives  have  been  disclosed.  What- 
ever may  be  said  of  the  official  world,  the  rank  and  file 
of  the  school  of  thought  created  by  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace,  the  World's  Court  League,  and  the  other  or- 
ganized peace  movements  in  the  United  States,  are  com- 
ing to  understand,  by  the  revelation  of  facts  which  their 
faith  prevented  them  from  anticipating,  that  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
so  indissolubly  connected  with  it  are  not  the  purely  ideal 
constructions  which  they  have  been  supposed  to  be;  but, 
on  the  contrary,  involve  on  the  one  hand  a  practical 
repudiation  of  the  principles  by  which  they  were  imagined 
to  be  controlled,  and  on  the  other  a  failure  to  embody, 
or  even  to  consider,  the  ideals  of  international  organi- 
zation which  for  the  last  quarter  of  a  century  have  ani- 
mated the  hopes  and  inspired  the  activities  of  the  best 
thought  on  international  questions  in  the  United  States. 
The  shock  of  surprise  and  disillusionment  which  these 
excellent  and  honorable  citizens  feel,  as  these  disclosures 
are  made,  will  enable  them  to  understand  why  some  in- 
dependent critics  long  associated  with  the  cause  they  hold 
dear  have  not  hesitated  from  the  beginning  to  seek  more 
light  upon  this  compact. 

It  is  a  fact  not  without  significance  that  American 


DISILLUSIONMENT  17 

statesmen  personally  familiar  through  their  own  experi- 
ence with  the  aims  and  methods  of  European  diplomacy 
have,  almost  without  exception,  regarded  with  skepticism 
the  effort  to  combine  with  a  peace  necessarily  punitive 
a  plan  for  the  political  reorganization  of  the  world.  They 
have  realized  not  only  that  a  tree  may  be  known  by  its 
fruits,  but  that  the  kind  of  fruit  to  be  expected  may  be 
known  from  the  nature  of  the  tree.  As  Americans,  they 
have  clearly  understood  that,  from  the  conditions  of  the 
case,  and  without  any  reflection  upon  the  integrity  of 
European  statesmen,  Europe  possesses  "a  set  of  primary 
interests"  with  which — as  Washington  said  long  ago, 
and  until  recently  every  American  statesman  of  the  first 
rank  has  believed — we,  as  a  constitutional  republic,  pos- 
sessing neither  dynastic  nor  colonial  interests  nor  imperial 
traditions  of  statecraft,  have  no  relation.  That  these 
interests  would  be  abandoned  in  the  Conference  at  Paris 
it  was  impossible  to  believe;  for  every  one  of  the  Great 
Powers  with  which  we  have  been  associated,  notwith- 
standing the  growth  of  democracy  among  the  people  in 
most  of  them,  is  either  an  actual  empire,  ruling  subject- 
races  and  exploiting  distant  continents  for  gain,  or  is 
an  aspirant  to  imperial  dominion.  All  of  them  are  eager 
to  write  a  policy  of  mutual  insurance.  Not  one  of  them 
is  ready  to  give  up  any  territory  or  any  advantage  it  now 
possesses,  no  matter  where  it  is  held  or  at  whose  disad- 
vantage. 

How  unequally  we  would  be  yoked  with  these  Powers 
in  any  unlimited  alliance  is  evident  to  all  who  reflect  upon 
it.  This  does  not  forbid  that  we  should  place  ourselves 
on  an  equality  with  all  of  them  in  the  advocacy,  the  fur- 
ther improvement,  and  the  defense  of  International  Law. 
We  may  rightly  refuse  to  deal  with  any  nation  that  vio- 


18     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

latcs  it  until  it  has  made  reparation  and  acknowledges 
its  authority.  We  should,  undoubtedly,  bring  all  our 
available  forces  to  bear  against  any  nation  that  crimi- 
nally breaks  its  legal  engagements ;  and  we  may  properly 
lend  such  aid  as  we  are  at  the  time  reasonably  able  to 
lend  to  a  nation  that  is  the  victim  of  criminal  aggres- 
sion; but  to  become  the  guarantor  of  possessions  the  ac- 
quisition of  which  was  iniquitous,  or  of  the  consumma- 
tion of  future  transactions  of  which  we  may  not  even  be 
aware,  is  not  only  wholly  outside  our  national  obligations, 
but  violative  of  the  only  principles  upon  which  interna- 
tional peace  and  harmony  can  ever  be  permanently  or- 
ganized. Unless  our  ideals  are  respected,  our  force  and 
our  resources  would  prove  more  helpful  to  the  true  in- 
terests of  mankind  if  left  entirely  under  our  own  control, 
with  no  prospect  of  future  stultification  through  exposure 
to  the  charge  of  being  faithless  to  obligations  which  we 
ought  never  to  have  assumed. 

It  is  with  extreme  reluctance  that  I  would  even  seem 
to  bring  under  criticism  any  of  our  co-belligerents  in  the 
Great  War.  Months  ago  I  pointed  out  the  danger  that 
a  too  intimate  interference  in  matters  foreign  to  us  might 
lead  to  animadversions  which  would  tend  to  alienate 
rather  than  to  solidify  the  members  of  the  Entente.  Un- 
happily, that  alienation  has  already  in  part  resulted  from 
a  too  close  relation  to  one  another's  private  affairs.  So 
far  as  the  defeat  of  the  Central  Powers  was  concerned, 
all  the  members  of  the  Entente  fought  together  in  a  holy 
companionship.  In  this  there  was  complete  unanimity 
of  aim  and  interest.  It  was  a  precious  achievement,  this 
sense  of  complete  community  in  action.  ■  It  has  unfortu- 
nately been  to  a  great  degree  sacrificed  by  an  attempt  to 


DISILLUSIONMENT  19 

regulate  matters  in  which  that  community  of  purpose 
had  no  place. 

There  was  obviously,  through  all  the  entanglements 
of  the  Peace  Conference,  one  high  and  universal  aim  to 
which  the  united  efforts  of  the  members  might  have  been 
directed;  while  the  adjustment  of  separate  national  in- 
terests could  have  been  left  to  those  to  whom  they  specifi- 
cally pertained,  in  accordance  with  definite  rules  previously 
agreed  upon.  In  truth,  the  decisions  and  arrangements  of 
the  Supreme  Council — which  ranged  at  different  times 
from  ten  to  three  members,  according  to  circumstances — 
were  invariably  based  on  conceptions  of  power,  and  vir- 
tually never  on  accepted  principles.  And  yet  there  re- 
mained, during  all  the  negotiations,  a  community  of  in- 
terest transcending  every  other,  which,  nevertheless,  was 
totally  ignored.  That  interest,  which  was  common  to  all, 
was  that,  henceforth,  the  world  should  be  governed  by 
definite  principles  of  justice,  and  not  controlled  by  pri- 
vate diplomatic  bargains.  If  this  is  so,  the  supreme  ef- 
fort of  the  future  should  not  merely  be  to  safeguard 
possessions,  irrespective  of  the  manner  in  which  they  were 
acquired  or  are  administered,  but  to  secure  the  inherent 
rights  of  States,  both  small  and  great,  under  the  rulings 
of  a  common  law. 

For  this  the  Conference  at  Paris  has  shown  no  in- 
clination. As  I  have  elsewhere  indicated,1  there  is  in 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  no  declaration 
of  the  inherent  rights  of  peoples,  no  assertion  or  admis- 
sion that  small  or  weak  States  have  any  rights  whatever, 
except  such  as  this  League  pleases  to  accord  to  them. 
As  to  definite  and  authoritative  law,  under  which  rights 
can  be  claimed  and  defended  in  a  judicial  manner,  there  is 

1  Present  Problems  in  Foreign  Policy,  pp.  120,  130. 


20     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

not  only  no  provision  for  it  in  the  Covenant,  but  a  pro- 
posal to  embody  it  coming  from  outside  the  Conference 
and  endorsed  by  the  best  legal  thought  in  this  country 
was  rejected.  This  was  a  disappointment  in  which,  I 
think,  all  lovers  of  justice  who  appreciate  its  significance 
must  share. 

I  do  not  affirm  that  in  any  of  their  transactions  the 
members  of  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris  have  been 
insincere.  According  to  accepted  standards  of  sincerity 
as  understood  in  traditional  diplomacy,  they  have  not 
been  insincere.  But  those  standards  are  not  our  stand- 
ards. They  are  not  the  standards  in  which  we  believe, 
and  which  many  felt  they  had  reason  to  expect  would  be 
observed.  We  were  looking  for  "open  covenants,  openly 
arrived  at,"  and  we  have  in  our  hands  secret  agreements 
secretly  arrived  at,  some  of  which  we  as  a  nation  are 
now  called  upon  to  sanction  and  even  to  guarantee. 

When,  therefore,  I  speak  of  "insincerity,"  I  am  read- 
ing no  lecture  in  morality  to  foreign  Powers.  I  am 
merely  stating  the  admitted  facts  with  regard  to  what 
those  Powers  have  done  and  intend  to  do,  not  assuming 
any  supervision  over  their  performance  or  making  any 
accusations  of  deliberate  deception.  The  insincerity  I 
wish  at  this  time  to  emphasize  is  that  which  we,  the  Amer- 
ican people,  would  manifest,  if  we  should  pretend,  in 
the  face  of  our  knowledge,  that  this  Covenant  and  the 
treaty  of  which  it  forms  a  part  are  a  realization  of  our 
American  international  ideals. 

It  will,  no  doubt,  be  said  that  this  Covenant  is  the 
nearest  approach  to  a  realization  of  our  hopes  which 
it  is  practically  possible  to  obtain.  Is  any  defender  of 
this  Covenant  sure  of  that?  Is  our  support  of  what 
has  been  proposed  in  this  Covenant  so  unimportant  to 


DISILLUSIONMENT  21 

the  rest  of  the  world  that  our  most  earnest  aims  as 
a  people  and  our  most  sacred  sense  of  national  responsi- 
bility may  be  treated  with  indifference?  But  a  short  time 
ago  we  were  instructed  otherwise.  Our  adherence  to 
this  Covenant  was  represented  as  something  upon  which 
the  welfare  of  the  whole  world  absolutely  depends,  and 
without  which  there  will  be  universal  chaos.  Is  this 
true,  or  is  it  false?  If  it  is  true,  is  it  conceivable  that 
our  efforts  to  modify  this  compact  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  conform  to  our  national  traditions  can  be  condemned 
either  by  the  American  protagonists  of  the  Covenant  or 
by  European  statesmen?  If,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  false, 
then  let  us  make  an  end  of  empty  illusions  about  it,  and 
sensibly  consider,  as  other  nations  do,  where  our  in- 
terests lie. 

We  have  at  present  before  us  a  considerable  body  of 
evidence  that  it  is  not  principles,  but  interests,  that  are 
to  be  protected  by  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. We  know  what  some  at  least  of  the  past  transac- 
tions have  been.  What  has  happened  to  change  the  in- 
tentions of  those  who  entered  into  those  compacts?  We 
have  seen  brought  to  the  light  the  secret  compacts  of 
France  and  Great  Britain  with  Russia,  with  Italy,  and 
with  Japan;  these  last  made  as  late  as  February  and 
March,  191 7,  at  the  very  moment  when  China,  whose  in- 
terests were  concerned,  was  being  urged  to  declare  her- 
self an  ally  and  a  belligerent,  not  in  her  own  interest, 
but  for  the  benefit  of  those  who,  without  her  knowl- 
edge, were  bargaining  away  among  themselves  her  un- 
doubted rights  and  her  future  safety.  Not  only  this, 
but  these  agreements  were  made  at  a  time  when  the 
probability  of  our  participation  in  the  war  was  one 
of  the  reasons  why  the  Chinese  Republic,  relying  upon 


22     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

our  friendship,  as  well  as  our  influence  and  example, 
was  disposed  to  enter  it;  yet  both  China  and  ourselves 
were  left  in  complete  ignorance  of  these  secret  "under- 
standings" against  the  interest  of  a  nation  whose  "terri- 
torial entity"  it  was  one  of  the  greatest  triumphs  of 
American  diplomacy  to  have  defended  against  the  ag- 
gressions of  European  Powers. 

We  had  all  been  aware  that  secret  "understandings" 
were  customary  in  the  past,  but  we  were  expecting  that 
they  were  to  be  abandoned.  It  was  believed  that  not 
one  of  them  would  be  allowed  to  outlive  the  formation 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  now  embodied  in  a  treaty 
which  sanctions  at  least  one  of  these  secret  compacts, 
in  the  provisions  of  Section  VIII  of  Part  IV  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace,  under  the  title  "Shantung."  Here  was 
an  opportunity  for  the  Conference  to  rectify  a  wrong  and 
repudiate  a  dangerous  policy,  but  the  wrong  was  neither 
righted  nor  the  policy  repudiated.  On  the  contrary,  the 
wrong  secretly  agreed  to  was  specifically  sanctioned  in 
this  Treaty  of  Peace,  and  the  defenders  of  that  docu- 
ment are  placed  in  the  position  of  having  to  say  that  the 
treatment  of  China  in  this  matter  is  not  unjust,  because 
in  her  weakness  she  could  not  have  prevented  it;  that 
the  concessions  enforced  upon  her  are  not  really  terri- 
torial but  only  economic;  and,  finally,  that  the  imposi- 
tion is  but  temporary.  This  defense  of  a  wrong  decision 
amounts  to  saying  that  the  Chinese  Republic  is  not  to 
be  treated  as  a  strong  Power  would  expect  to  be;  that 
encroachments  upon  economic  resources  have  no  vital 
connection  with  territorial  and  political  rights;  and  that 
a  condition  is  temporary  to  which  no  definite  limit  of  time 
is  set,  and  to  which  no  limit  is  even  suggested  in  the 
document  imposing  the  obligation  of  submission.     No 


DISILLUSIONMENT  28 

one  of  the  Powers  imposing  this  servitude,  however  it  be 
explained,  would  for  a  moment  entertain  the  thought  of 
itself  submitting  to  it. 

The  representatives  of  China  declare  that  the  conces- 
sions assigned  to  Japan  by  the  Treaty  constitute  a  danger 
not  only  to  the  economic  but  to  the  political  control  of 
the  entire  Republic;  and,  although  it  is  not  necessary  to 
establish  the  truth  of  this  in  order  to  justify  China's 
protest,  that  opinion  is  held  by  all  who  have  seriously 
examined  the  question.  That  these  concessions  were  ex- 
torted by  force  from  Germany  gives  no  title  to  them 
which  Germany  did  not  possess,  and  her  only  title,  as 
we  know,  was  forceful  occupation.  China  has  expressed 
a  wish  to  recover  her  rightful  possessions  by  reimburs- 
ing the  conqueror  for  the  cost  of  driving  out  the  Ger- 
mans, but  this  offer  has  not  been  accepted.  The  reason 
for  it  is  obvious.  The  question  is  not  merely  an  economic 
one. 

If  the  project  of  imperial  expansion  is  henceforth  to 
be  abandoned,  the  opportunity  of  Japan  to  win  the  con- 
fidence and  approval  of  the  rest  of  the  world  is  great. 
The  acceptance  of  China's  protest,  which  was  not  even 
heard  by  the  Conference,  would  have  been  a  telling  con- 
tribution to  the  new  order  of  international  relationship. 
But  it  would  be  unjust  to  place  too  much  blame  upon 
Japan.  What  evidence  had  been  given  by  the  Powers  as- 
sembled at  Paris  that  they,  in  like  circumstances,  would 
act  otherwise  than  in  the  manner  Japan  was  acting? 
Having  learned  the  game  of  European  diplomacy,  why 
should  the  Japanese  abandon  it,  so  long  as  the  rules  re- 
mained unchanged?  Who  had  proposed  any  change  in 
the  rules?  Who  had  proposed  any  declaration  of  rights? 
Who  had  declared  that,  juristically,  the  rights  of  a  weak 


24.     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

State  are  equal  to  those  of  a  strong  State,  and  would 
receive  the  same  protection?  Who  had  set  up  any  prin- 
ciple whatever  as  a  rule  and  standard  of  conduct?  The 
Japanese  attitude,  therefore,  is  not  to  be  too  severely 
censured.  Least  of  all  should  it  be  considered  an  offense 
to  us.  When  the  transfer  to  Japan  of  the  German  ex- 
tortions was  under  consideration,  although  a  majority 
of  the  American  Commission  is  reported  to  have  realized 
and  opposed  the  injustice  of  it  to  China,  the  Commis- 
sion nevertheless  decided  to  sustain  it.  Thus  the  repre- 
sentatives of  a  Republic  whose  potential  strength,  if  fully 
organized,  could  wipe  half  of  Asia  off  the  map,  went 
out  of  the  Conference  "with  their  heads  upon  their 
breasts" — to  employ  the  expression  which  the  President 
applied  in  his  Boston  speech  to  all  Europe,  in  case  we 
did  not  do  our  duty. 

Why  was  this  injustice  permitted?  There  is  but 
one  answer :  China  is  not  a  military  Power,  but  a  peace- 
ful nation,  unable  to  defend  its  rights  by  force;  while 
Japan  is  a  strong  and  militant  Power  whose  adhesion  is 
necessary  to  the  strength  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Her  will  must,  therefore,  be  accepted;  otherwise  the 
League  of  Nations,  it  was  believed,  could  not  be  formed. 
This,  then,  is  a  part  of  the  price  at  which  this  League  is 
bought.  But  this  is  not  the  whole  price.  The  principle 
of  equity  and  the  right  of  a  nation  to  self-determination 
were  thereby  abandoned.  In  brief,  it  was  a  choice  be- 
tween Justice  and  the  League. 

Nobody  in  Europe,  outside  of  Government  circles, 
approves  of  this  failure  of  the  Conference  to  rise  above 
the  conceptions  of  the  old  diplomacy.  "Among  French- 
men and  British  with  whom  I  talked  at  Paris,"  says  a 
highly  capable  observer,  "there  was  no  pretense  that  the 


DISILLUSIONMENT  25 

treatment  accorded  to  China  represented  the  sentiment 
of  the  French  and  British  peoples.  Political  expediency 
dictated  the  attitudes  of  the  French  and  British  Govern- 
ments" ;  and,  it  must  be  added,  of  our  own  also. 

There  is  no  sign  that  the  ethical  standards  of  the  old 
diplomacy  have  been  changed.  The  Japanese  face  their 
colleagues  with  perfect  equanimity.  "They  argued," 
continues  the  same  observer,  speaking  of  his  conversa- 
tions with  them,  "that  while  several  of  the  other  Powers 
in  the  Allied  group  are  still  retaining  special  leases  and 
concessions  in  China  obtained  and  held  against  China's 
wishes,  Japan  cannot  be  asked  to  forego  the  positions 
she  has  obtained." 

The  only  answer  to  this  argument  is  a  complete 
change  of  base.  The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
does  not  adopt  it.  It  even  seems  to  evade  the  proposal 
of  change.  It  requires  nothing  to  be  given  up,  no 
matter  how  it  was  obtained.  It  makes  no  provision  by 
which  any  of  these  economic  aggressions  on  weak 
Powers  may  be  ended.  While  we  in  America  are  think- 
ing of  the  League  of  Nations  as  a  remedy  for  wrongs, 
the  imperial  Powers  are  interested  in  sequestering  the 
spoils  of  war.  The  League,  it  is  said,  is  to  enforce 
peace;  but  it  is  not  to  the  League,  it  is  to  "the  Principal 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers"  that  all  the  concessions 
wrung  from  Germany  by  the  Treaty  of  Peace  are  com- 
mitted. 

Perhaps,  on  the  whole,  the  best  defense  of  the  Shan- 
tung article  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  is  the  fact  that  it  is 
based  on  certain  "understandings"  which  the  Powers 
entering  into  them  felt  they  could  not  disavow.  It  is, 
therefore,  timely  for  us  to  inquire  what  unexecuted  "un- 
derstandings" of  a  like  character  may  still  exist,  and 


26     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

what  may  be  the  relation  of  the  United  States  to  them 
in  case  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  is 
ratified. 

We  know  that  the  parts  of  Africa  and  the  Pacific 
Islands  for  which  mandates  are  to  be  issued  by  the 
League  of  Nations  are  already  the  subject  of  "under- 
standings." The  Dark  Continent  is  almost  entirely  di- 
vided between  Great  Britain  and  France,  with  some 
concessions  to  Italy,  in  the  expectation  that  Spain  and 
Portugal  will  eventually  dispose  of  their  holdings  on 
that  continent — of  course  in  a  market  where  the  bidding 
will  be  controlled  by  agreement. 

The  fate  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  is  still  in  question, 
but  many  private  engagements  are  known  to  exist  con- 
cerning it.  For  example,  a  writer  on  "The  Future  of 
Turkey,"  in  The  Contemporary  Review  for  June,  19 19, 
speaks  with  confidence  of  what  the  distribution  is 
to  be.  "So  far  as  Armenia  is  concerned,"  he  says,  "the 
first  necessity  is  to  endeavor  to  reconcile  the  claims  put 
forward  on  her  behalf  with  those  based  by  France  upon 
the  agreement  with  England  and  Russia,  made  in  the 
Spring  of  1916.  Whilst  public  opinion  seems  to  be  di- 
vided upon  the  present  validity  of  that  agreement,  it  is 
obvious  that  France  should  be  the  mandatory  Power  for 
Syria."  He  then  goes  on  to  argue  what  Armenia  should 
include,  and  thinks  it  of  "immense  importance";  for  "if 
America  is  to  be  persuaded  to  undertake  this  responsi- 
bility, Armenia  must  include,  not  merely  just  such  area 
as  Europe  might  consider  a  disencumbrance,  but,  in 
fact,  practically  so  much  or  so  little  as  the  Government 
of  Washington  might  believe  to  be  necessary  to  make  its 
work  a  success." 

Will  the  moral  enthusiasts  who   are  defending  the 


DISILLUSIONMENT  27 

Covenant  as  an  almost  divine  ordinance  dwell  long 
enough  on  this  quotation  to  comprehend  and  weigh  its 
implications?  The  claims  put  forth  in  behalf  of  Ar- 
menia are  to  be  "reconciled"  with  those  of  France  based 
on  an  agreement  made  with  England  and  Russia,  in 
1916,  for  the  possession  of  parts  of  Armenia!  That 
country,  it  would  seem,  is  to  be  delimited,  not  as  the 
Armenians  occupying  the  land  desire,  but  with  reference 
to  the  claims  of  France  to  this  territory  based  on  past 
agreements  with  England.  As  nothing  could  be  done  by 
the  League  of  Nations  without  the  consent  of  every 
member  of  the  Council,  the  Great  Powers,  parties  to  the 
"understanding,"  would  undoubtedly  sustain  it.  If  the 
United  States  should  feel  disposed  to  offer  objection,  it 
would  be  confronted,  as  in  the  case  of  Shantung,  with  a 
choice  between  submission  and  the  dissolution  of  the 
League,  and  its  decision  would  no  doubt  be  based  on  the 
precedent  itself  had  set. 

But  unless  America  is  prepared  to  repudiate  the  whole 
scheme  of  "mandates,"  it  will  be  necessary  to  become 
an  accomplice  in  the  "understandings"  of  the  imperial 
Powers  to  a  still  greater  extent  than  this.  If  America, 
the  writer  quoted  informs  us,  should  not  be  content  to 
accept  a  mandate  for  an  area  left  over  after  the  other 
Powers  had  taken  what  they  wanted — that  is,  such  a 
"disencumbrance"  as' Armenia  might  be  to  them — a  new 
"understanding"  would  have  to  be  arranged  in  order  to 
round  out  this  "disencumbrance,"  and  the  Government 
at  Washington,  not  the  inhabitants  of  the  region,  would 
then  determine  how  much  or  how  little  of  Armenia  should 
be  given  to  France! 

Where  in  this  partition  of  territory  do  the  rights  of 
the  Armenians  themselves  appear?     What  of  "self-de- 


28     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

termination"  in  general?  "Whilst  the  little  Republic 
of  Ararat,  composed  of  the  districts  of  Erivan,  Kars  and 
Batum,"  continues  this  writer,  "is  reported  to  have 
elected  to  become,  and  therefore  should  become,  a  part 
of  the  New  Armenia,  it  seems  to  me  that,  in  the  above 
mentioned  circumstances,  it  would  be  for  America  to 
decide  how  much  of  the  six  valayets  should  be  incor- 
porated." 

But  there  is  no  end  of  these  "understandings"  in  which 
the  people  disposed  of  have  nothing  to  say.  "As  no 
serious  division  of  opinion  seems  to  exist  to  the  effect 
that  Mesopotamia,  Arabia,  and  Palestine  .  .  .  are  to 
have  a  British  mandate,"  the  writer  continues,  "we  can 
pass  at  once  to  a  discussion  of  the  futures  of  the  areas 
which  remain,"  and  he  then  goes  on  to  state  what  dis- 
position is  to  be  made  of  the  rest  of  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire. "To  fulfill  the  principle  of  nationalities,  Greece," 
he  says,  "should  certainly  secure  possession  of  the  Mgean 
Islands  held  by  Italy  under  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne"; 
but  here  rises  another  ghost  of  murdered  nationality: 
"these  islands  were,  however,  definitely  given  to  the  lat- 
ter country  by  the  pact  of  London"!  With  regard  to 
the  Adalia  region,  as  there  is  no  basis  in  nationality,  the 
claim  of  Italy  "depends  upon  certain  rights  and  interests 
largely  self-assumed  and  self-imposed — a  claim  unfor- 
tunately recognized  by  England,  France,  and  Russia  at 
the  time  of  Italy's  entry  into  the  war." 

Very  soon,  it  appears,  if  this  Covenant  is  ratified,  we 
shall  find  ourselves  not  only  confronted  by  these  "under- 
standings" but  actually  involved  in  them,  and  even 
obliged  to  aid  in  executing  them,  or  enter  into  new 
"understandings"  with  regard  to  what  does  not  concern 
us. 


DISILLUSIONMENT  29 

The  question  is  thus  pressed  upon  us :  "What  are  the 
provisions  of  the  Covenant  regarding  these  "understand- 
ings"? Article  XXI  reads:  "Nothing  in  this  Covenant 
shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  validity  of  international  en- 
gagements such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or  regional  un- 
derstandings like  the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  securing  the 
maintenance  of  peace." 

These  words  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  original  draft 
of  the  Covenant.  They  were  introduced  with  the  osten- 
sible purpose  of  recognizing  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  but 
the  form  of  expression  employed  implies  that,  besides 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  there  are  certain  "engagements," 
such  as  "treaties  of  arbitration"  and  "regional  under- 
standings," of  which  last  the  American  policy  is  assumed 
to  be  only  an  example,  the  validity  of  which  is  not  affected 
by  this  Covenant.  So  far  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  itself 
is  concerned,  the  expression  "regional  understandings" 
might  have  been  omitted.  The  sentence  would  then 
simply  read:  "Nothing  in  this  Qovenant  shall  be  deemed 
to  affect  the  validity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine." 

It  has  been  generally  felt  in  the  United  States,  where 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not  regarded  as  an  "engagement" 
or  an  "understanding,"  but  simply  and  solely  as  a  national 
policy,  that  the  expression  "regional  understandings"  does 
not  properly  describe  this  policy.  Why,  then,  was  this 
expression  chosen?  No  form  of  expression  could  better 
cover  the  agreements  regarding  Shantung,  the  partition 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  the  distribution  of  the  Pa- 
cific Islands  taken  from  Germany.  These  are,  of  course, 
not  "like"  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  the  sense  of  having  a 
similar  purpose;  but  all  are  "regional,"  that  is  geographi- 
cally limited,  and  they  are  "understandings."  In  sub- 
stance they  are  not  only  different  from,  but  are  opposed 


80     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

to,  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  for  the  American  policy  re- 
gards the  "self-determination"  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  as  a  matter  of  interest  to  the  United 
States;  while  these  "understandings"  are  intended  to 
cover  the  agreements  of  foreign  Powers  among  them- 
selves to  divide,  and  occupy,  and  exploit  distant  terri- 
tories, regardless  of  the  will  of  the  inhabitants. 

The  only  intelligible  reason  for  classing  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  a  "regional  understanding"  is  the  assump- 
tion that  it  becomes  an  understanding  through  the  agree- 
ment entered  into  with  the  signatories  of  this  Covenant. 
There  must,  however,  be  a  purpose  in  using  the  general 
expression  "regional  understandings";  which  is  plainly 
intended  to  include  an  entire  class  of  agreements,  all  of 
which  are  recognized  as  being  of  equal  validity  and  lying 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  Covenant. 

It  is,  therefore,  desirable  to  know  precisely  what  "re- 
gional understandings,"  other  than  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
are  here  included,  and  at  the  same  time  who  originated 
this  new  and  undefined  expression  which  might  so  ob- 
viously be  applied  to  "understandings"  of  a  private  and 
even  secret  nature  to  which  attention  has  been  called. 

It  is,  of  course,  not  overlooked  that,  in  Article  XVIII, 
it  is  provided  that  "Every  convention  or  international 
engagement  entered  into  henceforth  by  any  member  of 
the  League  shall  be  forthwith  registered  with  the  Secre- 
tariat"; and,  in  Article  XX,  it  is  agreed  that  "this  Cove- 
nant is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  obligations  or  under- 
standings inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
thereof,  and  the  members  solemnly  undertake  that  they 
will  not  hereafter  enter  into  any  engagements  inconsis- 
tent with  the  terms  thereof." 

At  first  sight  these  provisions  seem  to  render  nuga- 


DISILLUSIONMENT  81 

tory  all  secret  "understandings"  between  the  members  of 
the  League.  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  no  obliga- 
tion is  accepted  to  abrogate  any  "understanding"  unless 
it  is  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  the  Covenant;  but,  in 
Article  XXI,  it  is  declared  that  "Nothing  in  this  Covenant 
shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  validity  of"  the  class  of  in- 
ternational engagements  therein  named,  "such  as  arbitra- 
tion treaties  and  regional  understandings."  This  pro- 
vision, therefore,  it  might  be  contended,  excludes  such 
"understandings"  from  registration,  abrogation,  and  pro- 
hibition in  the  future.  It  is,  in  effect,  a  ratification  of  all 
"regional  understandings."  It  might  even  be  held  that, 
since  their  validity  is  expressly  declared  not  to  be  af- 
fected by  anything  in  the  Covenant,  it  exempts  them  from 
arbitration,  unless  perhaps  with  reference  to  a  dispute 
about  one  of  the  terms  of  the  understanding.  It  has 
not,  I  believe,  been  pretended  that  China,  for  example, 
could  through  the  League  of  Nations  compel  Japan  to 
arbitrate  her  claims  in  Shantung.  There  would  be  at 
least  three  Powers  in  the  Council  which  would  deny  the 
appeal,  and  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  having  refused  even  to  hear  China's 
protest,  would  support  the  demand  for  arbitration. 

It  may  be  said  that  Article  X  is  an  adequate  protec- 
tion of  international  rights,  because  it  pledges  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  "to  respect  and  preserve  as  against 
external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity"  of  all  mem- 
bers of  the  League.  We  see,  however,  how  utterly  in- 
effective this  provision  is  in  the  case  of  a  weak  Power. 
In  May,  19 15,  Japan  presented  her  famous  "Twenty- 
one  Demands."  They  included  the  substitution  of  Japan 
for  Germany  in  Shantung,  the  political  and  economic 
domination  of  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 


32     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

golia,  the  Japanese  control  of  a  most  important  iron  and 
coal  enterprise  in  Central  China,  and  an  engagement  of 
China  not  to  cede  or  lease  to  any  other  Power  any 
part  of  the  coast  of  China.  To  these  demands  China 
was  compelled  to  submit  in  conventions  negotiated  and 
concluded  under  circumstances  of  intimidation  and  du- 
ress, regardless  of  the  sovereign  will  of  the  Republic. 
Other  demands  were  made  and  postponed,  but  not  with- 
drawn. 

At  the  Peace  Conference  China  prayed  for  the  abro- 
gation of  the  notes  of  May,  191 5,  on  the  ground  that 
they  were  violative  of  "the  territorial  integrity  and  po- 
litical independence  of  China,"  and  contradictory  of  what 
have  been  announced  as  the  guiding  principles  of  the 
Peace  Conference.  As  a  distinguished  Chinese  states- 
man has  put  the  case,  "They  constitute  an  injustice  which, 
if  not  righted,  will  cause  so  much  unrest  and  unsettle- 
ment  in  Far-Eastern  politics  as  will,  in  time,  assume  pro- 
portions which  will  have  a  reflex  action  in  Europe  and 
America." 

It  is  now  understood,  and  I  believe  officially  admitted, 
that  a  failure  to  support  the  demands  made  by  Japan 
upon  China  would  have  rendered  doubtful  the  adherence 
of  certain  Powers  to  the  League,  and  perhaps  would  have 
created  an  indisposition  to  form  any  League  at  all.  If 
that  is  the  price  at  which  the  formation  of  this  League 
was  bought,  it  is  not  difficult  to  foresee  what  its  future 
will  be ;  for,  as  a  Chinese  delegate  asked,  in  commenting 
on  a  semi-official  communication  upon  the  attitude  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  in  this  matter:  "What 
reason  is  there  to  assume  that  a  League  of  Nations, 
whose  Covenant  is  created  in  conjunction  with  this  Treaty 
of  Peace,  can  be  depended  on  to  rectify  or  to  reverse  the 


DISILLUSIONMENT  33 

provisions  of  that  treaty?"  He  might  have  added,  par- 
ticularly in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Covenant  itself  ex- 
pressly provides  for  the  exemption  of  "regional  under- 
standings," like  the  Shantung  compacts,  from  the  obli- 
gations of  the  Covenant,  by  affirming  this  exemption  in 
that  document  itself! 

In  this  connection  it  would  be  of  interest  to  know  pre- 
cisely to  what  "regional  understandings"  we  shall  be  com- 
mitting ourselves  if  we  accept  unchanged  Article  XXI  of 
this  Covenant.  And  here  it  is  important  to  note  that, 
until  they  go  into  execution,  these  understandings  will 
probably  remain  secret,  since  there  is  nothing  in  the  Cove- 
nant to  prohibit  this ;  for  they  are  not  formal  treaties  and 
conventions :  they  are  promises  contained  in  conversations 
and  notes  exchanged  in  the  course  of  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence, and,  if  they  are  soon  to  be  executed,  may  not 
even  be  reduced  to  writing.  They  seem,  therefore,  to 
permit  of  unlimited  secret  bargaining. 

As  events  develop,  this  reservation  of  the  validity  of 
"regional  understandings"  in  Article  XXI  may  be  found 
to  have  a  close  connection  with  intended  "mandates"  over 
all  so-called  "backward  countries."  Theoretically,  the 
League  of  Nations  is  to  issue  "Acts  and  Charters"  for 
the  administration  of  these  countries ;  but  practically  they 
will  be  portioned  out  to  the  "Big  Five,"  in  accordance 
with  "understandings"  already  agreed  upon.  A  highly 
competent  publicist,  who  was  in  Paris  during  the  Peace 
Conference  and  in  close  touch  with  important  sources  of 
information,  reports  as  a  matter  of  general  knowledge, 
that  a  private  agreement  was  reached  in  a  personal  con- 
ference of  delegates  in  March,  191 9,  in  Paris,  to  the  effect 
that  the  British,  French  and  Japanese  Governments  would 
support  one  another  in  all  questions  relating  to  Asia  and 


34     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

would  jointly  approve  of  Japan's  claims  in  Shantung,  as 
in  fact  they  had  already  agreed  to  do.  This  "under- 
standing" regarding  "all  Asia,"  he  reports,  was  reached 
between  the  completion  of  the  first  draft  of  the  Covenant 
and  the  revision  of  it,  which  resulted  in  the  addition  of 
Article  XXI  regarding  "regional  understandings." 

With  Russia  disintegrated,  the  Ottoman  Empire  dis- 
membered and  apportioned  to  European  Powers,  and 
China  left  without  independence,  it  is  noteworthy  that 
the  whole  of  Asia  becomes  a  field  for  unimpeded  foreign 
exploitation.  India,  Siam,  and  Hedjaz  are  voting  States 
in  the  Assembly  of  the  League,  but  all  of  them  are  al- 
ready under  the  control  of  Great  Britain  alone  or  jointly 
with  France.  Persia  is  the  only  other  Asiatic  State  in- 
vited to  become  an  adherent  of  the  League,  and  since 
the  collapse  of  Russia,  the  British  "sphere  of  interest" 
in  Persia  has  become  unlimited.  Italy  is  demanding  com- 
pensation in  Asia,  and  when  it  is  granted,  four  of  the 
five  permanent  members  of  the  Council  will  have  a  com- 
munity of  interest  in  the  "regional  understandings"  such 
as  Article  XXI  renders  valid  and  exempts  from  all  the 
obligations  of  the  Covenant. 

But  this  is  not  the  whole  import  of  Article  XXI.  If, 
appealing  to  the  protection  of  Article  X,  any  country 
likely  to  be  subjected  to  these  "understandings"  should 
seek,  as  China  has  done,  to  protect  itself  against  en- 
croachment, any  one  of  the  aggressors,  under  the  rule  of 
unanimity  in  the  Council,  could  object  that  intervention 
was  unwarranted,  and  if  any  other  member  of  the 
League,  actuated  by  sympathy  or  even  by  an  adverse  in- 
terest, should  then  go  to  war  to  prevent  the  aggression, 
that  nation  would  find  itself  violating  the  Covenant,  and 
thereby  at  war  with  the  League. 


DISILLUSIONMENT  85 

Before  adopting  this  Covenant,  the  reason  for  the  ref- 
erence in  it  to  "regional  understandings"  should  be  fully 
explained;  and,  above  all,  this  article  should  not  be  al- 
lowed to  take  its  place  there  under  the  cover  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  which  is  designed  to  protect  the  self-de- 
termination of  free  nations,  and  has  been  coupled  with 
the  Golden  Rule  as  summing  up  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States. 


II 

THE   UN-AMERICAN    CHARACTER    OF   THE   LEAGUE 

I  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm  that  this  Covenant  does  not 
embody  the  ideals  for  which  American  jurists  have  been 
working  for  a  generation.  It  does  not  unreservedly  adopt 
International  Law  as  a  standard  of  conduct,  but  its  own 
"understandings";  that  is,  its  own  policies.  It  contains 
no  declaration  of  rights,  and  the  members  are  not  bound 
by  any  statement  of  judicial  principles.  It  not  only  does 
not  accept  International  Law,  it  deliberately  abrogates 
it.  There  are  to  be  henceforth  no  "neutral  rights," — 
rights  for  which  this  Republic  throughout  its  history  has 
constantly  stood,  and  in  which  it  has  at  times  found  its 
safety.  In  this  League  sovereign  States  are  no  longer 
equal.  Most  of  them  are  distinctly  subordinated  to  the 
five  Great  Powers.  These  are  to  act  with  preponderant 
force  in  their  own  interest.  As  the  Honorable  Elihu 
Root  has  pointed  out,  this  Covenant  does  not  build  on 
the  historical  development  of  International  Law  or  of 
judicial  procedure.  He  justly  says :  "Instead  of  perfect- 
ing and  putting  teeth  into  the  system  of  arbitration  pro- 
vided for  by  the  Hague  conventions,  it  throws  those  con- 
ventions on  the  scrap  heap."  Those  conventions  needed 
nothing  to  render  them  effective  except  an  aggreement 
to  defend  them  as  law;  and  yet  this  Covenant  makes  no 
reference  to  them,  and  offers  no  substitutes  for  them. 
The  result  is  that  the  Covenant  as  it  stands  neither  makes 

3« 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      37 

provision  for  International  Law  nor  for  a  judicial  court. 
The  Council  itself  is  to  decide  between  nations  and  claims 
the  right  to  coerce  them;  but,  in  Mr.  Root's  language, 
"Its  function  is  not  to  decide  upon  anybody's  right." 

As  I  have  said  elsewhere,1  no  one  can  carefully  ex- 
amine this  Covenant  without  discerning  that  it  is  the  work 
of  politicians  and  not  the  work  of  jurists.  They  have 
created  an  organ  of  power,  but  not  an  institution  of  jus- 
tice. They  have  not  distinctly  recognized  any  rights,  or 
made  any  provision  for  determining  them  on  judicial 
grounds. 

Only  novices  in  the  history  of  international  arbitration 
are  favorably  impressed  by  the  articles  of  the  Covenant 
dealing  with  that  subject.  Treaties  now  in  force  between 
the  United  States  and  the  most  important  members  of 
the  League,  not  to  mention  others  not  included  in  it, 
not  only  cover  the  whole  ground  contemplated  by  the 
arbitral  provisions  of  the  League,  but  more  specifically 
and  with  more  certainty  regarding  the  standards  of  law 
by  which  judgment  would  be  rendered.  There  is,  there- 
fore, no  advance  made  by  this  League,  absolutely  no  ad- 
vantage to  be  obtained,  so  far  as  the  judicial  settlement 
of  international  disputes  is  concerned.  Mr.  Root,  who 
is  the  leading  American  authority  on  this  point,  has  not 
hesitated  to  say  of  the  Covenant,  "It  puts  the  whole  sub- 
ject of  arbitration  back  where  it  was  twenty-five  years 
ago. 

The  important  fact  in  this  singular  arrest  of  the  normal 
development  of  international  justice  is  not  that,  through 
possible  oversight,  there  have  been  omissions,  but  that  the 
omissions  were  deliberately  made  in  opposition  to  noti- 
fied dissent  from  the  first  draft  of  the  League  as  proposed 
*  Present  Problems  in  Foreign  Policy,  p.  120. 


38     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

by  the  Conference.  An  amendment  on  this  subject  pre- 
pared by  Mr.  Root  was  endorsed  by  the  American  So- 
ciety of  International  Law,  and  other  highly  competent 
bodies  of  jurists  of  a  non-partisan  character,  before  it 
was  sent  to  Paris,  where  it  was  entirely  ignored.  From 
this  fact  the  inference  is  justified  that  the  Conference 
had  no  intention  of  placing  the  League  on  a  juristic  basis, 
or  of  accepting  that  basis  as  an  aim  or  ideal  to  be  realized 
in  the  future.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  force,  not  justice, 
which  was  regarded  as  the  foundation  of  this  association 
of  Great  Powers  and  their  proteges. 

As  a  result,  it  is  made  difficult  for  some  of  the  small 
States,  and  among  them  the  most  truly  democratic,  to 
become  members  of  the  League,  without  renouncing  their 
most  sacred  traditions.  Take,  for  example,  the  case 
of  Switzerland,  a  republic  surrounded  by  powerful 
neighbors  who  have  been  almost  always  involved  in  con- 
troversies and  frequently  in  war.  In  order  to  assure  her 
existence  as  an  independent  sovereign  State,  Switzerland 
has  adopted  the  policy  of  complete  neutrality;  and,  at 
her  own  request,  has  long  been  recognized  in  the  public 
law  of  Europe  not  only  as  a  neutral  but  as  a  legally 
neutralized  State.  This  is  essential  to  the  existence  of 
the  Swiss  Confederation,  and  this  little  Republic  not 
only  desires  to  continue  this  neutrality  but  is  prepared 
to  defend  it  with  force  of  arms,  as  it  did  during  the 
Great  War. 

No  small  State  can  regard  without  alarm,  or  at  least 
without  apprehension,  a  combination  of  Great  Powers, 
such  as  this  League  would  be,  claiming  the  right  of  co- 
ercion, especially  economic  coercion,  unless  that  combi- 
nation is  based  frankly  and  explicitly  upon  International 
Law  as  a  standard  of  conduct,  a  declaration  of  rights 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      39 

as  a  guarantee  of  juristic  equality,  and  itself  subject  to 
a  tribunal  of  justice  not  under  ex  parte  control.  These 
conditions  are  not  fulfilled  by  the  proposed  Covenant  of 
a  League  of  Nations,  which  is  a  military  corporation 
under  the  control  of  five  Great  Powers. 

It  may,  of  course,  be  said  that  the  founders  of  this 
League,  no  matter  what  it  omits,  or  however  defective  it 
may  seem,  are  sincerely  aiming  at  what  is  right,  and 
especially  at  peace.  This  is  not  a  time  for  impugning 
the  motives  of  any  of  these  Powers.  They  are  such  as 
may  be  expected  to  operate  at  the  close  of  a  terrible 
war,  when  all  the  contestants  are  exhausted,  are  desirous 
of  peace,  and  most  of  all  anxious  to  come  out  of  the 
war  with  the  greatest  advantages  attainable  and  the  few- 
est disadvantages. 

Obviously,  such  a  time  is  not  the  most  auspicious  for 
a  general  reconstruction  of  the  world.  The  situation  of 
necessity  involves  two  opposite  points  of  view,  with  many 
national  divergences  of  interest.  In  making  a  concrete 
peace  there  are  the  victors  and  the  vanquished.  They 
cannot  possibly  see  things  alike.  Unless  the  peace  is 
made  a  peace  of  victory,  and  not  merely  a  peace  of  com- 
promise, the  whole  moral  value  of  the  war  is  lost. 

Instead  of  this,  the  prospect  of  a  compromise  peace 
has  been  steadily  before  the  eyes  of  Germany.  Defeat 
has  never  been  accepted  and  is  now  denied  by  Germany. 
An  opportunity  for  immediate  national  rehabilitation — 
so  it  is  represented — was  offered  by  the  fourteen  rubrics 
of  peace  set  forth  by  the  President  of  the  United  States 
as  a  pledge  to  a  government  of  the  German  people.  In 
this  Germany  professes  to  have  been  deceived.  She  also 
is  now  beginning  to  speak  of  "scraps  of  paper." 

But  we  must  face  the  facts  as  they  have  been  created : 


40     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

an  impenitent,  self-deceived,  and  revengeful  Germany;  a 
triumphant  Britain,  coming  out  of  the  war  with  her  losses 
all  behind  her,  and,  if  the  United  States  will  aid  in  de- 
fending her  scattered  possessions,  with  nothing,  apart 
from  domestic  troubles,  but  the  prospect  of  increased  im- 
perial gam  and  power  ahead;  a  sorrow-stricken  France, 
desolated,  fearful  of  the  revived  strength  of  a  powerful 
neighbor,  but  glorious  in  her  tribulations,  and  victori- 
ous in  her  fight  for  life;  an  Italy  in  part  reintegrated, 
her  great  persecutor,  Austria-Hungary,  dismembered,  a 
Slav  rival  creeping  toward  the  Adriatic  after  much  suf- 
fering and  bitter  disappointment;  a  Russia  disorganized 
and  demoralized;  and  between  this  demented  giant  and  a 
hostile  Germany,  Poland  still  uncertain  of  her  fate. 

There  is  probably  no  thoughtful  man  in  the  United 
States  who  does  not  believe  and  desire  that  some  im- 
provement in  international  relations  and  some  new  se- 
curity for  the  peace  of  the  world  should  result  from  the 
experience  of  the  Great  War. 

While  the  desire  to  prevent  such  a  catastrophe  has, 
no  doubt,  been  greatly  strengthened  by  our  recent  ex- 
perience, it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  this  purpose  is 
not  entirely  the  product  of  this  struggle.  Among  the 
misfortunes  which  the  beginning  of  hostilities  brought 
upon  the  world  one  of  the  most  serious  was  the  inter- 
ruption of  plans  for  the  better  understanding  of  gov- 
ernments and  the  better  organization  of  international 
justice.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  historic  con- 
tinuity of  this  development  has  been  broken,  that  the  gen- 
eral movement  in  the  direction  of  international  organiza- 
tion has  been  given  over  almost  entirely  to  a  few  gov- 
ernments, and  that  the  effort  to  establish  a  new  world 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      41 

order  has  been  subordinated  to  the  exigencies  of  a  neces- 
sarily punitive  peace. 

The  obligations  of  the  Covenant  distinctly  involve  war. 
When  the  contingencies  involving  it  arrive,  ex-President 
Taft  asserts,  Congress  will  have  no  choice  but  to  declare 
it ;  and  there  is  no  means  of  knowing  against  which  Pow- 
ers, or  how  many  Powers,  or  for  what  duration,  it  must 
be  declared,  even  though  no  American  interest  may  be 
affected.  By  this  Covenant  every  war  becomes  a  World 
War,  in  so  far  as  the  obligations  of  the  Covenant  are 
concerned.  Unless  the  Covenant  is  a  mere  illusion  and 
pretense,  the  United  States  would  be  bound  to  partici- 
pate on  one  side  or  the  other — the  Council  would  de- 
termine on  which  side — in  every  Balkan  frontier  quarrel 
involving  a  resort  to  arms;  for,  whatever  errors  the 
cartographers  at  Paris  may  make,  under  Article  X  the 
United  States  would  be  pledged  to  "preserve  as  against 
external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  existing 
political  independence  of  all  members  of  the  League." 
Not  only  all  the  newly  formed  States,  but  all  the  sur- 
viving Empires  scattered  over  the  earth,  become  by  this 
article  proteges  of  the  United  States. 

No  one  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  would  have  im- 
agined that  it  could  lead  to  this  result.  Although  the 
oriental  interests  of  Great  Britain  were  vital,  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  on  July  25th,  19 14,  said  to  the  British  am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg :  "I  do  not  consider  that  pub- 
lic opinion  here  would  or  ought  to  sanction  our  going  to 
war  over  a  Serbian  quarrel." 

There  is,  undoubtedly,  one  essential  preliminary  to  a 
free  expression  of  the  mind  of  the  nations,  namely,  an 
actual  state  of  peace.  It  should  be,  moreover,  a  state  of 
peace  that  would  prove  beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt 


42     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

that  there  exists  in  the  world  the  purpose  and  the  power 
to  vindicate  violated  law  and  enforce  just  reparation  for 
injuries  inflicted.  Such  a  state  of  peace  would  involve 
a  victory  already  achieved  and  enforced.  The  power  to 
punish  international  crime  having  been  thus  demonstrated, 
there  would  remain  the  task  of  making  it  evident  not 
only  that  new  attempts  of  a  similar  character  would  be 
futile,  but  that  international  justice  could  be  so  organ- 
ized as  to  offer  protection  to  all  nations  that  were  dis- 
posed to  respect  International  Law,  and  to  secure  the 
punishment  of  those  who  violated  it. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  attempt  to  create  a  League 
of  Nations  as  part  of  a  punitive  peace  settlement  should 
fail  to  embody  the  essential  elements  of  a  general  So- 
ciety of  States.  Inevitably  the  formation  of  such  a 
League,  at  such  a  time,  would  be  limited  to  those  nations 
which  were  in  a  state  of  hostility  to  the  Powers  upon 
which  the  peace  was  to  be  imposed.  It  would  be  designed 
chiefly  as  an  agency  for  enforcing  and  executing  a  peace 
with  those  Powers.  It  would  therefore  render  difficult 
the  adhesion  of  small  States,  unwilling  to  abandon  their 
neutrality  lest  they  endanger  their  own  future,  and  would 
take  the  form  of  a  defensive  alliance  for  the  mutual  pro- 
tection of  its  members  against  the  possible  aggression  of 
outsiders. 

It  is  indisputable  that  the  League  of  Nations  created 
at  Paris  by  five  Great  Powers  and  a  subordinate  group 
of  small  nations,  for  various  reasons  subject  to  their 
influence,  is  a  limited  association  of  this  kind. 

It  is  openly  asserted,  as  a  reason  for  forming  this 
League,  that  it  is  necessary  to  the  enforcement  and  ex- 
ecution of  the  terms  of  peace  imposed  upon  Germany ;  and 
in  order  to  render  it  serviceable  in  this  respect,  the  Cove- 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      43 

nant  of  the  League  has  been  intentionally  and  deliberately 
so  interwoven  with  the  Treaty  of  Peace  that  they  are 
declared  to  be  inseparable.  The  effect  of  this  upon  the 
small  States  who  are  neighbors  of  Germany  is  already 
apparent.  They  have  been  requested  to  join  in  rendering 
effective  the  economic  boycott  of  Germany  in  case  of  her 
further  resistance.  How  could  they  be  expected  to  com- 
ply with  this  demand  without  incurring  the  risk  of  Ger- 
many's future  hostility  ?  They  have  found  their  right  to 
remain  neutral,  hitherto  unquestioned  and  generally  ap- 
proved, virtually  repudiated  and  denied  by  the  demand 
that  they  commit  acts  of  war  against  a  powerful  neigh- 
bor in  the  interest  of  the  League.  To  them  this  neces- 
sarily seems  like  impressment  into  a  service  which  they 
would  esteem  it  dangerous  to  undertake,  and  a  forerun- 
ner of  what  their  fate  might  be,  if  by  compliance  they 
exposed  themselves  to  the  enmity  of  a  neighbor  powerful 
enough  to  injure  them  vitally,  or  if  on  the  other  hand  by 
refusal  they  incurred  the  penalties  which  the  League 
might  inflict  upon  them.  The  situation  of  Denmark  and 
Sweden  is  thus  evidently  rendered  precarious ;  but,  in  the 
case  of  Switzerland,  a  strict  neutrality  is  absolutely  es- 
sential to  her  very  existence,  for  her  population  is  com- 
posed of  four  different  races,  each  one  subject  to  the 
constant  influence  as  well  as  to  the  possible  hostility  of 
neighbors  of  the  same  race  and  language  between  whom 
they  would  have  to  choose.  Clearly,  the  only  safe  policy 
of  the  Confederation  is  to  maintain,  against  all  counsel 
to  the  contrary,  the  strict  neutrality  which  a  permanently 
neutralized  State  should  preserve. 

It  is  equally  indisputable  that  the  center  of  gravity 
in  this  League  of  Nations  is  to  be  found  in  the  mutual 
guarantee  by  all  the  members  of  one  another's  territorial 


44     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

integrity  and  existing  political  independence,  as  expressed 
in  Article  X  of  the  Covenant.  In  brief,  the  League  is 
in  its  essence  a  defensive  alliance  of  a  limited  group  of 
Powers  against  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Upon  this  point  some  comments  are  necessary. 

First  of  all,  this  guarantee  extends  far  beyond  any 
compact  or  purpose  with  which  the  Entente  Powers  en- 
tered into  the  war;  and  still  further  beyond  any  reason 
for  entering  into  it,  or  any  decision  formally  taken  con- 
cerning it,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  The  reason 
for  our  going  to  war  with  Germany  was  officially  de- 
clared to  be  that  the  Imperial  German  Government  had 
created  a  state  of  war  with  the  United  States  by  re- 
peated and  brutal  violations  of  International  Law,  which 
it  was  intended  by  that  government  to  continue.  The 
cause  of  our  entrance  into  the  war  being  these  violations 
of  our  legal  rights  as  a  nation,  our  object  in  the  war 
was  to  make  our  rights  respected.  The  one  clear  duty  of 
the  treaty-making  power  in  concluding  peace  with  Ger- 
many, therefore,  is  to  secure  this  result.  Whatever  is 
necessary  to  this  end  is  evidently  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  our  representatives  in  making  peace.  If  it  is  neces- 
sary to  cooperate  with  our  co-belligerents  in  order  to 
impose  upon  Germany  such  restraints  as  will  render  her 
incapable  of  renewing  her  designs,  that  also  is  within 
their  jurisdiction;  but  the  purpose  with  which  the  United 
States  engaged  in  the  war  should  unquestionably  deter- 
mine the  jurisdiction  of  its  spokesmen  in  making  peace. 
Although  there  is  no  formal  compact  with  the  Entente 
Allies,  there  is  a  common  interest  and  a  common  obli- 
gation to  render  Germany  incapable  of  repeating  her 
crimes;  but  it  would  be  difficult  to  show  that  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  States  are  called  upon  to  dictate 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN       45 

terms  to  nations  with  which  we  have  not  been  at  war,  or 
have  the  legal  or  moral  right  to  destroy  their  territorial 
integrity,  to  administer  its  fragments,  or  to  impose  pen- 
alties in  no  way  connected  with  the  issues  which  made 
us  participants  in  the  war. 

The  League  of  Nations,  as  proposed,  includes  not  only 
obligations  not  related  to  the  reasons  for  engaging  in 
the  war  but  also  obligations  opposed  to  the  traditions, 
the  time-honored  policies,  and  even  the  constitutional  pro- 
visions of  the  United  States.  It  commits  the  whole  future 
policy  of  this  country  to  the  decisions  of  an  interna- 
tional body  in  which  it  would  have  only  a  single  voice; 
it  permits  that  body  to  intrude  its  judgments,  and  thereby 
its  policies,  into  a  sphere  hitherto  regarded  as  exclusively 
American;  and,  in  addition,  it  demands  that  the  terri- 
tories held  by  each  of  the  members  of  this  League  under 
this  treaty,  no  matter  how  obtained,  how  ruled,  or  what 
violence  may  be  done  to  the  self-determination  of  peoples 
within  them, — including  territories  containing  whole  pop- 
ulations separated  from  their  kindred  and  liable  at  any 
time  to  be  reclaimed  by  the  nations  from  which  they 
are  sundered, — shall  receive  the  permanent  protection  of 
the  United  States  as  integral  parts  of  the  nations  that 
now  claim  them. 

Article  X  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  might,  per- 
haps, appropriately  be  applied  to  the  protection  of  the 
strictly  self -governed  peoples,  if  further  menaced  by  the 
common  enemy;  but  the  Covenant  does  not  stop  with 
such  a  clear,  defensible,  and  single  purpose.  It  extends 
to  all  territorial  possessions,  however  acquired;  and  not 
only  this,  but  to  circumscriptions  of  territory  made  by 
the  arbitrary  decree  of  three  or  four  powers,  regardless 
of  the  wishes  or  affinities  of  the  populations.     Such  al- 


46      AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

lotments  of  territory,  once  consecrated  by  the  treaty,  are 
unalterable  so  long  as  any  one  member  of  the  Council 
objects  to  change.  It  is  almost  needless  to  affirm  that 
such  provisions,  wholly  beyond  the  aims  and  contentions 
of  the  war,  as  engaged  in  by  the  United  States,  are  in 
contradiction  to  every  policy  and  every  principle  hitherto 
known  as  American. 

To  give  color  to  this  departure  from  all  that  can  be 
characterized  as  American,  this  League  attempts  to  shift 
the  burden  of  executing  and  enforcing  the  terms  of  peace 
from  the  shoulders  of  the  victorious  Entente  Powers  to 
what  professes  to  be  "a  general  association  of  nations," 
but  which  in  reality  is  merely  a  small  group  of  Great 
Powers  so  organized  as  to  control,  and  if  necessary 
to  coerce,  the  small  States  drawn  within  its  circle  of 
power.  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say,  that  such  an  enterprise 
not  only  oversteps  the  legal  jurisdiction  of  those  who 
have  been  engaged  in  it,  but  is  clearly  beyond  the  con- 
stitutional prerogatives  of  the  treaty-making  power  of 
the  United  States;  whose  authority  does  not  extend, 
and  without  imperial  assumptions  in  contradiction  to  the 
principle  of  government  as  founded  on  the  consent  of 
the  governed  cannot  be  made  to  extend,  to  the  issuing 
of  "special  Acts  and  Charters"  for  the  rule  of  peoples 
with  whom  our  Government  has  not  been  at  war,  under 
a  wholly  imaginary  lex  regia  which  the  American  people 
have  condemned  by  revolution  as  intolerable  to  them- 
selves and  unjust  to  all  men. 

To  render  the  mask  of  democracy  in  the  pursuit  of 
this  imperial  programme  as  complete  as  possible,  it  has 
seemed  necessary  to  call  in  as  co-partners  other  nations 
less  plainly  influenced  by  imperial  purposes.  It  is,  how- 
ever, demonstrable  that  the  additions  to  this  corporation 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      47 

for  international  control  add  nothing  to  its  real  strength, 
vitality,  authority,  or  claim  to  universality.  It  would  be 
provocative  of  mirth  to  pretend  that  any  new  legal  au- 
thority is  acquired  by  this  League  through  the  accession 
of  such  potentialities  as  Siam,  which  England  and  France 
have  in  past  years  reduced  to  practical  vassalage;  Hed- 
jaz,  made  up  of  nomads  of  the  desert,  from  whom  Great 
Britain  has- evoked  the  semblance  of  a  new  State;  or  even 
of  the  accessions  to  international  dignity  whose  foreign 
affairs  have  always  been,  and  still  are,  directed  from 
London,  as  parts  of  the  British  Empire;  and  the  same 
may  be  said  of  Haiti,  Honduras,  Liberia,  and  Nicaragua, 
which  also  serve  to  fill  out  the  proportions  of  this  League 
of  Nations.  By  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  can  this 
group  of  Powers  be  identified  with  the  Society  of  States. 
It  is,  in  truth,  a  coalition  of  five  Great  Powers  and  their 
humble  adherents  who  await  their  decisions.  To  this  it 
must  be  added  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  how,  without 
changes  so  radical  that  they  would  amount  to  a  total 
reconstruction,  this  League  could  ever  develop  into  such 
a  general  society. 

The  great  obstacle  is  that  the  League  is  designed,  if 
the  claim  of  its  sponsors  is  to  be  credited,  primarily  as 
an  instrument  to  enforce  a  punitive  peace  upon  Ger- 
many. If  this  profession  is  sincere,  how  can  those  who 
have  not  wished  to  enter  the  list  of  antagonists  to  Ger- 
many consistently  enter  into  this  League?  Among  the 
States  invited  to  enter  into  it  are  the  Argentine  Re- 
public, Chile,  Colombia,  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  Nor- 
way, Paraguay,  Persia,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and 
Venezuela.  Why  should  these  States,  any  of  them,  hav- 
ing remained  neutral  during  the  war,  change  their  policy 
now,  abandon  their  neutrality,  and  repudiate  their  past, 


48     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  upon  Germany  penalties 
which  they  have  had  no  part  in  inflicting  by  hostility 
during  the  war?  Is  it  not  evident  that  the  addition  of 
such  States  at  this  time  would  be  only  so  much  added 
insincerity  in  the  composition  of  the  League, — the  brav- 
ery that  injures  only  when  the  object  of  it  is  already 
powerless  ? 

It  is  extremely  doubtful  if  there  will  be  any  real  growth 
of  the  League  in  military  strength  or  international  au- 
thority so  long  as  its  most  conspicuous  object  is  to  punish 
Germany.  That  task,  just  and  righteous  as  it  is,  is  not 
one  that  invites  new  recruits.  As  it  is  pictured,  it  is  one 
from  which  even  the  victors,  after  a  long  delay,  may 
tend  more  and  more  to  recoil.  Already  English  writers 
who  were  advanced  leaders  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  are  displaying  much  more  than  apathy  at  the  thought 
of  executing  during  a  long  term  of  years  the  articles  of 
peace.  At  some  time  the  war,  and  even  the  expiation  of 
its  crimes,  must  have  an  end.  "We  were  supposed  to 
fight  against  militarism  and  to  intend  devising  construc- 
tive and  reconciling  substitutes  for  it,"  writes  an  ardent 
anti-German  Englishman.  "The  world  now  suggested 
to  us,"  he  continues,  "is  to  be  based  on  militarism,  and 
on  nothing  else  for  a  long  term  of  years.  .  .  .  Yet  the 
actual  force  which  alone  could  sustain  it  never  will  be 
available  for  the  period  contemplated.  There  is  the  con- 
spicuous vice  of  this  nominal  settlement.  It  piles  in- 
ordinate weight  upon  a  floor  which  in  any  case — having 
in  view  the  whole  democratic  tendency  of  our  time — 
would  be  liable  to  collapse  of  itself.  .  .  .  Tribute  running 
for  years  to  more  thousands  of  millions  will  be  a  per- 
manent incitement  to  unrest,  protest,  conspiracy,  to  inter- 
national agitation  and  intrigue." 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      49 

However  we  may  envisage  our  duty  in  this  matter, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Mr.  Garvin  has  here  stated  the 
truth,  and  it  is  very  solemn  truth. 

We  started  out  to  destroy  militarism.  The  Confer- 
ence at  Paris  has  created  a  situation  in  the  name  of 
peace  that  positively  necessitates  military  force,  and  the 
League  of  Nations  is  organized  to  supply  it.  That  is 
why  the  adherence  of  America  is  represented  to  be  neces- 
sary. The  purpose  of  the  League  is  to  enforce,  not 
law,  but  peace;  but  there  can  never  be  any  lasting  peace 
without  justice,  there  can  never  be  any  justice  without 
the  rule  of  law,  and  there  can  never  be  any  law  that 
will  be  respected  until  the  nations  say,  "Peace  or  no 
peace,  we  stand  for  law  and  will  both  observe  and  de- 
fend it." 

The  President  professes  that  this  Covenant  is  to  sup- 
port and  execute  International  Law.  This  is  nowhere 
declared  in  the  Covenant.  The  Conference  at  Paris  de- 
clined to  commit  itself  to  a  general  conference  to  formu- 
late or  revise  International  Law;  and,  as  I  have  shown 
elsewhere,  it  abolishes  whole  sections  of  it  as  it  now 
stands.1 

It  will  not  do  for  the  possessing  nations,  the  beati  possi- 
dentes,  to  say  we  will  enforce  peace  without  law ;  yet  five 
Great  Powers,  or  less,  propose  to  rule  the  world  and  to 
coerce  other  nations  according  to  their  own  decisions. 

I  have  said  "five  Great  Powers,  or  less,"  because  while 
the  alleged  purpose  of  the  League  and  its  origin  as  a 
war  expedient  are  liable  to  affect  its  growth,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  note  that  there  is  also  a  possibility  of  its  arrested 
development,  and  even  its  early  dissolution.  Provision 
has  already  been  made — but  not  quite  ingenuously — for 
1  Present  Problems  in  Foreign  Politics,  pp.  125,  133. 


50     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

withdrawal  from  it ;  which  would  hardly  be  the  case  if  it 
were  really  a  well-conceived  and  wholly  unobjectionable 
Society  of  States. 

It  cannot  be  maintained  that  either  Italy  or  Japan  has 
any  great  affection  for  the  League,  or  any  deep  sense 
either  of  gratitude  to  it  or  confidence  in  it.  Gratitude  is 
wanting,  because  wishes  dear  to  these  nations  have  been 
denied;  and  confidence  is  wanting,  because  they  know 
that  the  professed  principles  upon  which  the  League  was 
to  be  founded  have  been  already  violated,  in  order  to  re- 
tain their  adherence.  There  are  other  nations  that  will 
be  even  less  satisfied  with  the  decisions  made  at  Paris. 
China  finds  it  impossible  to  accept  the  peace  with  Ger- 
many, because  it  has  refused  justice  to  that  Republic. 
Germany,  Russia,  Turkey,  and  Bulgaria  are  not  to  be 
at  once  admitted,  and  may  never  be  included.  In  fact, 
at  its  beginning,  only  a  little  more  than  one-third  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Europe  will  be  comprised  in  this  League, 
and  many  countries,  even  if  disposed  to  join  it,  will  be 
confronted  with  serious  obstacles  to  adhering  to  it  at  any 
time,  so  long  as  it  retains  its  present  character.  In  the 
meanwhile  three  new  States,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and 
Jugoslavia,  with  mutual  antagonisms  very  difficult  to 
allay,  and  needing  help  rather  than  able  to  offer  it,  will 
form  the  rope  of  sand  with  which  to  bind  two  giant  neigh- 
bors, Germany  and  Russia,  in  their  efforts  to  combine 
their  strength  in  resistance  to  the  League. 

It  must  in  candor  be  confessed,  since  the  fact  is  open 
to  demonstration,  that  in  organizing  the  League  at  this 
time,  and  in  making  it  the  organ  of  executing  a  peace 
of  victory  over  Germany,  the  Conference  at  Paris  has 
obstructed  rather  than  facilitated  the  organization  of  that 
"general  association  of  nations"  which  it  was  desirable, 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      51 

under  auspicious  conditions,  to  organize  for  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  peace  and  administering  justice.  Unless 
radically  altered,  the  League  will  stand  in  history  as  an 
attempt  to  preserve  peace  on  a  basis  of  power,  rather 
than  on  a  basis  of  law  and  justice,  by  centering  control 
in  a  few  dominant  Great  States,  every  one  of  which,  by 
entering  into  this  compact,  will  subordinate  the  princi- 
ples of  democracy  and  adopt  in  practice  the  principles 
of  imperialism. 

It  would  be  futile  to  deny  the  imperial  character  of 
this  League.  Its  authors  proudly  declare  it.  If  this  char- 
acterization seems  offensive  to  us,  it  is  not  at  all  so  to 
its  British  supporters.  General  Smuts,  who,  with  the 
aid  of  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  is  its  principal  author,  ex- 
pressly declares,  that  it  "is  modeled  on  the  British  Em- 
pire, including  its  crown  colonies  and  protectorates." 
"The  two  systems,"  he  adds,  "closely  resemble  each 
other";  and  he  asserts,  "Where  the  British  Empire  has 
been  so  eminently  successful  as  a  political  system,  the 
League,  working  on  somewhat  similar  lines,  could  not 
fail  to  achieve  a  reasonable  measure  of  success."  He 
goes  further,  and  bases  the  rights  of  the  League  on  the 
fact  that  it  is  "the  successor  to  the  empires" ;  which  can 
only  mean  that,  having  overthrown  them,  the  victors,  the 
surviving  empires,  have  full  authority  to  rule  them  in 
their  own  way,  as  Great  Britain  rules  her  crown  colonies, 
and  as  she  once  ruled  America. 

I  am  offering  no  gratuitous  or  hostile  criticism  of  the 
British  Empire  as  such.  I  am  merely  pointing  out  a  fact, 
a  fact  rendered  indisputable  by  the  highest  authority,  re- 
garding the  nature  and  purpose  of  this  League. 

If  this  fact  is  of  any  interest  to  us,  it  lies  in  the  dif- 
ferent conception  which  we  have  in  America  regarding 


52     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

the  nature  of  political  authority,  as  embodied  in  our  Con- 
stitution and  entertained  by  most  of  our  people.  We  con- 
sider that  government  is  founded  on  rights  inherent  in 
the  people  who  establish  it  and  live  under  it,  and  that 
it  has  no  authority  except  as  it  emanates  from  them.  A 
free  people  may  rightly  constitute  a  State,  which  then 
becomes  itself  a  possessor  of  rights  in  its  relation  to  other 
States,  because  it  is  an  institution  for  the  protection  of 
rights.  If  it  is  not  an  expression  and  embodiment  of  a 
people's  rights,  it  is  merely  an  expression  and  embodi- 
ment of  power. 

The  British  Empire  is  not  based  on  these  conceptions. 
Its  statesmen  speak  of  "liberty,"  but  liberty  in  Great 
Britain  has  never  been  held  to  be  a  natural  inherent  per- 
sonal attribute.  That  is  an  American  doctrine,  and  we 
made  a  revolution  to  establish  it.  The  British  Parlia- 
ment rules  whole  nations  against  their  will,  in  its  own 
interest,  nations  which  have  no  representatives  in  it.  An 
omnipotent  Parliament,  restrained  by  no  law,  has  under 
its  control  and  rules  under  its  laws  more  than  one- fourth 
of  the  population  of  the  earth,  scattered  over  every  quar- 
ter of  the  globe,  without  representation  in  its  govern- 
ment. 

The  proposed  League  of  Nations  claims  to  be  pat- 
terned on  this  model.  I  am  not  here  opposing  the  British 
Empire,  or  questioning  the  beneficence  of  its  rule.  What 
I  wish  to  emphasize  is,  that  a  League  of  Nations  con- 
structed in  imitation  of  it,  and  on  its  principles,  does  not 
embody  the  ideals  of  America.  Such  a  League  is  by 
definition  an  organ  of  power  and  not  an  institution  of 
justice.  It  operates  by  the  will  of  a  superior.  It  is  es- 
sentially a  super-government,  the  work  of  a  Supreme 
Council. 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      53 

This  League  can,  in  perfect  harmony  with  its  princi- 
ples, issue  "special  Acts  and  Charters"  for  the  govern- 
ment of  distant  nations  who  have  no  voice  in  their  own 
government.  This  is  what  England  has  always  done, 
and  now  continues  to  do,  and  intends  always  to  do.  At 
one  time  the  King,  in  his  own  name,  personally  issued 
such  "Acts  and  Charters"  to  colonists  in  America.  The 
British  people,  having  taken  over  the  power  of  the  King, 
now  exercise  it  in  the  same  way  all  over  the  world.  The 
fact  is  recognized  by  Englishmen.  They  are  deeply  con- 
scious that  this  system  is  un-American.  A  writer  in 
"The  New  Europe"  is  much  troubled  about  it.  He  is 
anxious  that  Liberalism  be  "maintained  at  home  and  ex- 
plained abroad."  "In  Dublin,  in  Cairo,  in  Calcutta,"  he 
says,  "a  new  chapter  of  our  historic  essay  in  govern- 
ment is  being  opened,  and  the  manner  of  its  writing  will 
have  a  profound  influence  not  only  upon  our  own  im- 
perial future,  but  upon  the  relations  of  Britain  and  Amer- 
ica throughout  the  twentieth  century." 

Is  this  a  time,  when  the  best  thought  in  Great  Britain 
is  looking  forward  and  American  conceptions  are  tri- 
umphing even  there,  for  America  to  enter  into  an  im- 
perial partnership?  Confessedly,  this  League  is  imperial 
in  its  origin,  its  nature,  and  its  aims.  It  may  mean  well, 
it  may  intend  to  strive  for  justice,  but  for  justice  only  in 
an  imperial  sense.  It  may  consider  itself  benevolent,  and 
may  even  speak  of  "sacrifice  for  the  good  of  humanity" ; 
but  can  any  one  appeal  to  the  history  of  the  British 
Empire  as  a  conspicuous  example  of  national  sacrifice? 

It  will  be  said,  no  doubt,  the  British  Empire  is  ready 
to  enter  into  this  League  on  the  same  footing  as  its  part- 
ners. Is  it  so?  What  has  Great  Britain  given  up?  And 
what  new  responsibility  does  she  assume?    She  gets  the 


54      AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

German  colonies  under  a  mandate  of  the  League  just  as 
effectively  as  if  they  were  taken  by  direct  annexation. 
There  is  no  disposition  on  her  part  to  abandon  her  su- 
premacy on  the  sea.  There  are  reasons  why  we  should 
not  demand  it,  for  we  comprehend  Britain's  need  for  de- 
fense; but  if  we  did  exact  it,  we  know  she  would  not 
under  any  conditions  make  this  sacrifice.  In  addition, 
she  demands  the  recognition  of  five  of  her  dependencies, 
whose  foreign  affairs  she  controls,  and  which  she  will 
control  in  all  decisions,  as  members  of  the  Assembly  on 
a  plane  of  equality  with  the  United  States. 

Why,  in  the  presence  of  these  concessions,  should 
America  sacrifice  any  of  her  ideals?  Why  should  the 
League,  if  it  is  to  exist,  be  on  the  plan  of  the  British 
Empire,  and  not  on  the  plan  of  our  American  ideals? 
If  we  are  to  get  nothing  out  of  this  League  but  ideals, 
why  should  we  not  at  least  have  the  ideals?  Is  it  that 
the  others  will  not  let  us  have  them?  Then  why  should 
we  be  the  chief  sponsors  of  this  League? 

But,  in  addition,  we  are  told  that  it  is  our  duty  to 
make  "sacrifices."  Shall  we  not  be  permitted  to  judge 
what  sacrifices  we  are  prepared  to  make?  I  cannot  see 
that  it  is  our  duty  to  make  any  sacrifice  of  our  princi- 
ples. I  cannot  see  with  what  justice  we  can  be  asked 
either  to  participate  in  a  new  corporate  imperialism,  or 
to  defend  the  surviving  empires,  or  to  subordinate  our 
conception  of  the  rule  of  law  to  a  rule  of  force.  The 
American  people,  League  or  no  League,  will  know  in 
each  case  what  their  duty  is,  and  they  may  be  trusted 
to  perform  it. 

I  do  not  for  a  moment  question  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  in  the  task  of  enforcing  the  terms  of  a  just  peace 
upon  a  common  enemy;  but  I  do  question  the  justice 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      55 

of  demanding  that  the  United  States  abandon  its  distinc- 
tive policies,  which  mean  no  harm  to  any  one,  and  dedi- 
cate its  powers  to  the  enforcement  of  peace  everywhere 
in  the  world,  regardless  of  our  interests  or  responsibility. 
I  doubt,  for  reasons  already  stated,  if  a  combination  in- 
tended primarily  for  the  enforcement  of  a  particular 
peace  can  ever  become  a  true  Society  of  States  without 
the  adoption  of  very  definite  standards  of  law,  such  as 
this  Covenant  does  not  contain,  which  would  give  confi- 
dence to  all  nations,  the  weak  and  the  small  as  well  as 
the  great,  that  strict  justice  will  be  accorded  them;  and 
for  this  they  must  have  a  part  in  the  making  of  the  law 
which  this  League  does  not  accord  to  them.  Organized 
as  this  League  is,  every  new  adherent  must  recognize  that 
entrance  into  it  implies  submission  to  an  order  of  power 
rather  than  protection  by  an  institution  of  justice.  It  is 
an  organization  for  central  control  by  a  few  Great  Pow- 
ers, to  be  exercised  in  secret,  without  a  definite  body  of 
International  Law  as  a  standard  to  which  the  powerful 
as  well  as  the  weak  must  conform,  and  without  a  court 
where  the  rights  of  States  may  be  openly  adjudicated 
upon  just  and  equal  terms,  uninfluenced  by  the  prepon- 
derant force  or  the  particular  policies  of  dominant  and 
imperial  Powers.  I  think  it  is  fair  to  ask  the  question, 
What  hope  is  there,  under  this  League,  as  now  organized, 
that  the  Republic  of  China,  for  example,  can  seek  and 
obtain  a  judicial  decision  that  the  League  would  enforce 
upon  the  question  whether  that  republic  has  the  right 
to  demand  the  immediate  return  of  property  and  territory 
taken  away  by  force?  If  there  is  no  hope  of  this,  then 
the  Conference  at  Paris  and  its  heir,  the  League,  must 
accept  the  tremendous  handicap  of  being  an  unjust  judge. 
It  is  desirable  for  American  citizens  to  divest  their 


56     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

minds  of  illusions  regarding  the  nature  and  significance 
of  this  League.  If  it  accomplishes  what  many  of  its 
advocates  expect  of  it,  it  will  have  an  enormous  task  be- 
fore it.  It  will  have  not  only  to  enforce  the  execution 
of  the  peace  imposed  upon  Germany,  which  is  a  proper 
task,  but  to  end  the  numerous  little  wars  now  in  operation 
in  Europe.  As  an  organ  of  power  rather  than  an  insti- 
tution of  justice,  it  will  be  challenged,  as  every  dominant 
form  of  force  is  challenged,  because  it  assumes  to  com- 
mand and  control.  If  it  cannot  do  this  effectively  and 
in  a  just  manner,  it  will  become  an  object  of  derision. 
Nothing  can  save  it  but  a  change  of  purpose;  and  America 
is  the  only  Power  that  can  effect  this  change,  because 
America  is  the  only  Power  that  is  working  solely  for 
the  victory  of  international  ideals. 

The  issue  then  assumes  this  form:  Shall  the  treaty- 
making  power  of  the  United  States  accept  the  League 
of  Nations  as  it  is,  or  avail  itself  of  its  opportunity  to 
embody  in  it  some  at  least  of  the  saving  qualities  which 
it  lacks? 

The  chief  objection  to  adopting  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  as  it  now  stands  is  its  fundamentally  un-Ameri- 
can character.  It  does  not  embody  our  traditional  Ameri- 
can ideals.  The  influences  that  are  trying  to  force  its 
adoption  unchanged  are  partisan  and  not  frankly  and 
freely  American.  The  influences  that  demand  changes 
are  American  rather  than  partisan;  and  they  are  able 
to  state  why  they  demand  changes  and  precisely  what 
changes  they  demand. 

It  cannot,  I  think,  be  denied  that,  if  the  formation 
of  the  League  had  been  undertaken  at  another  time, 
wholly  apart  from  the  exigencies  of  a  punitive  peace,  it 
would  have  assumed  a  different  character,  it  would  have 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      57 

emphasized  institutions  of  justice  rather  than  organs  of 
power;  and  if  the  Entente  had  already  completed  its  task, 
and  vindicated  the  inviolability  of  the  innocent  and  the  au- 
thority of  law,  a  permanent  organization  of  justice  would 
have  been  an  easier  achievement. 

Our  plain  duty  as  a  nation  is  to  embody  in  this  treaty 
our  highest  American  ideals.  It  cannot  be  admitted  that 
a  Supreme  Council  of  Four,  sitting  in  secret  as  this  Coun- 
cil has  sat,  can  write  a  document,  and  say  to  the  ad- 
visory half  of  the  constitutional  treaty-making  power 
of  the  United  States:  "This  must  be  signed  at  once, 
and  as  it  is  written." 

Senator  Knox,  whose  service  in  the  cabinet  of  three 
Presidents  adds  to  his  authority  in  such  matters,  has  pro- 
posed to  separate  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
from  the  treaty  of  peace,  in  order  that  each  may  be  con- 
sidered upon  its  merits.  Under  ordinary  circumstances, 
nothing  would  be  regarded  as  more  normal,  more  reason- 
able, or  more  prudent;  but  in  this  case,  there  has  been 
a  deliberate  purpose  to  prevent  the  separate  discussion 
of  these  questions. 

Two  objections  have  been  raised  to  Senator  Knox's 
proposal.  The  chief  one  is  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  "acting  in  his  own  name  and  by  his  own 
proper  authority,"  should  alone  decide  into  what  foreign 
obligations  the  Republic  should  enter,  regardless  of  the 
advice  of  the  Senate,  which  it  is  thought  impertinent  for 
the  Senators  to  insist  upon,  since,  it  is  alleged,  they  can 
be  actuated  only  by  partisan  motives,  from  which  the 
President  is  entirely  free.  The  other  objection  is  the 
pretense  that  without  prompt  action  the  United  States 
would  be  left  alone  at  war  with  Germany,  and  unable 
to  resume  trade  relations  with  her,  while  the  Entente 


58      AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Allies  are  enjoying  this  advantage!  The  first  of  these 
objections  I  have  sufficiently  characterized  elsewhere. 
The  second  is  too  hysterical  to  deserve  an  answer. 

It  is  true  that  the  whole  world  is  anxious  for  peace, 
and  that  it  should  not  be  unnecessarily  retarded.  Im- 
pressed by  this,  and  recognizing  the  desirability  of  some 
kind  of  international  association,  another  American 
statesman  of  unsurpassed  qualification,  has  thought  it 
possible  immediately,  without  extended  debate,  to  indi- 
cate the  conditions  upon  which  the  United  States  might 
safely  try  the  experiment  of  a  League.  If,  in  the  cir- 
cumstances, it  is  to  be  a  choice  between  a  modification 
of  this  League  and  no  understanding  at  all,  Mr.  Root 
thinks  it  worth-while  to  secure  a  permanent  center  of 
discussion  and  conciliation,  where  an  interchange  of  views 
may  be  had,  in  the  hope  of  ultimately  organizing  those 
international  arrangements  which,  as  a  jurist,  he  deems 
essential  to  justice  as  well  as  to  peace. 

He,  therefore,  states  very  clearly  his  objections  to  the 
Covenant  of  the  League,  as  presented  for  ratification,  in 
the  following  comments: 

"Nothing  has  been  done  to  provide  for  the  reestab- 
lishment  and  strengthening  of  a  system  of  arbitration 
or  judicial  decision  upon  questions  of  legal  right.  Noth- 
ing has  been  done  toward  providing  for  the  revision  or 
development  of  International  Law.  In  these  respects, 
principles  maintained  by  the  United  States  without  varia- 
tion for  half  a  century  are  still  ignored,  and  we  are 
left  with  a  programme  which  rests  the  hope  of  the  world 
for  future  peace  in  a  government  of  men  and  not  of 
laws,  following  the  dictates  of  expediency,  and  not  of 
right.  Nothing  has  been  done  to  limit  the  vast  and 
incalculable  obligation  which  Article  X  of  the  Covenant 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      59 

undertakes  to  impose  upon  each  member  of  the  League 
to  preserve  against  external  aggression  the  territorial 
integrity  and  political  independence  of  all  members  of 
the  League  all  over  the  world. 

"The  clause  authorizing  withdrawal  from  the  League 
on  two  years'  notice  leaves  a  doubt  whether  a  mere 
charge  that  we  had  not  performed  some  international 
obligation  would  not  put  it  in  the  power  of  the  Council 
to  take  jurisdiction  of  the  charge  as  a  disputed  question 
and  keep  us  in  the  League  indefinitely  against  our  will. 

"The  clause  which  has  been  inserted  regarding  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  erroneous  in  its  description  of  the 
doctrine  and  ambiguous  in  meaning.  Other  purely  Amer- 
ican questions,  as,  for  example,  questions  relating  to 
immigration,  are  protected  only  by  a  clause  apparently 
empowering  the  Council  to  determine  whether  such  ques- 
tions are  solely  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States.  I  do  not  think  that  in  these  respects  the 
United  States  is  sufficiently  protected  against  most  in- 
jurious results  which  are  wholly  unnecessary  for  the 
establishment  and  maintenance  of  this  League  of  Na- 
tions." 

There  is,  however,  Mr.  Root  finds,  a  great  deal  of  high 
value  in  the  Covenant  which  the  world  ought  not  to  lose. 
In  order  to  preserve  this  for  future  development,  he 
formulates  as  follows  the  reservations  which  the  United 
States  ought  to  make : — 

"The  Senate  of  the  United  States  advises  and  con- 
sents to  the  ratification  of  the  said  treaty  with  the  fol- 
lowing reservations  and  understandings  to  be  made  a  part 
of  the  instrument  of  ratification,  viz. : 

"(i)  In  advising  and  consenting  to  the  ratification  of 
the  said  treaty  the  Senate  reserves  and  excludes  from  its 


60     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

consent  the  tenth  article  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  as  to  which  the  Senate  refuses  its  consent. 

"(2)  The  Senate  consents  to  the  ratification  of  the 
said  treaty,  reserving  Article  X  aforesaid,  with  the  un- 
derstanding that  whenever  two  years'  notice  of  with- 
drawal from  the  League  of  Nations  shall  have  been  given, 
as  provided  in  Article  I,  no  claim,  charge  or  finding 
that  international  obligations  or  obligations  under  the 
Covenant  have  not  been  fulfilled,  will  be  deemed  to  render 
the  two  years'  notice  ineffectual  or  to  keep  the  Power 
giving  the  notice  in  the  League  after  the  expiration  of 
the  time  specified  in  the  notice. 

"(3)  Inasmuch  as,  in  agreeing  to  become  a  member 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  the  United  States  of  America 
is  moved  by  no  interest  or  wish  to  intrude  upon  or  in- 
terfere with  the  political  policy  or  international  admin- 
istration of  any  foreign  State,  and  by  no  existing  or 
anticipated  dangers  in  the  affairs  of  the  American  con- 
tinents, but  accedes  to  the  wish  of  the  European  States 
that  it  shall  join  its  power  to  theirs  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  general  peace,  the  Senate  consents  to  the  ratifi- 
cation of  the  said  treaty,  excepting  Article  X  aforesaid, 
with  the  understanding  that  nothing  therein  contained 
shall  be  construed  to  imply  a  relinquishment  by  the  United 
States  of  America  of  its  traditional  attitude  toward 
purely  American  questions,  or  to  require  the  submis- 
sion of  its  policy  regarding  questions  which  it  deems 
to  be  purely  American  questions  to  the  decision  or  recom- 
mendation of  other  Powers." 

These  reservations  (1)  reject  Article  X,  which  the 
Honorable  Charles  E.  Hughes  promptly  pointed  out  as 
"a  trouble-breeder,"  because  as  a  nation  composed  of  citi- 
zens derived  from  many  different  nationalities,  we  can- 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      61 

not  accept  an  obligation  that  would  involve  our  entering 
into  the  contentions  of  different  races  over  their  national 
boundaries  and  the  permanent  retention  of  previously 
conquered  or  arbitrarily  annexed  peoples,  thus  exciting 
by  our  participation  in  distant  quarrels  civil  strife  in 
our  own  composite  population.  (2)  They  retain  the 
right  of  withdrawal  without  restraint,  if  the  United 
States  does  not  approve  of  the  conduct  of  the  League. 
And  (3)  they  safeguard  purely  American  questions  from 
control  or  interference  by  the  League.  In  effect,  they 
are  necessary  to  save  our  country  from  a  hopeless  state 
of  division  on  vital  issues. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  Mr.  Root's  proposed  reser- 
vations change  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  League,  so 
far  as  American  ideals  are  concerned.  They  substitute 
for  the  idea  of  central  control  the  idea  of  inherent  rights 
in  the  member  States  which  they  may  reserve  from  the 
League's  authority. 

If  these  reservations  were  adopted,  with  the  unre- 
stricted right  of  withdrawal,  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
would  approximate  the  character  of  a  written  Entente, 
providing  a  mechanism  for  consultation  and  discussion, 
with  a  prospect  of  making  it  an  agreement  to  defend  In- 
ternational Law  rather  than  a  compact  for  the  defense 
of  existing  empires. 

As  to  the  technique  of  the  procedure,  Mr.  Root  is  on 
sure  ground.  Treaties  have  often  been  thus  changed  by 
the  Senate,  and  the  result  has  usually  been  of  national 
benefit.  The  second  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  was  far  bet- 
ter than  the  first,  and  the  negotiation  of  it  was  not  diffi- 
cult. Reservation  is  a  well-established  procedure  which 
affects  only  the  nation  resorting  to  it,  and  does  not  alter 
the  obligations  entered  into  by  other  nations  as  between 


62     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

themselves.  It  has  never,  I  believe,  been  questioned  in 
any  international  document  where  complete  sovereignty 
was  the  necessary  postulate  of  the  act. 

The  reservation  made  by  Virginia  in  ratifying  the 
Federal  Constitution,  which  is  alleged  to  have  proved  in- 
operative to  secure  the  right  of  secession,  has  been  cited 
to  show  that  such  a  reservation  would  be  invalid;  but  it 
is  wholly  irrelevant,  both  in  form  and  in  principle.  The 
Virginia  reservation  reads :  "The  powers  granted  under 
the  Constitution  being  derived  from  the  People  of  the 
United  States  may  be  resumed  by  them  whensoever  the 
same  shall  be  perverted  to  their  injury  or  oppression," 
but  "the  People  of  the  United  States"  never  decided  that 
the  powers  granted  by  them  under  the  Constitution  had 
been  "perverted  to  their  injury  or  oppression."  The  for- 
mation of  the  Constitution  was  not  an  international  act; 
it  was  the  formation  of  a  national  government  by  "the 
People  of  the  United  States." 

One  might  very  consistently  add  to  Mr.  Root's  reser- 
vations a  refusal  to  take  any  part  in  the  exercise  of  the 
composite  sovereignty  assumed  by  this  Covenant  in  pro- 
posing to  issue  "special  Acts  and  Charters"  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  parts  of  dismembered  empires,  particularly 
of  those  with  which  the  United  States  has  never  been 
at  war.  Article  XXII,  it  is  true,  has  been  so  phrased  as 
to  require  only  those  to  act  under  a  mandate  "who  are 
willing  to  accept  it" ;  but,  it  would  appear,  the  American 
member  of  the  Council  is  expected  to  take  part  in  deter- 
mining by  a  sovereign  act  "the  degree  of  authority,  con- 
trol or  administration  to  be  exercised"  by  those  who  re- 
ceive the  mandates  of  the  League  over  peoples  not  living 
under  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  No  imperial  vice- 
roy has  ever  exercised  greater  power  than  this.     If  the 


THE  LEAGUE  UN-AMERICAN      63 

United  States  Senate  decides  to  ratify  this  Covenant  with- 
out any  reservation  on  this  point,  the  problem  will  arise, 
by  what  authority  will  the  American  member  of  the  Coun- 
cil exercise  this  imperial  function? 

Can  it  be  held  that  the  Senate  has  no  power  to  make 
a  reservation  on  this  point?  If  it  cannot  be  allowed  to 
make  it,  and  this  Covenant  binds  the  United  States  to 
the  exercise  of  powers  for  which  the  Constitution  makes 
no  provision,  over  peoples  not  subject  to  its  laws,  and 
living  in  territory  not  under  its  jurisdiction,  either  by 
purchase,  conquest,  or  cession,  it  is  of  high  importance 
to  examine  more  closely  into  a  scheme  for  control  that 
secures  "equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce 
of  members  of  the  League,"  as  Article  XXII  of  the  Cove- 
nant provides,  but  does  not  accord  them  to  any  nation 
not  a  member  of  this  close  imperial  corporation. 

Although  the  United  States  is  invited  to  share  in  the 
imperial  syndicate  organized  under  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  it  finds  itself  confronted  with  "re- 
gional understandings"  on  the  part  of  some  of  its  mem- 
bers which  have  in  advance  already  apportioned  the 
most  important  mandates  among  themselves.  These  "en- 
gagements," as  we  have  seen,  are  all  explicitly  exempted 
from  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  by  Article  XXI, 
which  covers  them  with  its  sanction. 

If  the  interests  of  the  United  States  are  to  be  fully 
protected,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  accept  as  an  offset  to 
this  provision  the  exemption  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
from  the  control  of  the  League ;  for  this  purely  American 
policy  is  not  a  "regional  understanding"  and  carries  no 
economic  implications  as  these  understandings  do,  since 
they  establish  economic  "spheres  of  influence"  which  are 


64     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

meant  to  be  commercially  exclusive  under  the  guise  of 
political  protectorates. 

There  is,  therefore,  good  ground  for  still  another  res- 
ervation by  the  United  States,  declaring  that  it  does  not 
commit  itself  under  this  Article  to  recognize  exclusive 
economic  "spheres  of  influence"  through  "regional  under- 
standings" regarding  undeveloped  countries. 

Finally,  it  should  not  be  overlooked  that  the  principle 
of  making  reservations  is  explicitly  recognized  in  the 
Covenant  itself  by  the  provisions  of  Article  XXI,  which 
exempts  certain  "engagements,"  "treaties,"  and  "under- 
standings" from  the  obligations  of  the  Covenant.  It 
would,  therefore,  be  unreasonable  to  object  to  other  res- 
ervations, especially  when  these  are  necessary  to  con- 
form to  constitutional  requirements.  This  has  been  fur- 
ther recognized  in  dealing  with  Swiss  neutrality.1  There 
is,  therefore,  nothing  new  or  irregular  in  the  proposal  of 
reservations  by  the  United  States. 
1  See  Document  VI  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


Ill 

THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY  TO  THE  SENATE 

On  October  6,  19 18,  Germany,  abandoned  by  her  allies, 
beaten  and  broken,  sued  for  an  armistice,1  in  the  hope  of 
negotiating  peace  on  terms  which  had  been  proposed  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States. 

Strict  compliance  with  those  terms,  if  construed  as 
Germany  expected  them  to  be  construed,  would  have  ad- 
mitted her  to  the  Peace  Conference  after  the  Kaiser's 
abdication,  as  a  negotiator  in  her  own  right  and  entitled 
to  equal  membership  in  "a  general  association  of  nations," 
to  be  formed  for  the  purpose  of  affording  to  her,  as 
to  other  States,  "mutual  guarantees  of  political  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity."  2 

In  the  United  States  there  arose  a  loud  protest  against 
treating  Germany,  even  under  a  democratic  disguise,  as  a 
Power  entitled  to  negotiate  peace  upon  equal  terms  with 
those  she  had  attacked.  It  was  believed,  and  it  has  since 
been  established  beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt,  that 
Germany  sought  peace  only  because  she  was  incapable 
of  further  military  action,  that  the  armistice  should  be 
granted  only  after  unconditional  surrender,  and  that  a 
severe  punitive  peace  should  be  imposed  upon  a  nation 
that  had  broken  its  solemn  pledges,  assaulted  its  neigh- 
bors without  provocation,  and  violated  ruthlessly  the 
laws  of  war. 

1  See  Document  II,  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 
'  See  Document  I. 

65 


66     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

While  accepting  the  President's  fourteen  rubrics  of 
peace  as  a  nominal,  but  essentially  indefinite,  basis  of 
peace-making,  the  Entente  Allies,  believing  that  the  mili- 
tary situation  should  be  more  controlling  than  any  the- 
ory of  peace,  drew  the  terms  of  the  armistice  in  a  man- 
ner that  compelled  the  German  forces  to  confess  the 
military  impotence  to  which  they  had  been  reduced.  To 
all  who  were  familiar  with  the  European  situation,  it  was 
at  once  evident  that  the  definitive  formulation  of  the 
terms  of  peace  at  Paris  would  proceed  upon  the  basis 
of  fact  evidenced  by  the  armistice,  and  not  at  all  in  con- 
formity with  the  President's  plan  of  a  peace  without  vic- 
tory embodied  in  the  fourteen  points. 

The  President  himself,  although  but  vaguely  aware  of 
the  obstacles  to  be  overcome  in  evolving  out  of  the 
situation  a  peaceful  Europe,  was  convinced  that  nothing 
short  of  American  participation  in  the  peace  settlement 
could  maintain  the  authority  of  the  fourteen  points. 
Given  the  part  the  United  States  had  taken,  under  the 
spontaneous  inspiration  of  the  people,  in  bringing  the 
war  to  a  successful  termination,  and  the  importance  to 
the  Entente  Allies  of  continued  American  aid,  he  be- 
lieved that,  if  he  could  centralize  in  his  own  hands  the 
whole  force  and  influence  of  America,  he  could  practi- 
cally dictate  the  process  of  peace-making  at  Paris  and 
thus  be  able  to  direct  the  future  of  Europe  and  of  the 
world. 

That  the  action  the  President  had  in  view  was,  to 
his  mind,  in  the  interest  of  permanent  peace,  no  fair- 
minded  man,  I  believe,  can  reasonably  doubt.  He  was, 
it  may  be  conceded,  actuated  by  a  desire  to  achieve  what 
he  considered  an  incalculable  human  benefit.  But  in  the 
execution  of  his  purpose  he  trusted  neither  Europe  nor 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY     67 

America.  His  obsession  was  that  he,  and  he  only,  could 
accomplish  the  result.  It  was  not  to  be  obtained  by  ar- 
gument, by  discussion,  or  by  any  other  means  than  ac- 
tion. He  alone  could  bring  to  bear  the  motives  and 
exert  the  influence  which  would  constrain  the  other- 
wise refractory  Powers  to  accept  conditions  which  would 
achieve  universal  and  perpetual  peace.  The  pacific  as- 
pirations of  the  liberated  peoples,  the  methods  of  democ- 
racy, and  the  lessons  of  the  war,  were  not,  he  thought, 
of  themselves  to  be  counted  on  to  produce  the  desired 
result.  No  general  discussion  would  be  profitable.  No 
public  exchange  of  views  was  necessary.  Only  one  course 
was  practicable.  This  was  for  him  personally  to  go  to 
Europe  and  personally  to  control  the  negotiations.  To 
accomplish  this,  it  was,  however,  important  that  he  should 
be  in  a  position  to  claim  complete  and  undivided  author- 
ity, in  the  name  of  the  United  States,  to  grant  or  to 
withhold  whatever  concession,  aid,  or  influence  might 
be  found  necessary  to  induce  compliance  with  his  pro- 
posals. This  monopoly  of  power,  he  believed,  he  would 
not  possess,  unless  the  constitutional  provisions  for 
treaty-making  were  rendered  inapplicable  by  his  control 
of  his  partner,  the  Senate,  in  the  treaty-making  process. 
If  it  could  be  made  apparent  that  he,  as  President,  alone 
represented  the  united  will  and  resources  of  the  Ameri- 
can people,  if  a  Congress  could  be  elected  composed  of 
persons  belonging  to  his  own  political  party,  and  con- 
trolled by  him,  then  it  would  be  understood  in  Europe, 
and  would  have  to  be  admitted  at  home,  that  the  Presi- 
dent, singly  and  alone,  possessed  a  mandate  to  express 
the  will  of  the  American  people  and  to  act  without  re- 
striction on  their  behalf. 

What  I  wish  at  this  point  to  emphasize  is,  that  while 


68     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

claiming  to  repudiate  the  methods  of  the  old  diplomacy, 
that  is,  of  pressure  and  bargaining,  it  was  upon  pre- 
cisely this  procedure  that  the  President  meant  to  rely. 
The  Entente  Allies,  who  had  with  American  assistance 
completely  vanquished  Germany,  were  to  surrender  a  part 
of  their  victory  in  the  interest  of  future  peace.  A  re- 
formed and  democratized  Germany  was  to  be  received  in 
good  faith,  after  certain  renunciations,  into  the  "general 
association  of  nations,"  and  the  Entente  Allies  were  to 
make  in  their  turn  certain  renunciations  as  the  basis 
of  peace  and  good  understanding;  such,  for  example,  as 
the  surrender  of  Great  Britain's  claim  to  maritime  su- 
premacy, which  the  President  thought  was  a  contradic- 
tion of  "the  freedom  of  the  seas,"  and  the  inclusion  of 
Germany  in  the  League  for  mutual  protection,  which, 
however  offensive  to  France  after  the  treatment  she  had 
received  from  Germany,  would  secure  to  her  the  protec- 
tion of  the  League. 

It  was,  of  course,  understood  by  the  President  that 
the  Entente  Allies  would  not  be  inclined  to  make  these 
renunciations  voluntarily;  and  that,  in  order  to  secure 
them,  strong  pressure  must  be  exerted.  This  could  be 
done  only  in  case  the  influence  of  America  were  brought 
to  bear  upon  them  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it  clear 
that  her  continued  support  could  not  be  expected  unless 
these  renunciations  were  conceded.  In  brief,  the  United 
States,  the  President  thought,  by  exerting  its  influence, 
as  the  holder  of  the  balance  of  power,  could  produce  a 
situation  in  Europe  which  would  control  the  decisions 
of  all  the  nations,  and  thus  enable  peace  to  be  organ- 
ized upon  a  permanent  basis. 

The  theory  was  superficially  plausible.  The  victors 
in  the  war,  without  America's  support,  were  at  the  time 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY     69 

of  the  armistice  little  better  off  than  the  vanquished.  The 
opportunity  for  control  seemed  great.  History  did  not 
record  an  occasion  for  diplomacy  more  attractive  to 
a  lover  of  power,  who  could  so  readily  answer  every 
suggestion  of  personal  ambition  by  pointing  to  the  glori- 
ous ideal  of  peace.  No  nation  could  resist  the  force 
of  such  an  appeal.  If  governments  opposed  it,  then  it 
would  be  the  end  of  governments.  A  new  order  would 
take  their  place,  as  it  had  already  done  in  Russia. 

The  chance  for  exercising  the  preponderant  influence 
of  the  United  States  in  forcing  compliance  with  the  four- 
teen points  was  imperiled  by  the  possibility  of  Germany's 
unconditional  surrender.  If  that  happened,  the  victory 
of  the  Entente  Allies  would  be  so  complete  that  no  com- 
promise would  be  possible.  The  victors  would  themselves, 
in  that  case,  dictate  a  punitive  peace,  and  the  occasion 
for  enforcing  upon  them  any  plan  by  diplomatic  pres- 
sure would  have  passed. 

The  negotiations  for  an  armistice,  therefore,  presented 
a  delicate  situation.  In  the  United  States,  there  was  a 
strong  demand  for  unconditional  surrender,  but  the  Pres- 
ident did  not  desire  that.  On  October  23,  19 18,  he 
had  succeeded  in  preventing  it.  On  that  day  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  addressed  the  following  note  to  a  defeated 
Germany :  "Having  received  the  solemn  and  explicit  as- 
surance of  the  German  Government  that  it  unreservedly 
accepts  the  terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  his  address  to 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  on  the  8th  of  Janu- 
ary, 19 18,  and  the  principles  of  settlement  enunciated  in 
his  subsequent  addresses,  particularly  the  address  of  the 
27th  of  September,  and  that  it  desires  to  discuss  the  de- 
tails of  their  application  and  that  this  wish  and  purpose 
emanate  not  from  those  who  have  hitherto  dictated  Ger- 


70     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

man  policy  and  conducted  the  present  war  on  Germany's 
behalf,  but  from  Ministers  who  speak  for  the  majority 
of  the  Reichstag  and  for  an  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  German  people;  .  .  .  the  President  of  the  United 
States  feels  that  he  cannot  decline  to  take  up  with  the 
Governments  with  which  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  associated  the  question  of  an  armistice." 

Before  the  proposal  of  an  armistice  had  been  formally 
submitted  to  the  Entente,  the  President's  fourteen  rubrics 
of  peace  had  been  thus  accepted  by  Germany.  They  were 
the  pivot  upon  which  the  question  of  an  armistice  had 
been  made  to  turn.  Whatever  the  terms  of  the  armistice 
itself,  even  though  involving  an  absolute  surrender,  there 
was  thus  imposed  one  condition  that  affected  the  process 
of  negotiating  peace, — the  President's  influence  in  the 
Peace  Conference,  as  interpreter  of  his  proposals,  had 
been  secured.  It  was  only  a  question  of  a  little  time  when 
the  great  diplomatic  opportunity  would  be  ripe,  and  im- 
mediate preparation  to  utilize  it  was  undertaken. 

The  near  approach  of  a  congressional  election  gave 
the  President  an  opportunity  to  inquire  of  the  people 
whether  or  not  they  wished  to  give  him  carte  blanche 
at  the  coming  Peace  Conference.  A  fair  way  to  ascer- 
tain their  disposition  in  this  regard  would  have  been  to 
propose  some  policy  in  definite  terms,  and  to  ask  the 
electors  to  vote  upon  it  on  the  5th  of  November.  But 
the  President  did  not  desire  an  expression  of  the  people's 
will  regarding  a  League  of  Nations  or  any  other  particu- 
lar policy.  What  he  desired  was  that  he  should  ostensi- 
bly be  authorized  to  act  in  any  way  he  might  deem  fit, 
without  responsibility  to  any  one,  and  especially  without 
being  obliged  to  subject  his  personal  plans  to  the  advice 
and  consent  of  a  Senate  which  he  could  not,  as  a  party 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    71 

leader,  confidently  control.  Two  days  after  the  ques- 
tion of  an  armistice  was  virtually  settled,  therefore,  the 
President  took  the  unprecedented  step  of  issuing  the  fol- 
lowing "Appeal  to  the  Electorate  for  Political  Support" : 

"If  you  have  approved  of  my  leadership  and  wish  me 
to  continue  to  be  your  unembarrassed  spokesman  in  af- 
fairs at  home  and  abroad,  I  earnestly  beg  that  you  will 
express  yourselves  unmistakably  to  that  effect  by  return- 
ing a  Democratic  majority  to  both  the  Senate  and  the 
House  of  Representatives.  I  am  your  servant  and  will 
accept  your  judgment  without  cavil,  but  my  power  to 
administer  the  great  trust  assigned  me  by  the  Con- 
stitution would  be  seriously  impaired  should  your  judg- 
ment be  adverse,  and  I  must  frankly  tell  you  so  because 
so  many  critical  issues  depend  upon  your  verdict.  No 
scruple  of  taste  must  in  grim  times  like  these  stand  in 
the  way  of  speaking  the  plain  truth." 

By  large  majorities  the  electors  of  the  United  States 
gave  their  answer.  If  being  an  "unembarrassed  spokes- 
man" depended  upon  this  response,  the  President's  aspi- 
ration for  unlimited  control  of  "affairs  at  home  and 
abroad"  was  denied  by  the  election  of  a  Republican  ma- 
jority in  both  Houses  of  Congress.  Without  impairing 
in  the  slightest  degree  his  power  to  administer  the  great 
trust  assigned  to  him  by  the  Constitution,  the  voters 
openly  and  emphatically  refused  to  grant  him  the  extra- 
constitutional  power  he  had  demanded,  and  in  effect  im- 
pressively reminded  him  that  a  strict  fulfillment  of  his 
duty  to  observe  the  requirements  of  the  Constitution  was 
what  they  desired  and  expected  of  him.  For  the  pur- 
poses of  prosecuting  the  war  both  parties  had  supported 
him  loyally.  The  opposition  party,  though  constantly 
reproached  because  it  was  not  "pro-Administration,"  had 


72     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

united  in  giving  him  grants  of  power  unprecedented  in 
our  history,  and  in  fact  exceeding  those  accorded  to  the 
head  of  any  other  government  engaged  in  the  war.  They 
had  made  the  President  almost  a  dictator. 

How  fully  he  realized  his  dictatorship  was  evinced 
by  the  startling  self-confidence  with  which  the  President 
stated  the  issue.  "The  return  of  a  Republican  majority 
to  either  House  of  Congress  would,  moreover,"  he  de- 
clared, "be  interpretative  on  the  other  side  of  the  water 
as  a  repudiation  of  my  leadership.  It  is  well  understood 
there  as  well  as  here  that  Republican  leaders  desire  not 
so  much  to  support  the  President  as  to  control  him.  .  .  . 
They  would  find  it  very  difficult  to  believe  that  the  voters 
of  the  United  States  had  chosen  to  support  their  Presi- 
dent by  electing  to  the  Congress  a  majority  controlled 
by  those  who  are  not,  in  fact,  in  sympathy  with  the  at- 
titude and  action  of  the  Administration." 

Having  decided  to  demand  this  test,  it  was  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  the  President  meant  to  abide  by  it.  But 
he  did  not  do  so,  either  before  or  after  the  election.  Be- 
fore the  election,  he  endeavored  personally  to  influence 
the  result  by  preventing  the  choice  of  senators  whom  he 
feared  he  could  not  control,  even  though  they  were  Demo- 
crats, and  by  urging  the  choice  of  others, — statesmen  of 
the  type  of  Henry  Ford,  for  example, — whom  he  be- 
lieved he  could  control,  although  they  were  nominally 
Republicans;  and,  after  the  election,  he  assumed  that, 
all  the  same,  he  was  still  an  "unembarrassed  spokesman," 
although,  by  his  own  test,  his  leadership  had  been  plainly 
repudiated.  The  whole  world  then  knew  with  what  it 
had  to  deal.  In  England,  where  statesmanship  is  largely 
governed  by  the  rules  of  honorable  sport,  every  sports- 
man understood  that  the  rules  of  the  game  were  of  small 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    73 

importance  to  Mr.  Wilson;  and  that,  if  he  could  not 
really  win,  he  would  not  be  averse  to  maintaining  that 
he  had  not  actually  lost.  Whatever  happened,  he  could 
be  satisfied  so  long  as  any  chance  was  left  open  to  make 
it  appear  that  he  had  somehow  won.  From  that  mo- 
ment the  course  to  be  pursued  at  Paris  by  Great  Britain 
became  clear.  The  "Constitution  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions" would  be  written  by  General  Smuts,  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  would  accept  it  as  what  he 
came  to  Europe  to  obtain. 

One  other  matter  also  was  made  clear.  Mr.  Wilson 
did  not  really  believe  in  democracy.  When  it  served  him 
he  approved  of  it,  but  when  it  denied  him  what  he  wanted 
he  tried  to  outwit  it.  In  temperament  he  was  an  im- 
perialist. He  wanted  to  enforce  peace  upon  his  own 
terms.  He  should  be  shown  that  peace  could  not  be 
enforced  without  the  sea-power  of  Great  Britain.  If  this 
supremacy  was  incidentally  employed  to  promote  the 
special  interests  of  the  British  Empire,  that  did  not  dimin- 
ish its  value  as  a  means  to  enforce  peace.  Democracy, 
alone  and  unaided,  seldom  enforced  anything,  and  it  was 
only  an  imperialized  democracy  that  could  enforce  its 
will.  Trading  with  Mr.  Wilson  would,  therefore,  be 
easy.  America  had  not  authorized  him  to  issue  any  ulti- 
matum. He  would,  undoubtedly,  take  what  he  could 
get;  and  it  was  forthwith  resolved  that  Great  Britain 
would  give  up  nothing  and  forego  nothing  that  implied 
a  limitation  of  her  imperial  policies. 

That  the  President  openly  repudiated  democracy  when 
he  declined  to  accept  the  result  of  the  test  to  which  he 
had,  in  a  moment  of  arrogance,  unwisely  subjected  him- 
self, was  well  understood  by  all  who  at  the  time  reflected 
upon  his  action,  and  to  many  it  occasioned  no  surprise. 


74     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

He  had,  in  fact,  ceased  to  be  a  democrat.  He  had  more 
than  once  shown  his  contempt  for  that  "common  coun- 
sel" which  in  his  first  electoral  campaign  he  had  empha- 
sized as  democracy's  preeminent  attribute.  He  had  be- 
come a  convert  to  the  idea  of  the  omnipotent  adminis- 
trative State  and  the  uncontrolled  predominance  of  its 
head.  In  combatting  the  Kaiser,  the  President  had  been 
permitted  to  exercise  powers  which  the  German  Em- 
peror had  never  even  claimed.  This  had  been  necessary, 
because  a  war-lord,  to  be  successful,  must  possess  all  the 
war  powers;  and  these  had  been  freely  conferred  upon 
him.  Suddenly  he  found  himself  face  to  face  with  the 
problems  of  peace,  but  failed  to  remember  that  democracy 
has  no  place  for  a  peace-lord. 

Not  being  able  to  obtain  the  control  of  Congress  which 
he  had  demanded,  he  resolved  simply  to  ignore  the  Senate, 
which  it  was  his  constitutional  duty  to  consider  as  a 
partner  in  the  process  of  treaty-making.  The  method  of 
exhibiting  this  disregard  he  had  long  before  worked  out ; 
— the  only  writer,  I  believe,  who  had  distinctly  envisaged 
as  possible  a  deliberate  disregard  of  constitutional  duty, 
which  he  had  suggested  might  be  evaded  even  when  an 
obligation  to  perform  it  could  not  be  denied. 

The  passages  in  the  President's  "Congressional  Gov- 
ernment" here  referred  to  have  been  frequently  cited, 
but  all  their  implications  have  not,  I  think,  been  fully 
realized.     His  comments  are  as  follows: — 

"The  greatest  consultative  privilege  of  the  Senate — 
the  greatest  in  dignity,  at  least,  if  not  in  effect  upon  the 
interests  of  the  country — is  its  right  to  a  ruling  voice  in 
the  ratification  of  treaties  with  foreign  powers.  .  .  . 

"The  President  really  has  no  voice  at  all  in  the  con- 
clusions of  the  Senate  with  reference  to  his  diplomatic 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    75 

transactions,  or  with  reference  to  any  of  the  matters 
upon  which  he  consults  it.  .  .  . 

"He  is  made  to  approach  that  body  as  a  servant  con- 
ferring-with  his  master,  and  of  course  deferring  to  that 
master.  His  only  power  of  compelling  compliance  Ion 
the  part  of  the  Senate  lies  in  his  initiative  in  negotia- 
tion, which  affords  him  a  chance  to  get  the  country  into 
such  scrapes,  so  pledged  in  the  view  of  the  world  to  cer- 
tain courses  of  action,  that  the  Senate  hesitates  to  bring 
about  the  appearance  of  dishonor  which  would  follow 
its  refusal  to  ratify  the  rash  promises  or  to  support 
the  indiscreet  threats  of  the  Department  of  State." 

The  last  paragraph  of  this  citation  speaks  for  itself. 
Although  constitutionally  bound,  it  declares,  under  his 
oath  of  office,  to  respect  the  prerogative  of  the  Senate 
in  offering  its  advice  and  withholding  its  consent  in  the 
making  of  treaties,  the  President  may,  nevertheless, 
"compel  compliance"  with  his  own  views  and  engage- 
ments "by  getting  the  country  into  such  scrapes,"  or  "so 
pledged  in  the  view  of  the  world,"  that  the  Senate  would 
hesitate  to  bring  about  an  "appearance  of  dishonor"  by 
refusing  to  approve  of  the  action  of  the  Executive. 

Did  the  President  deliberately  resort  to  this  method 
when,  in  December,  191 8,  he  went  to  Europe  to  form  a 
League  of  Nations? 

If  he  had  intended  to  pledge  the  country,  in  the  view 
of  the  world,  to  certain  courses  of  action  which  the  Sen- 
ate would  hesitate  either  to'  ratify  or  to  oppose,  he  could 
not  have  pursued  a  course  better  adapted  to  produce  this 
effect  than  the  one  he  adopted.  Neither  the  Senate  nor, 
so  far  as  is  known,  the  President's  own  Cabinet  knew 
precisely  what  he  intended  to  do.  There  are  those  who 
contend  that  he  did  not  know  himself.     The  one  thing 


76     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

certain  is  that  he  did  not  intend  to  seek  any  advice  from 
the  Senate,  either  by  previous  conference  regarding  the 
difficult  problems  of  the  peace  settlement,  or  through  the 
presence  at  Paris  of  one  of  its  members  in  the  Peace  Com- 
mission. Having  opposed  the  selection  of  Senators  by 
the  free  will  of  the  electorate,  in  order  that  he  might  be 
an  "unembarrassed  spokesman  in  affairs  at  home  and 
abroad,"  the  President  announced  to  the  Congress,  in 
his  parting  message  of  December  2,  1918:  "I  welcome 
this  occasion  to  announce  my  purpose  to  join  in  Paris 
the  representatives  of  the  Governments  with  which  we 
have  been  associated  in  the  war  against  the  Central  Em- 
pires for  the  purpose  of  discussing  with  them  the  main 
features  of  the  treaty  of  peace.  I  realize  the  great  in- 
conveniences that  will  attend  my  leaving  the  country,  par- 
ticularly at  this  time,  but  the  conclusion  that  it  was  my 
paramount  duty  to  go  has  been  forced  upon  me  by  con- 
siderations which  I  hope  will  seem  as  conclusive  to  you 
as  they  have  seemed  to  me.  The  Allied  Governments 
have  accepted  the  bases  of  peace  which  I  outlined  to  the 
Congress  on  the  8th  of  January  last,  as  the  Central  Em- 
pires also  have,  and  very  reasonably  desire  my  personal 
counsel  in  their  interpretation  and  application,  and  it  is 
highly  desirable  that  I  should  give  it,  in  order  that  the 
sincere  desire  of  our  Government  to  contribute  without 
selfish  purpose  of  any  kind  to  settlements  that  will  be 
of  common  benefit  to  all  the  nations  concerned  may  be 
made  fully  manifest." 

There  was  here  no  request  for  the  Senate's  approval 
either  of  the  purpose  of  the  President  to  leave  the  coun- 
try and  personally  conduct  the  negotiations  at  Paris  or  of 
the  commissioners  selected  to  accompany  him.  The  cables 
and  the  wireless,  then  just  taken  over  by  the  Govern- 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    77 

ment  and  under  its  control,  would  be  available,  he  said, 
"for  any  counsel  or  service  you  may  desire  of  me" ;  but 
it  was  not  intimated  that  they  would  be  available  for  any 
advice  or  suggestions  to  him  on  the  part  of  the  Senate, 
no  member  of  which  was  invited  to  join  the  mission.  The 
President  plainly  intended  to  present  the  Senate  with 
a  fait  accompli. 

There  was  much  that  was  unusual  in  this  procedure. 
The  retinue  of  the  mission,  it  is  reported,  contained  more 
than  thirteen  hundred  persons,  of  varied  but  undefined 
attainments  in  history,  geography,  ethnology,  cartogra- 
phy, publicity,  finance,  and  the  cryptic  arts  of  suppressing 
and  censoring  news,  not  one  of  whom  enjoyed  the  honor 
of  having  his  name  sent  to  the  Senate  for  the  confirma- 
tion of  his  appointment,  although  the  aim  of  the  expe- 
dition was  so  momentous  a  task  as  the  reorganization  of 
the  world.  Experience  in  international  business,  in  so 
far  as  it  was  represented,  was  conspicuously  subordi- 
nated to  inexperience.  Radical  journalism  was  even  more 
conspicuously  honored.  If  "advisers"  were  present,  it 
was  apparently  not  for  their  "advice"  that  they  were  en- 
rolled in  this  formidable  phalanx  engaged  in  the  re- 
construction of  Europe.  There  was,  however,  an  abun- 
dance of  atmosphere  for  the  creation  and  transmission  of 
"voices  in  the  air." 

No  plenipotentiary  of  any  country  had  ever  been  ac- 
companied by  such  tin  apparatus  for  the  making  of  peace. 
.Bound  by  no  instructions,  restrained  by  no  power  of 
review  or  recognized  control  at  home,  the  President  was, 
as  he  assumed,  "acting  in  his  own  name  and  by  his  own 
proper  authority."  Constitutionally,  he  had  a  partner 
in  the  solemn  process  of  treaty-making,  "by  and  with" 
whose  "advice  and  consent"  he  was  required  to  act  by 


78     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

the  same  charter  of  government  from  which  his  own 
proper  authority  was  derived;  but  this  was  of  little  im- 
portance to  those  with  whom  he  was  to  negotiate,  since 
no  one  could  challenge  his  representative  character. 

The  President's  most  loyal  admirers  and  supporters 
had  questioned  not  only  the  wisdom  but  even  the  le- 
gality of  his  leaving  the  country  for  a  considerable  period 
of  time,  in  the  midst  of  the  serious  domestic  problems 
that  were  looming  up  before  the  country ;  and  great  jour- 
nals devoted  to  himself  and  to  his  policies  urged  him  not 
to  absent  himself  from  Washington  at  such  a  critical 
juncture.  It  was  pointed  out  that  it  was  of  the  utmost 
importance  for  the  President  to  keep  in  close  touch  with 
the  sentiment  of  the  country  as  the  various  steps  in  the 
process  of  peace-making  would  be  brought  under  discus- 
sion, and  public  opinion  would  take  on  sharper  defini- 
tion. Friendly  attention  also  was  called  to  the  fact  that, 
if  "open  covenants"  were  to  be  "openly  arrived  at,"  it 
would  be  wise  for  the  American  commissioners  to  receive 
written  instructions,  in  order  that  they  might  be  held  ac- 
countable for  their  conduct;  and  it  was  made  plain  that 
it  would  lay  the  President  open  to  a  subsequent  charge 
of  practicing  secret  diplomacy  if,  without  intermediaries 
or  public  records  as  a  refutation  of  such  insinuations, 
he  personally  should  undertake,  by  oral  communication 
with  foreign  negotiators,  to  consummate  transactions  in- 
volving the  give  and  take  of  diplomatic  bargaining.  It 
should  never  be  possible,  it  was  maintained,  that  the 
President's  course  could  thus  be  made  a  source  of  future 
embarrassment  to  him  or  to  his  country.  His  aims  should 
be  so  clear  and  constant,  and  so  supported  by  the  utmost 
possible  evidence  of  concurrent  approval  by  his  own  coun- 
trymen qualified  to  judge  of  such  matters,  that  the  coun- 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    79 

try  would  present  a  united  front.  Happily,  the  means 
of  avoiding  future  controversy  were  well  known  and 
already  established  in  the  traditional  usages  and  safe- 
guards of  American  constitutional  practice  in  the  conduct 
of  foreign  affairs. 

While  it  was  true  that  the  American  people  were  di- 
vided as  regards  their  confidence  in  the  President's  per- 
sonal judgment  concerning  international  matters,  in 
which  he  had  so  frequently  failed  to  grasp  the  purport 
of  current  events,  there  was  nowhere,  I  think,  a  dispo- 
sition to  impede  in  any  manner  the  making  of  a  speedy 
and  a  just  peace,  and  it  was  universally  recognized  that 
responsibility  for  this  would  be  largely  his.  The  gen- 
eral thought  of  the  nation  was,  that  the  time  had  come 
to  punish  Germany  for  her  crimes,  to  render  impossible 
a  repetition  of  them  in  the  future  by  immediately  de- 
stroying militarism,  to  open  thereby  a  prospect  of  future 
peace  with  justice  to  all  nations,  and  to  get  back  as  soon 
as  possible  to  normal  life  under  the  Constitution  and  the 
Law  of  Nations.  If  the  expression  "League  of  Nations" 
meant  that, — and  many  thought  it  did, — then  a  League 
of  Nations  was  desired.  If  it  meant  new  wars,  the  sup- 
pression of  self-determination  by  the  small  States,  the 
centralization  of  power  in  a  few  great  nations,  a  secret 
trusteeship  of  others  acting  nominally  for  the  general 
good  but  in  reality  for  their  own  aggrandizement  and 
permanent  control  by  internal  bargaining;  in  short,  if  it 
meant  any  form  of  imperialism,  however  disguised,  and 
above  all  if  national  independence  was  in  any  way  to 
be  surrendered,  these  were  not  the  objects  for  which  the 
war  had  been  fought,  and  that  kind  of  a  League  was  not 
desired.  Nor  was  it  a  common  opinion  that  America's 
part  in  the  war  or  responsibility  for  the  future  of  Eu- 


80     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

rope  were  of  such  proportions  as  to  entitle  the  United 
States  to  dictate  the  terms  of  peace.  The  nations  that 
had  suffered  most  should  take  the  lead  in  determining  the 
kind  of  future  that  would  give  them  the  best  security. 
The  American  people  were  disposed  to  help  them,  and 
above  all  to  be  loyal  to  them,  in  seeing  that  the  common 
enemy  should  not  after  all  be  triumphant  in  the  terms 
of  peace  or  afterward. 

When,  therefore,  Mr.  Wilson  began  his  visits  and 
speech-making  in  Europe,  pleasure  was  at  first  experi- 
enced in  America  in  witnessing  the  honor  shown  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  and  in  the  fact  that  he 
was  so  well  received  in  the  allied  countries.  His  speech 
in  response  to  the  greeting  of  President  Poincare,  at 
Paris,  on  December  14,  1918,  was  admirable,  and  ex- 
pressed with  eloquence  and  propriety  the  sentiments  of 
the  American  people.  In  subsequent  addresses  high  and 
noble  sentiments  were  expressed,  but  it  was  evident  to 
observing  minds  that  these  public  speeches  had  the  ten- 
dency, and  were  apparently  designed,  to  weaken  the  faith 
of  the  people  in  their  own  past  and  to  suggest  a  new  lead- 
ership, which  Mr.  Wilson  himself  might  supply ;  and  this 
was  rendered  still  clearer  when,  after  his  return  to  Amer- 
ica, he  said:  "When  I  speak  of  the  nations  of  the 
world,  I  do  not  speak  of  the  governments  of  the  world. 
I  speak  of  the  peoples  who  constitute  the  nations  of  the 
world.  They  are  in  the  saddle  and  they  are  going  to  see 
to  it  that  if  their  present  governments  do  not  do  their 
will,  some  other  governments  shall.  And  the  secret  is 
out  and  the  present  governments  know  it." 

The  really  dangerous  character  of  the  influence  thus 
exeicised  was  that  Mr.  Wilson  held  out  hopes  which  were 
not  capable  of  being  realized  and  represented  a  state  of 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    81 

things  that  did  not  exist.  The  nations  were,  in  fact, 
very  far  from  that  "communion  of  ideals,"  "unity  of 
command,"  and  "common  understanding"  which  the 
President  attributed  to  them.  What  the  people  really 
needed  was  the  truth,  and  not  "visions  on  the  horizon." 

I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  the  President  was  not  sin- 
cere in  all  he  said  in  those  speeches.  No  one  can  read 
them  without  feeling  their  moral  fervor.  Therein  lay  the 
danger  they  created.  They  awakened  hopes  which  neither 
the  governments  nor  the  people  themselves  were  able  to 
fulfill.  Europe  was  nervous,  hungry,  excited,  impov- 
erished, and  full  of  jealousies.  Mr.  Wilson's  gospel  was 
a  creed  regarding  a  world  to  come.  It  had  all  the  potency 
for  stirring  the  emotions,  and  therein  concealed  all  the 
perils,  of  a  religious  revival.  Many  thought  the  Mes- 
siah had  come.  But  suppose  the  trading  in  the  temple 
should  go  on  unhindered!  "The  Socialist  journalists  in 
France  who  then  hailed  him," — as  an  English  writer  puts 
it, — "as  'he  who  should  have  redeemed  Israel,'  are  now 
venting  their  disappointment  in  unmeasured  language, 
and  speaking  of  him  as  'the  great  vanquished'  and  'the 
fallacious  hope  of  a  day.' " 

On  February  14,  19 19,  the  Constitution  of  a  League 
of  Nations  was  promulgated  at  Paris,  the  work  of  five 
Great  Powers  sitting  in  secret  as  a  Supreme  Council. 
This  document  was  read  to  the  representatives  of  four- 
teen nations  and  then  published  as  approved  by  them. 
It  was  praised  by  Mr.  Wilson  in  the  plenary  session  of 
the  Conference,  and  received  in  the  United  States  as  if 
it  were  the   President's  personal   triumph. 

A  few  words  will  serve  to  recall  the  incidents  attend- 
ing the  reception  and  discussion  of  this  document  in  the 
United  States.     The  President  had  sent  word  that  until 


82      AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

his  arrival  it  should  not  be  discussed.  On  February  24th 
he  landed  at  Boston  and  an  address  by  him  was  an- 
nounced. Two  important  facts  had  by  that  time  been 
brought  to  public  attention:  first,  that  the  Conference 
at  Paris  had  constituted  a  new  corporate  entity  possess- 
ing important  powers  and  organs  of  power,  under  the 
control  of  five  of  the  greater  Governments;  and,  second, 
that  nothing  had  so  far  been  done  to  make  peace  with 
Germany  or  to  punish  her  crimes.  The  situation  re- 
quired explanation,  and  the  President's  address  was 
looked   forward  to  with  deep  and  widespread  interest. 

Either,  it  was  thought,  he  would  avail  himself  of  this 
earliest  opportunity  to  present  to  the  American  people 
a  clear  exposition  of  the  meaning  and  purpose  of  this 
new  "Constitution,"  or  he  would  postpone  all  reference 
to  it  until  he  had  conferred  with  the  Senate  at  Washing- 
ton. To  the  surprise  of  every  one,  the  President  took 
this  occasion  to  express  his  personal  resentment  of  any 
criticism  of  this  "Constitution,"  declared  that  he  pos- 
sessed "fighting  blood,"  and  would  consider  it  an  "in- 
dulgence to  let  it  have  scope."  He  then  proceeded  to 
denounce  all  the  critics  of  the  League  as  wishing  to  have 
America  "keep  her  power  for  those  narrow,  selfish,  pro- 
vincial purposes  which  seem  so  dear  to  some  minds  that 
have  no  sweep  beyond  the  nearest  horizon." 

It  was  perceived  at  once  that  the  President  meant  to 
impose  this  "Constitution"  upon  the  country,  in  spite  of 
what  the  Senate  might  have  to  say  about  it.  A  Confer- 
ence with  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  occurred 
at  the  White  House  which  brought  out  the  fact  of  gen- 
eral opposition  by  the  Senate.  This  "Constitution,"  it 
was  declared,  was  in  conflict  with  the  Constitution  of 
the   United    States,    inasmuch   as    it   created   a   super- 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    83 

government,  automatically  made  the  peace  of  the  United 
States  contingent  upon  the  acts  of  other  nations,  thereby 
bringing  into  operation  certain  obligations,  which  in- 
cluded the  war-making  power  conferred  upon  Congress, 
and  created  a  permanent  alliance  with  a  group  of  na- 
tions who  proposed  to  control  the  world  in  the  name  of 
peace. 

It  is  needless  here  to  enter  into  the  discussion  of  this 
subject,  which  is  amply  considered  in  other  chapters  of 
this  book,  or  to  repeat  the  terms  of  opprobrium  and  con- 
tempt, both  privately  and  publicly  expressed,  applied  to 
the  Senators  who  refused  to  fall  down  and  worship  this 
image,  and  were  even  presuming  to  call  attention  to  its 
feet  of  clay,  some  of  the  most  contemptuous  of  these 
denunciations  emanating  from  the  President  himself.  On 
March  3d,  a  resolution  was  signed  by  thirty-nine  Sena- 
tors, referring  to  the  article  of  the  Constitution  which 
renders  necessary  to  the  ratification  of  a  treaty  the  ad- 
vice and  consent  of  the  Senate.  The  resolution  recalled 
the  fact  of  the  continued  session  of  the  Conference  at 
Paris,  before  which  the  proposal  of  a  League  of  Na- 
tions was  still  pending,  and  alleged  it  to  be  the  sense  of 
the  Senate  that,  while  it  is  the  sincere  desire  that  the 
nations  of  the  world  should  unite  to  promote  peace  and 
general  disarmament,  the  "Constitution  of  the  League  of 
Nations"  in  the  form  proposed  to  the  Peace  Conference 
should  not  be  accepted  by  the  United  States.  The  reso- 
lution further  expressed  the  sense  of  the  Senate  that  the 
negotiation  of  peace  terms  with  Germany  should  be 
pressed  with  the  utmost  expedition,  and  that  the  proposal 
for  a  League  of  Nations  to  insure  the  permanent  peace 
of  the  world  should  then  be  taken  up  for  careful  and 
serious  consideration.     On  the  following  day,   March 


84     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

4th,  in  a  speech  delivered  in  New  York  immediately  be- 
fore his  return  to  Paris,  the  President  in  reply  flung 
down  his  challenge  in  the  words:  "When  that  treaty 
comes  back  gentlemen  on  this  side  will  find  the  Covenant 
not  only  in  it,  but  so  many  threads  of  the  treaty  tied  to 
the  Covenant  that  you  cannot  dissect  the  Covenant  from 
the  treaty  without  destroying  the  whole  vital  structure." 

The  attempts  to  secure  certain  amendments  of  the 
"Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations,"  as  presented  in 
February,  I  have  fully  discussed  elsewhere.1  It  is  well 
known  that  they  were  only  partially  successful,  and  that 
the  changes  made  neither  removed  the  objections  to  the 
original  draft  nor  embodied  the  international  ideals 
which  have  long  been  current  in  the  United  States.  When, 
therefore,  the  final  form  of  the  so-called  "Covenant"  was 
sent  to  this  country,  on  April  28th,  the  word  "Constitu- 
tion" having  been  dropped,  the  "Executive  Council"  hav- 
ing become  simply  the  "Council,"  and  the  "Body  of  Dele- 
gates" the  "Assembly" — superficial  changes  which  were 
meant  to  remove  or  obscure  the  power  of  the  League  as 
a  corporate  entity  or  international  voting  trust — it  was 
even  clearer  than  before  that  the  design  had  been  to  cre- 
ate an  instrument  of  power  rather  than  an  institution 
of  justice. 

Although  upon  the  President's  return  to  Paris  in  March 
the  work  of  the  Conference  had  so  far  advanced  that  a 
provisional  treaty  of  peace'  with  Germany  was  reported 
as  almost  complete,  he  carried  into  execution  his  pur- 
pose to  interweave  the  Covenant  and  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
in  an  inextricable  manner  by  making  the  former  the  first 
Part  of  the  latter,  and  the  ostensible  agent  for  its  enforce- 

1  Present  Problems  in  Foreign  Policy,  pp.  283,  290 ;  and  the  text  of 
the  amendments  proposed  by  Messrs.  Taft,  Hughes,  and  Root,  pp. 
327,  333- 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    85 

ment.  The  Covenant,  though  published  separately,  was 
to  constitute  an  integral  part  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
which  was  withheld  as  secret.  The  League  of  Nations 
which  was  to  have  been  a  "general  association  of  na- 
tions," or  a  complete  Society  of  States,  was  thus  con- 
verted into  an  alliance  between  a  group  of  Powers  estab- 
lished to  enforce  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  The  organ  of 
universal  peace  and  conciliation  had  become  a  confessed 
instrument  of  undefined  punishment. 

Although  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  in  its  entirety  was 
long  withheld  from  the  Senate,  the  campaign  for  the 
adoption  of  the  League  of  Nations  went  steadily  on.  No 
one  knew,  or  could  discover,  to  what  precise  obligations 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  other  subsidiary  treaties 
would  bind  the  members  of  the  League.  They  were,  how- 
ever, to  be  blindly  accepted.  When,  at  last,  although  it 
had  long  been  published  and  on  public  sale  in  Europe,  a 
copy  could  be  obtained  only  privately  from  financiers  in 
New  York,  and  was  thus  laid  before  the  Senate,  it  was 
ascertained  that  it  was  to  "the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers,"  and  not  to  the  League,  that  Germany  made  her 
concessions;  yet  the  League  was  bound  to  preserve  to 
the  beneficiaries  of  the  Treaty  all  the  unknown  territorial 
accessions  assigned  to  them,  as  well  as  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  all  the  surviving  empires. 

It  was  a  reasonable  proposition  that  the  Senate,  before 
giving  its  advice  and  consent,  should  separate  the  two 
disparate  documents,  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions and  the  Treaty  with  Germany.  The  President  and 
his  supporters  in  the  Senate  refused  to  permit  this.  They 
demanded  the  immediate  ratification  of  the  whole  com- 
mitment, without  amendment  or  reservation;  or,  as  the 


86     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

President's  supporters  insisted,  "without  the  dotting  of 
an  i  or  the  crossing  of  a  t." 

This  demand,  considered  merely  as  a  partisan  attitude, 
may  have  been  defensible;  but  the  attempt  to  enforce  it 
by  assailing  or  undermining  the  constitutional  preroga- 
tive of  the  Senate  is  another  matter.  Having  failed  in 
numerous  private  conversations  and  in  a  public  confer- 
ence to  convince  a  sufficient  number  of  Senators  that  they 
should  yield  to  his  demand,  the  President  personally  took 
the  field  and  proceeded  to  an  open,  violent,  and  bitterly 
vituperative  attack  upon  the  Senate  as  a  means  of  carry- 
ing his  point. 

In  urging  the  impossibility  of  reopening  any  question 
in  the  Peace  Conference — although  it  was  still  in  session 
and  transacting  business — and  at  the  same  time  charging 
the  Senate  with  a  willful  obstruction  of  peace,  the  Presi- 
dent was  testing  his  theory  that  it  lies  in  the  power  of  the 
Executive  to  create  a  situation  so  embarrassing  that  the 
Senate  could  be  forced  to  surrender  its  constitutional 
right  and  fail  in  the  performance  of  its  duty. 

The  issue  thus  raised  is  far  more  serious  than  any 
question  regarding  the  expediency  of  accepting  a  place 
in  the  League  of  Nations.  It  discloses  an  intention  to 
break  down  constitutional  government  and  by  direct 
action  to  concentrate  all  power  in  foreign  affairs  in  the 
hands  of  the  President.  In  going  before  the  people,  not  to 
explain  the  Treaty,  which  could  have  been  done  by  a 
statesmanlike  exposition  issued  from  Washington,  but  to 
suppress  the  freedom  of  a  coordinate  branch  of  the  Gov- 
ernment by  a  demonstration  of  his  personal  popularity, 
the  President  struck  a  blow  at  what  is  most  vital  in  our 
system  of  responsible  authority — the  freedom  of  each  de- 
partment to  exercise  its  untrammeled  judgment  in  the 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  HOSTILITY    87 

discharge  of  its  duty.  The  President  has  no  better  justi- 
fication for  trying  to  destroy  by  a  popular  appeal  the 
prerogative  of  the  Senate  in  the  matter  of  treaty-making 
than  he  would  have  for  demanding  popular  pressure  upon 
the  Supreme  Court  in  a  matter  pending  before  it. 

In  his  denunciation  of  the  Senate  as  a  perverse  and 
refractory  body,  the  President  has  boldly  declared  that 
he  represents  a  cause  "greater  than  the  Senate,  and  greater 
than  the  Government."  This  is  to  announce  that  the 
League  of  Nations,  the  cause  for  which  he  is  contending, 
is  of  greater  importance  than  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  which  has  created  the  Government  and 
delegated  certain  specific  powers  to  the  Senate.  In  the 
interest  of  so  great  a  cause,  the  Constitution  may,  there- 
fore, properly  be  overruled;  and  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  by  the  same  reasoning,  may  properly  be 
subordinated  to  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

It  is  to  prevent  this  result  and  to  safeguard  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  in  the  control  of  its  foreign 
relations  that  the  Senate  has  by  a  majority  vote  adopted 
certain  reservations.  If  these  reservations  do  in  reality 
"nullify"  the  Covenant,  as  the  President  claims  they  do, 
it  is  because  the  Covenant  imposes  obligations  which  af- 
fect the  independence  of  the  United  States. 

The  issue  then  is  a  clear  one.  The  Senate  is  determined 
that  there  shall  be  no  super-government,  no  international 
authority  in  the  form  of  treaty  obligations  that  shall  in 
effect  control  the  action  of  Congress.  The  President  in- 
sists that  there  shall  be  no  treaty  in  which  these  obliga- 
tions are  limited  by  reservations.  Without  him,  he  af- 
firms, no  treaty  can  be  ratified;  and,  in  order  to  force 
upon  the  Senate  the  acceptance  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
without  change,  he  has  declared  his  power  to  defeat  it 


88      AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

altogether!  The  attitude  of  the  President,  therefore,  is 
that  at  no  time  shall  the  Senate  be  permitted  freely  to  per- 
form its  constitutional  duty  of  giving  its  advice  and  with- 
holding its  consent ;  which  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the 
future  destiny  of  the  United  States  in  its  relation  to  other 
countries  is  wholly  in  the  hands  of  one  man.  The  issue 
presents  a  conflict  between  representative  and  autocratic 
democracy;  and  it  is  not  untimely  to  be  reminded,  that 
the  Roman  Republic  was  transformed  into  the  Empire  by 
the  simple  process  of  conferring  all  the  highest  offices 
upon  Caesar. 


IV 


THE   STRUGGLE   OF    THE    SENATE    FOR    ITS    PREROGATIVES 

During  the  months  of  discussion  in  the  Senate  regard- 
ing the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  there  has 
been  a  steady  growth  of  the  conviction  that  no  form  of 
super-government  should  be  accepted  by  the  United 
States.  This  conclusion  has  rested  upon  two  grounds: 
first,  that  a  subordination  of  the  powers  of  Congress  to 
any  form  of  international  control  is  forbidden  by  the 
nature  of  the  Constitution;  and,  secondly,  that,  even  if 
such  subordination  were  allowed  by  the  Constitution,  it 
would  be  inexpedient  to  enter  into  any  international  part- 
nership that  would  involve  the  surrender  of  our  national 
independence. 

Even  the  most  earnest  advocates  and  defenders  of  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  have  been  finally 
compelled  to  assent  to  the  soundness  of  these  proposi- 
tions; and  they  have,  therefore,  devoted  their  energies 
chiefly  to  the  task  of  trying  to  make  it  appear  that  the 
Covenant  does  not  set  up  a  super-government,  and  that 
the  sovereignty  of  the  members  of  the  League  is  in  no 
respect  diminished  by  the  proposed  compact. 

If  we  could  accept  these  representations  as  the  correct 
measure  of  the  League's  powers  and  prerogatives,  we 
should  be  entitled  to  celebrate  the  virtual  triumph  of  the 
idea  of  an  "Entente  of  Free  Nations,"  as  well  as  the 
definitive  defeat  of  the  original  intention  of  the  Paris 

89 


90     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Conference  to  create  a  super-government.  Instead  of  the 
corporate  entity  to  be  established  by  the  "Constitution  of 
a  League  of  Nations,"  controlled  by  an  oligarchy  com- 
posed of  five  Great  Powers  claiming  a  right  of  supervi- 
sion over  the  smaller  States,  and  having  for  its  purpose 
the  enforcement  of  peace  by  the  exercise  of  preponderant 
military  and  economic  force,  the  League  is  now  repre- 
sented by  its  proponents  to  be  merely  a  voluntary  associa- 
tion of  entirely  independent  States,  incapable  of  taking 
any  action  except  by  the  unanimous  agreement  of  all  the 
members  of  the  Council,  whose  united  recommendations 
are  held  to  be  of  a  merely  "advisory"  character. 

There  would  be  no  unanswerable  objection  to  such  an 
Entente  as  the  Covenant  thus  represented  would  imply, 
if  it  were  only  a  real  one;  for  there  is  no  more  solid 
ground  upon  which  to  construct  an  international  associa- 
tion than  a  clear  and  definite  community  of  purpose  when 
freely  determined.  In  truth,  by  whatever  name  it  may 
be  called,  whether  "League"  or  "Alliance,"  such  an  asso- 
ciation has  no  value  except  as  it  is  in  fact  an  Entente  and 
continues  to  be  one ;  but,  for  any  association  to  have  that 
character,  there  must  be  a  common  aim  in  which  all  the 
participants  have  the  same  if  not  an  equal  interest  in 
uniting. 

The  League  proposed  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  does 
not  possess  this  quality.  Its  aims  are  divergent  and  even 
conflicting.  On  the  one  hand,  it  claims  to  be  a  general 
association  for  insuring  future  peace  and  international 
friendship;  on  the  other,  a  union  of  victorious  Powers  for 
the  execution  of  penalties  upon  conquered  nations  and 
the  preservation  by  the  victors  of  the  fruits  of  conquest, 
which  they  have  already  divided  among  themselves  and 
desire  to  possess  henceforth  for  their  separate  benefit  and 


THE  SENATE'S  PREROGATIVES     91 

aggrandizement.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  any 
nation  that  has  remained  neutral  during  the  war  should 
wish  to  enter  into  this  retributive  combination,  and  there- 
by incur  the  hostility  of  those  with  whom  they  have  con- 
tinued friendly,  in  order  to  aid  in  executing  the  terms  of 
a  victory  which  they  did  not  help  to  win  but  whose  penal- 
ties they  are  now  asked  to  aid  in  making  effective. 

Such  an  association  as  this  League  in  its  double  char- 
acter is  declared  to  be  is,  in  truth,  at  the  same  time  some- 
thing less  and  something  more  than  an  Entente  of  Free 
Nations.  It  is  something  less,  because  it  not  only  lacks 
the  unity  of  purpose  which  an  Entente  must  have,  but  it 
does  not  provide  any  clear  statement  of  the  principles  on 
which  it  is  founded.  It  speaks  of  justice,  but  it  does  not 
make  justice  the  end  of  its  existence.  It  proposes  peace, 
but  it  is  a  peace  which  is  not  based  on  any  defined  national 
right  but  is  to  be  imposed  by  superior  force.  It  refers  to 
law,  but  it  does  not  provide  for  any  specific  code  or  agree 
upon  its  enforcement.  It  does  not  admit  that  sovereign 
States  are  jurally  equal.  It  divides  them  into  classes  and 
bases  the  classification  on  power  and  magnitude,  thereby 
eliminating  that  which  is  most  vital  in  a  true  Entente  of 
Free  Nations — their  equal  rights  and  their  equal  free- 
dom. Being  a  combination  for  the  mutual  protection  of 
all  territorial  possessions,  regardless  of  the  origin  and 
nature  of  the  title  by  which  such  possessions  are  held,  in 
effect  it  repudiates  the  doctrine  of  national  self-determina- 
tion, and  reaffirms  the  principle  of  imperial  authority, 
thus  reconsecrating  the  right  of  forcible  conquest. 

Notwithstanding  the  efforts  to  deny  the  charge  that  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  establishes  a  super-government, 
it  is  clearly  demonstrable  that  it  does  so.  It  is  true  that 
an  attempt  was  made  in  the  process  of  revision  at  Paris 


92     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

to  diminish  the  appearance  of  super-governmental  author- 
ity in  the  League.  The  word  "Constitution,"  which  im- 
plied that  a  new  authority  was  constituted,  was  dropped 
and  the  word  "Covenant"  made  to  take  its  place.  The 
"Executive  Council"  became  merely  the  "Council,"  thus 
obscuring  its  executive  character.  "The  Body  of  Dele- 
gates," which  seemed  to  connote  the  organic  unity  of  the 
Powers,  was  changed  to  the  more  vague  and  indefinite 
designation  the  "Assembly,"  which  is  represented  to  be 
a  mere  hall  of  echoes  where  complaints  and  proposals  may 
be  voiced,  without  any  power  of  action. 

These  changes  were  in  effect  admissions  that  a  super- 
government  had  been  intended  and  had  been  found  ob- 
jectionable; but  while  they  serve  to  obscure  the  fact  that 
the  League  remains  a  super-national  authority,  they  do 
not  divest  it  of  this  quality,  for  what  appeared  to  be 
eliminated  from  the  powers  of  the  Council  was  already 
embodied  in  the  obligations  of  the  Covenant. 

It  has  been  thought  in  some  quarters  that,  to  disprove 
the  super-governmental  character  of  the  League  it  was 
sufficient  to  show  that  at  most  the  Council  can  only  "rec- 
ommend" action,  and  especially  as,  even  for  this  purely  ad- 
visory act,  a  unanimous  vote  is  required.  This  position 
seems  plausible  until  it  is  remembered  that  there  are  obli- 
gations in  the  Covenant  which  the  Council  neither  creates 
nor  is  able  to  modify.  They  are  absolute,  because  they 
are  obligations  to  act  in  a  definite  manner  when  a  specified 
set  of  circumstances  comes  into  being.  In  brief,  they  are 
entirely  automatic  in  their  operation. 

This  automatic  character  of  the  League  has  been  dwelt 
upon  by  some  of  its  defenders  as  constituting  the  preemi- 
nent excellence  of  the  Covenant.  "There  are,"  says  Presi- 
dent Lowell,  in  the  "Covenanter,"  "two  possible  forms  in 


THE  SENATES  PREROGATIVES     93 

which  a  league  to  maintain  peace  may  be  organized. 
These  may  be  termed  the  delegated  and  the  automatic 
forms.  The  first  of  these  is  like  a  federation  of  States, 
where  certain  powers  are  delegated  to  a  central  authority, 
whose  action,  within  those  limits,  is  binding  on  the  several 
States.  In  a  league  constructed  in  such  a  manner  a  cen- 
tral organ  would  have  power  to  issue  directions  which  the 
members  of  the  League  agree  to  obey.  The  automatic 
form  is  more  simple,  more  primitive,  but  not  ill-adapted 
to  sovereign  States  whose  duties  to  the  League  are  so  few 
that  they  can  be  specifically  enumerated  in  the  Covenant. 
It  consists  in  prescribing  definitely  the  obligation  which 
the  members  assume,  or  will  assume  on  the  happening  of 
a  certain  event,  and  giving  no  authority  to  any  central 
organ  to  exercise  its  discretion  in  giving  orders  binding 
upon  them." 

It  would  be  diffilcult  to  state  more  clearly  in  a  few  words 
the  precise  difference  between  the  two  types  of  associa- 
tion, the  federative  and  the  automatic.  The  former  would 
leave  decisions  to  a  central  body  of  delegates.  The  latter 
would  create  definite  obligations  to  be  fulfilled  regardless 
of  particular  decisions  in  such  a  manner  that  each  mem- 
ber of  the  League  would  be  already  pledged  to  act  in  a 
prescribed  sense  whenever  the  contingency  occurred. 

The  distinction  between  the  two  forms  of  league  is 
clear;  but  it  is  equally  clear  that  a  super-government  may 
exist  in  the  automatic  form  as  well  as  in  the  delegated 
form,  for  the  question  whether  or  not  a  super-government 
exists  turns,  not  upon  the  nature  of  the  depository  in 
which  super-national  power  rests,  but  upon  the  degree 
of  discretion  and  freedom  of  action  retained  by  the  na- 
tional governments  under  the  Covenant  of  the  League. 
An  Entente  of  Free  Nations  would  retain  them  entirely, 


94     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

but  with  the  pledge  to  pursue  certain  ends  in  common  and 
to  meet  new  situations  as  they  arise  in  a  spirit  of  mutual 
helpfulness  and  cooperation  in  accordance  with  definitely 
defined  principles  of  action.  If,  however,  discretion  and 
freedom  have  been  previously  surrendered,  there  is  cre- 
ated a  power  which  controls  the  action  of  the  govern- 
ments that  have  surrendered  them  and  a  super-govern- 
ment has  been  thus  established,  no  matter  where  that  con- 
trolling power  is  lodged  so  long  as  it  continues  to  exist. 
That  super-government  may  reside  in  the  decisions  of 
certain  persons  authorized  to  determine  the  action  to  be 
taken ;  or  it  may  be  allowed  to  reside  in  a  mechanism  act- 
ing automatically  as  various  conditions  come  into  being. 
In  either  case,  discretion  and  freedom  are  no  longer  re- 
tained by  the  national  government  which  has  thus  sur- 
rendered the  power  of  free  decision.  Future  action  has 
then  passed  from  the  realm  of  freedom  into  the  realm  of 
necessity.  A  pledge  having  been  given  to  act  in  a  certain 
way  in  certain  circumstances,  a  government  thus  pledged 
must  act  in  the  manner  agreed  upon  whenever  those  cir- 
cumstances occur. 

It  may  be  said  in  reply  to  this  statement  of  the  case, 
that,  inasmuch  as  the  governments  in  the  League  of  Na- 
tions freely  engage  to  be  bound  by  the  obligation  of  the 
Covenant,  even  though  its  mechanism  be  automatic  and 
individual  freedom  be  thereby  suppressed,  such  a  Cov- 
enant does  not  establish  a  super-government.  Having 
been  voluntarily  created,  it  is  not  a  super-government. 

This  observation  fails  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that 
the  voluntary  establishment  of  a  super-government  does 
not  render  it  any  the  less  authoritative,  or  any  the  less  a 
surrender  of  independence,  after  the  renunciation  has 
once  been  made.     The  States  of  the  American  Union 


THE  SENATES  PREROGATIVES     95 

voluntarily  created  the  existing  Federal  Government ;  but 
its  superior  control  is  in  no  way  diminished  or  in  any 
manner  affected  by  the  fact  that  it  was  freely  established, 
except  to  render  obedience  to  the  superior  authority  more 
obviously  a  binding  obligation  than  it  would  be  if  the 
compact  had  not  been  freely  entered  into. 

The  fundamental  issue  in  the  controversy  over  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  and  especially  over  the  Covenant 
constituting  its  first  Part,  is:  Should  the  United  States 
entrust  to  an  automatic  mechanism,  such  as  the  League  of 
Nations  is  described  to  be,  powers  which  the  Constitu- 
tion has  conferred  exclusively  upon  Congress,  or  should 
those  powers  be  retained  and  freely  exercised  by  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  people,  as  provided  in  the  fundamental 
law  which  created  the  Republic? 

"Vigorous  objection  has  been  made  in  the  United 
States,"  says  President  Lowell,  "to  a  super-sovereign 
league  that  would  have  authority  to  order  this  country 
what  to  do  in  case  of  an  attack  against  another  member 
of  the  League.  The  objection  is  not  without  cogency; 
but  it  does  not  apply  to  the  Covenant  of  Paris,  either  in 
its  original  or  its  amended  form,  for  that  covenant  has 
adopted  as  its  basic  principle  the  automatic  type  of  league, 
fixing  the  obligations  of  the  members  and  the  sanctions 
for  violation  in  the  pact  itself,  instead  of  leaving  them 
to  be  determined  by  a  representative  body." 

A  representative  body  would  at  least  be  free,  but  a 
league  of  the  automatic  type  binds  all  its  members  to 
action  by  the  fact  that  their  obligations  and  the  sanctions 
for  the  violation  of  them  are  fixed  in  the  pact  itself.  By 
whom  are  these  obligations  and  sanctions  fixed?  The 
President  of  the  United  States  holds  that  this  may  be  done 
by  himself  alone,  and  that  his  partner  in  the  treaty- 


96     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

making  process  has  nothing  to  say  about  them.  But, 
even,  though  the  whole  Senate  should  assent,  by  what 
authority  could  the  President  fix  such  controlling  obliga- 
tions in  the  pact  itself  ? 

I  take  no  exception  to  the  statement  that  the  League 
proposed  by  the  Covenant,  both  in  its  original  and  its 
revised  form,  is  in  the  main  of  the  automatic  type,  and 
that  its  obligations  are  largely  predetermined;  but  it  is 
precisely  this  predetermination  of  obligatory  action  de- 
pendent upon  an  unknown  sequence  of  events  that  renders 
the  League  a  super-government,  under  which  every  rep- 
resentative body,  including  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  is  deprived  of  powers  conferred  by  the  Constitu- 
tion. 

In  Article  X  of  the  Covenant,  for  example,  all  the 
members  of  the  League  are  solemnly  pledged  "to  respect 
and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial 
integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of  all  mem- 
bers of  the  League."  When  such  aggression  occurs,  auto- 
matically it  brings  into  operation  the  obligation,  and  action 
must  follow  as  a  necessity  of  the  Covenant.  Even  a 
unanimous  decision  of  the  Council  cannot  set  aside  the 
obligation  or  avoid  the  necessity  of  action.  The  pledge 
applies  to  all  future  as  well  as  to  all  present  members  of 
the  League,  and  it  is  not  affected  by  the  merits  of  the  case. 
If  the  United  States  unconditionally  accepts  this  obliga- 
tion, its  Government  is  no  longer  free  to  determine  its 
decision,  for  the  pledge  is  absolute,  and  whether  it  de- 
sires to  act  or  not,  wholly  regardless  of  the  provocation 
that  may  cause  the  aggression  which  it  is  pledged  to 
repel,  the  obligation  must  be  fulfilled. 

It  would  be  futile  to  assume  that  the  fulfillment  of  this 
obligation  will  never  involve  war.     Such  a  contention 


THE  SENATE'S  PREROGATIVES     97 

would  leave  the  pledge  without  any  value.  Its  whole 
force  and  significance  lie  in  the  assumption  that  every 
signatory  of  the  Covenant  will  be  obliged  to  engage  in 
war  whenever  the  conditions  of  the  agreement  demand  it. 

This  involves  surrendering  to  the  operation  of  a  mere 
mechanism  of  control  the  most  important  power  any 
government  possesses,  the  power  to  determine  when  and 
why  it  will  engage  in  war.  Such  a  surrender  involves 
the  creation  of  a  super-government  in  the  form  of  a  blind, 
unconscious  mechanism  which,  though  animated  by  no 
human  feelings  and  endowed  with  no  intelligent  fore- 
sight, may  involve  millions  of  men  in  sanguinary  strife 
over  questions  remote  from  their  interests ;  for  this  Arti- 
cle X  of  the  League  of  Nations,  according  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  is 
not  a  provision,  intended  specifically  to  avoid  war,  but  to 
preserve  boundaries  that  have  never  yet  been  settled  on 
any  definite  principles  of  right. 

In  the  Conference  at  the  White  House  with  the  For- 
eign Relations  Committee  of  the  Senate,  on  August  19, 
19 19,  the  President  made  the  extraordinary  statement, 
that  the  "invasion"  of  the  territory  of  a  member  of  the 
League  is  not  forbidden  by  Article  X.  He  said :  "I  under- 
stand that  article  to  mean  that  no  nation  is  at  liberty  to 
invade  the  territorial  integrity  of  another.  That  does 
not  mean  to  invade  for  the  purposes  of  warfare,  but  to 
impair  the  territorial  integrity  of  another  nation.  Its 
territorial  integrity  is  not  destroyed  by  armed  interven- 
tion. It  is  destroyed  by  retention,  by  taking  territory 
away  from  it,  that  impairs  its  territorial  integrity."  When 
Senator  Brandegee  suggested  that  the  words  are  not 
"territorial  aggression,"  but  "external  aggression,"  the 
President,  to  support  his  interpretation,  insisted,  "But  it 


98     AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

says  the  preservation  of  its  territorial  integrity  against 
external  aggression." 

Under  this  article  of  the  Covenant,  according  to  the 
President's  interpretation,  invasion  "for  purposes  of  war- 
fare" is  not  forbidden.  An  enemy  might  invade  any 
country,  so  far  as  this  provision  for  its  protection  is  con- 
cerned, take  possession  of  its  resources,  carry  away  its 
portable  property,  desolate  its  fields,  destroy  its  mines,  and 
even  exterminate  its  population;  but  the  President  de- 
clares the  obligation  of  Article  X  would  not  be  brought 
into  operation  until  it  came  to  a  diplomatic  settlement! 
Then,  and  only  then,  would  the  obligation  to  "preserve 
territorial  integrity  and  political  independence"  come  into 
operation ! 

It  is  difficult  to  be  patient  with  such  an  evasion  as  this, 
to  which  no  government  could  resort  in  practice  without 
losing  the  respect  of  mankind,  including  that  of  its  own 
people.  If  this  were  the  true  meaning  of  Article  X,  it 
would  be  a  mockery  to  call  it  "the  heart  of  the  Cove- 
nant." If  such  an  interpretation  were  inserted  in  the  act 
of  ratification,  it  would  undoubtedly  be  rejected. 

The  purpose  of  the  President  in  trying  to  limit  the 
application  of  Article  X  to  the  ultimate  settlement  of 
boundary  disputes  is  obvious.  It  was  to  diminish  the 
extent  of  the  obligation  assumed  under  it.  The  wide 
extent  of  that  obligation  is,  however,  distinctly  revealed 
in  the  second  sentence  of  that  article,  which  reads:  "In 
case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in  case  of  any  threat  or 
danger  of  such  aggression  the  Council  shall  advise  upon 
the  means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled." 
And  if  we  turn  to  Article  XI,  which  immediately  follows, 
we  read:  "Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  imme- 
diately affecting  any  of  the  members  of  the  League  or 


THE  SENATE'S  PREROGATIVES    99 

not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  whole 
League,  and  the  League  shall  take  any  action  that  may  be 
deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  na- 
tions;" and  yet  the  President  insists  that  the  obligation 
under  Article  X  would  not  become  operative  until  an  in- 
vading nation  had  completed  its  conquest  and  decided  to 
annex  territory  and  impose  its  own  rule ! 

Article  X  undoubtedly  means  what  it  says,  and  so  does 
Article  XI.  The  preservation  of  territorial  integrity  and 
political  independence  against  external  aggression  is  an 
explicit  obligation  and  that  obligation  is  nowhere  limited 
in  the  manner  maintained  in  the  President's  interpreta- 
tion. "Any  war  or  threat  of  war"  is  "a  matter  of  con- 
cern to  the  whole  League,"  and  "the  League  is  to  take 
any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safe- 
guard the  peace  of  nations."  "In  case  any  such  emer- 
gency should  arise,  the  Secretary-General  shall,  on  the 
request  of  any  member  of  the  League,  forthwith  sum- 
mon a  meeting  of  the  Council." 

The  Council  once  called,  the  duty  of  every  member  is 
plain.  It  is  to  fulfill  and  enforce  the  obligations  of  the 
Covenant.  "The  League  is  to  take  action."  That  is  a 
part  of  the  contract.  What  action  must  it  take?  "Any 
action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual."  It  can- 
not abrogate  or  modify  any  Covenant  obligation  of  the 
League.  That  is  where  the  super-government  becomes 
automatically  absolute.  The  "whole  League" — for  it  is 
a  corporate  unit  and  not  a  mere  aggregation  of  separate 
States — and  every  member  of  the  League  must  act  in  a 
manner  to  fulfill  its  obligations.  If  war  is  necessary, 
then  war  must  follow,  or  the  Covenant  is  broken  and  the 
defaulters  are  not  only  delinquent  in  performance,  they 
are  also  subject  to  discipline.    They  may  not  then  freely 


100   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

withdraw  from  the  League  (Article  I),  or  they  may  be 
expelled  from  it  (Article  XVI). 

The  function  of  the  Council  is  clearly  defined  in  the 
second  sentence  of  Article  X :  "The  Council  shall  advise 
upon  the  means  by  which  the  obligation  shall  be  ful- 
filled." "Advise  upon"  means  that  the  members  of  the 
Council  shall  advise  or  take  counsel  together ;  not  that,  as 
a  body,  they  shall  merely  give  advice  to  the  separate  gov- 
ernments regarding  the  "means"  they  must  employ  in  ful- 
filling the  obligation.  Under  Article  XI  it  is  explicitly 
prescribed  that  "the  League  shall  take  action/*  It  is 
clearly  the  function  of  the  Council  to  decide  what  action 
will  be  "wise  and  effectual,"  and  then  the  League  is  to 
take  that  particular  action.  It  may  be  any  action,  includ- 
ing war  by  the  entire  League ;  but  from  the  nature  of  the 
case  it  must  be  a  specific  action  and  it  is  action  by  the 
League. 

It  seems  a  perversion  of  language  to  say  that,  because 
the  expression  "advise  upon"  is  employed,  the  Council 
acts  only  in  an  "advisory"  manner.  The  League  as  such 
is  authorized  to  "take  action,"  not  merely  to  advise  its 
members  to  take  action.  No  referendum  is  provided  for ; 
nor  is  it  necessary,  since  unanimity  is  required  in  the 
Council.  Every  member  will  have  had  an  opportunity 
of  vetoing  the  action  proposed  under  the  instruction  of 
his  Government,  before  any  decision  is  reached.  No  re- 
vision or  confirmation  of  the  decision  is  anywhere  pre- 
scribed or  even  referred  to.  The  implication  is  plain  that 
the  Covenant  is  automatic  here  also,  to  the  extent  that 
the  obligation  to  act  upon  a  decision  thus  unanimously 
arrived  at  is  fixed  by  the  terms  of  the  Covenant. 

In  saying  this,  I  do  not  overlook  the  fact  that  the  Presi- 
dent has  declared  that  all  the  obligations  of  the  Covenant 


THE  SENATE'S  PREROGATIVES  101 

are  only  "moral"  and  not  "legal,"  and  that  a  moral  obli- 
gation involves  a  personal  "judgment"  when  it  comes  to 
execution,  and  that  such  a  separate  judgment  may  justify 
a  refusal  to  fulfill  the  obligation !  But  I  shall  not  attempt 
to  enter  into  the  casuistry  in  which  this  singular  dis- 
tinction takes  refuge.  I  assume  that,  whatever  the  dis- 
tinction between  a  "moral"  and  a  "legal"  obligation  may 
be,  it  cannot  be  invoked  in  international  agreements,  in 
which  all  obligations  are  fundamentally  moral,  because 
they  are  based  entirely  upon  national  honor. 

What  I  am  more  concerned  about  is,  who  has  the  right 
to  pledge  the  national  honor,  and  who  under  our  Con- 
stitution must  fulfill  the  pledge;  and  I  assume  that  no 
one  has  the  right — either  moral  or  legal — to  pledge  the 
honor  of  the  nation  in  a  manner  that  may  conflict  with  the 
fundamental  law,  or  that  may  render  disputable  the  obli- 
gation to  fulfill  the  pledge  after  it  has  been  made. 

I  draw  attention,  therefore,  to  the  fact  that,  while  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  if  respected,  would 
predetermine  the  occasion  for  the  United  States  going  to 
war  or  refusing  to  go  to  war,  and  is  to  that  extent  a 
super-government  controlling  the  constitutional  right  of 
Congress  freely  to  decide  these  questions,  it  virtually 
places  the  entire  control  of  foreign  policy,  so  far  as  any 
independent  national  control  is  left,  in  the  hands  of  the 
Chief  Executive,  who  is  at  the  same  time  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States.  The  moment  war  is  automatically  called  for  by 
the  obligations  of  the  Covenant,  at  that  moment  the 
President  might  claim  the  right  to  act  by  the  authority  of 
a  treaty,  and  a  decision  regarding  his  right  to  act  under 
the  treaty  could  be  reached  only  by  a  long  and  difficult 
process,  if  at  all.    It  is  probable  that  other  nations  would 


102   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

consider  him  bound  to  act,  since  his  own  decision  that  he 
should  do  so  had  already  been  expressed  in  the  Council 
when  action  was  "advised  upon." 

It  has,  I  am  aware,  been  intimated,  that  any  proposed 
action  by  the  League  of  a  character  objectionable  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  could  be  prevented  by 
instructing  the  representative  of  this  country  in  the  Coun- 
cil to  vote  against  it.  Since  unanimity  is  necessary  to  any 
decision  of  the  Council,  such  action  could  be  prevented 
by  that  single  vote. 

This  is  true,  and  it  is  also  true  that  any  other  action, 
and  all  action,  could  be  prevented  by  any  one  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Council,  except  that  rendered  necessary  by 
the  obligations  of  the  Covenant,  which  all  the  members 
together  could  not  change. 

It  is,  therefore,  evident  that  the  President,  having  pre- 
viously instructed  the  American  representative  in  the 
Council  how  to  vote  on  a  particular  issue,  would  be  al- 
ready bound  by  its  decision,  and  would  be  honorably 
bound  also  to  carry  it  into  execution.  If  it  be  held  that 
the  Council  does  not  determine  action,  but  merely  gives 
advice,  the  advice  thus  given  would  of  necessity  be  in 
effect  the  President's  own  advice,  since  no  recommenda- 
tion could  be  made  without  it. 

In  order  that  the  full  force  of  this  statement  may  be 
appreciated,  it  is  necessary  to  note  that  it  is  the  Council 
of  the  League  that  "advises  upon"  the  action  to  be  taken 
whenever  the  machinery  of  the  League  calls  for  action. 
There  is  no  other  provision  for  it.  To  reverse  it,  to  pro- 
pose other  action,  or  to  refuse  to  participate  in  the  action 
determined  upon  by  the  Council  would  be  equivalent  to 
declining  to  perform  the  obligation  automatically  brought 
into  being.    To  any  such  course  the  reply  of  other  nations 


THE  SENATE'S  PREROGATIVES  103 

would  be,  "You  are  repudiating  the  agreement  of  your 
own  Government,  which  has  already  approved  this  action 
in  the  Council.    You  are  already  bound  by  it." 

We  come  here  to  the  most  fundamental  of  all  the  ques- 
tions relating  not  only  to  this  Covenant,  but  to  the  whole 
future  policy  of  the  United  States  in  its  relation  to  other 
countries  and  the  issues  of  war  and  peace,  namely :  "Who 
is  authorized  to  bind  the  United  States  in  an  international 
agreement?" 

We  know  the  answer  of  President  Wilson.  In  his  let- 
ter addressed  to  Senator  Hitchcock  on  November  19, 
19 19,  he  declared  that  changes  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
which  had  been  proposed  in  the  Senate,  would  be  in  ef- 
fect a  "nullification  of  the  treaty" ;  and  he  previously  in- 
timated that,  if  the  treaty  were  in  any  essential  respect 
modified,  he  would  himself  suppress  the  act  of  ratifica- 
tion. 

This  attitude  is  in  effect  an  assertion  that  the  Presi- 
dent, "in  his  own  name  and  by  his  own  proper  authority," 
may  bind  the  United  States  in  a  treaty  which  fixes  in  the 
obligations  of  the  contract  the  occasions  when  war  must 
and  when  it  may  not  be  engaged  in  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States. 

If  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  skillfully  interwoven  with  it  as  the 
only  means  of  binding  it  upon  the  country  can  be  thus 
forced  upon  the  Senate,  what  may  be  expected  when  the 
League  of  Nations — the  heir  and  virtual  successor  of 
the  Conference  at  Paris — comes  into  operation?  Will 
there  be  in  the  conduct  of  its  business  any  greater  pub- 
licity than  in  that  of  the  Conference?  Does  it  not  prom- 
ise to  afford  a  secret  center  for  the  adjustment  and  exten- 
sion of  "regional  understandings,"  the  validity  of  which 


104   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

is  expressly  secured  by  Article  XXI  of  the  Covenant? 
What  contact  will  there  be,  unless  it  is  established  in 
some  manner  not  foreshadowed  in  the  organization  of 
the  Council,  between  that  body  and  the  public,  or  even 
between  it  and  both  Houses  of  Congress,  except  through 
the  Executive?  And  may  not  the  Executive  be  expected 
to  continue  to  act  upon  the  same  principle  as  permitted 
the  disposition  of  Shantung?  After  the  experience  of 
the  Conference,  who  even  of  the  regularly  confirmed  and 
responsible  officers  of  the  Department  of  State  can  be 
expected  to  know  what  is  really  going  on  in  the  Council  ? 
As  the  method  of  procedure  is  presented  in  the  Cov- 
enant, all  the  decisions  of  the  Council  will  be  prepared, 
confirmed,  and  partly  executed  before  the  public  or  the 
Senate  will  know  of  their  existence.  The  "honor"  of  the 
Nation  being  thus  engaged,  a  refusal  to  act  or  even  tardy 
action  by  Congress,  which  is  constitutionally  charged  with 
furnishing  the  material  means  for  the  execution  of  inter- 
national engagements,  would  find  itself  placed  where  the 
Senate  is  now  placed  in  the  minds  of  those  who  reproach 
its  legitimate  exercise  of  its  prerogative  as  obstructive  and 
partisan. 

Do  the  American  people — even  those  who  are  most 
anxious  about  peace  and  most  desirous  of  promoting  the 
comity  of  nations — wish  either  an  automatic  super-gov- 
ernment or  a  secret  executive  government,  or  any  possi- 
ble combination  of  them,  such  as  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  if  not  modified  will  create?  I  cannot 
believe  it.  On  the  contrary,  I  think  the  time  will  soon 
come  when  the  whole  country,  and  especially  those  who 
are  interested  in  international  peace,  will  realize  what  an 
immense  service  has  been  rendered  to  the  Nation,  and 
even  to  the  whole  world,  by  the  effort  made  in  the  Senate 


THE  SENATE'S  PREROGATIVES  105 

to  preserve  the  constitutional  safeguards  regarding  the 
obligations  to  be  undertaken  by  the  United  States  with 
foreign  Powers. 

The  two  conspicuous  features  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles— the  creation  of  a  super-government  by  automatic 
action  and  the  excessive  power  of  the  Executive,  through 
the  exclusive  control  of  our  representative  in  the  Coun- 
cil— have  seemed  to  a  majority  of  the  Senate  to  be  in 
conflict  with  the  spirit,  and,  in  part,  with  the  letter,  of 
our  fundamental  law,  which  bases  the  national  security 
on  the  division  of  power.  The  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  without  repudiating  either  the  Cov- 
enant of  the  League  of  Nations  or  the  conditions  of 
peace  with  Germany,  recommended  such  a  modification 
of  the  Covenant,  so  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
as  would  remove  this  conflict. 

There  were  three  ways  in  which  such  a  modification 
could  be  made. 

The  first  was  by  "amendment."  This  is  clearly  within 
the  constitutional  power  of  the  Senate  with  regard  to  any 
treaty,  and  it  has  often  been  beneficially  exercised.  In 
the  case  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  the  large  number  of 
signatories  was  naturally  urged  as  a  reason  for  not  press- 
ing the  process  of  amendment,  but  there  was  a  more  im- 
portant reason.  The  treaty  had  already  been  accepted 
by  several  Powers,  including  Germany.  A  change  in  the 
text  of  the  treaty  would  involve  all  the  signatories,  some 
of  whom  were,  no  doubt,  content  with  its  present  form, 
whereas  changes  were  demanded  only  as  they  might  affect 
the  United  States.  It  was  decided,  therefore,  to  seek 
some  more  generous  and  expeditious  course  of  procedure, 
and  the  thought  of  amendment  was  abandoned. 

A  second  method  of  modification  was  by  "interpreta- 


106  AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

tion."  To  this  two  objections  were  opposed.  The  chief 
criticism  of  the  Covenant  was,  not  that  the  text  was 
equivocal,  but  that  its  clear  meaning  was  not  acceptable. 
If  the  treaty  were  ratified  as  it  stood  in  its  completeness, 
it  would  be  futile  to  try  to  make  it  mean  what  it  evidently 
did  not  mean;  and  besides,  an  interpretation  would  be 
only  an  expression  of  opinion  which  might  not  be  accepted 
by  any  other  signatory  and  would  have  no  value  before 
an  international  tribunal.  Even  the  President  had  no 
objection  to  "interpretations" ;  he  had  made  too  many  of 
them  himself ;  but  he  opposed  inserting  any  of  them  in  the 
act  of  ratification! 

There  remained  a  third  method,  well  established  in 
diplomatic  usage,  with  numerous  precedents  in  the  prac- 
tice of  the  United  States  and  other  nations,  the  validity 
of  which  in  an  international  engagement  had  never  been 
questioned  by  any  competent  authority.  This  was  the 
method  of  "reservation." 

The  theory  of  it  is  very  simple.  It  accepts  the  treaty, 
with  the  exception  of  certain  obligations  contained  in  it. 
It  does  not  ask  that  those  obligations  shall  be  omitted  or 
changed  in  the  text  of  the  treaty.  It  does  not  attempt  to 
interpret  them.  It  admits  their  existence  and  their  au- 
thority for  all  who  choose  to  accept  them.  It  does  not  ask 
that  the  United  States  may  have  the  benefit  of  them.  It 
simply  declares  that  they  are  not  accepted  by  the  United 
States  as  a  part  of  the  treaty  to  which  this  country  be- 
comes a  signatory.  In  brief,  it  implies  acceptance  of  the 
treaty  with  certain  definitely  specified  exceptions  or  limi- 
tations. 

The  engagement  being  essentially  limited  in  its  char- 
acter, it  is  of  limited  reciprocity  as  well  as  of  limited  obli- 
gation.    It  does  not  in  any  way  alter  the  contract  for 


THE  SENATES  PREROGATIVES  107 

those  who  make  no  reservations,  except  as  related  to 
the  reserving  Power.  The  acceptance  of  such  limited 
membership  may  be  refused  by  other  signatories,  if  they 
choose  to  refuse ;  but  their  formal  acceptance  is  not  essen- 
tial to  the  validity  of  the  treaty  if  the  reservations  are 
named  in  the  act  of  ratification. 

Ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  including  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  with  reservations, 
was  the  method  adopted  by  the  majority  of  the  Senate, 
and  opposed  by  the  minority,  virtually  by  a  party  divi- 
sion; the  Republicans  standing  for  that  principle,  the 
Democrats,  with  a  few  exceptions,  opposing  it  under  the 
direction  of  the  President,  who  declared  in  his  letter  of 
November  19,  1919,  to  Senator  Hitchcock,  that  a  "reso- 
lution in  that  form  does  not  provide  for  ratification,  but 
rather  for  nullification  of  the  treaty." 

This  last  statement  is,  perhaps,  the  most  illuminating 
admission  of  what  the  treaty  was  really  designed  to  be 
that  has  come  from  any  source.  If  the  reservations  that 
were  adopted  by  the  Senate  on  November  19th  would  in 
reality  nullify  the  treaty,  it  is  because  they  would  defeat 
its  purposes.  We  may,  therefore,  conclude  that  the  treaty 
was  intended  to  accomplish  what  the  reservations  aim  to 
prevent.  The  President's  objection  to  the  reservations 
reveals  the  fact  that  he  opposes  what  they  require  and 
requires  what  they  oppose.  In  substance,  the  reservations 
proposed  at  that  time  are  as  follows  :* 

1.  The  United  States  shall  be  the  sole  judge,  in  case 
of  withdrawal  under  Article  I,  as  to  whether  its  obliga- 
tions under  the  Covenant  have  been  fulfilled.  Was  the 
Council  to  determine  this  ? 

2.  The  United  States  assumes  no  obligations  under 
*Sce  for  full  text  Document  V. 


108   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Article  X,  unless  in  any  particular  case  the  Congress  shall 
provide  for  the  employment  of  the  military  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States.  Were  these  forces  intended 
to  be  employed  without  reference  to  Congress?  Or  was 
Congress  bound  to  act  as  the  Council  might  direct  ? 

3.  No  mandate  shall  be  accepted  by  the  United  States 
except  by  action  of  Congress.  Was  it  expected  that  man- 
dates would  be  accepted  without  reference  to  Congress? 

4.  The  United  States  reserves  the  right  to  decide 
what  questions  are  of  a  domestic  character.  Was  it  in- 
tended that  the  Council  or  the  Assembly  should  decide? 

5.  The  United  States  will  not  submit  to  arbitration 
or  inquiry  questions  depending  upon  or  relating  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Was  it  intended  that  it  should  submit 
such  questions? 

6.  The  United  States  withholds  its  assent  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  treaty  regarding  Shantung.  Is  there  any 
reason  why  it  should  not  reserve  assent  ? 

7.  The  Congress  of  the  United  States  will  provide 
by  law  for  the  appointment  of  the  representatives  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Council  and  Assembly  of  the  League 
of  Nations  and  members  of  commissions.  Was  it  in- 
tended that  they  should  be  appointed  solely  by  the  Execu- 
tive? 

8.  The  United  States  understands  that  the  Reparation 
Commission  will  regulate  or  interfere  with  the  trade  of 
the  United  States  with  Germany  only  when  the  Congress 
approves.  Was  it  designed  that  the  Commission  might 
override  the  will  of  Congress  in  this  matter? 

9.  There  is  to  be  no  obligation  for  the  expenses  of 
the  League  of  Nations  without  an  appropriation  of  funds 
by  Congress.  Was  the  League  to  determine  and  collect 
expenses  regardless  of  Congress? 


THE  SENATE'S  PREROGATIVES  109 

10.  The  United  States  reserves  the  right  to  increase 
its  armament  without  the  consent  of  the  Council  whenever 
the  United  States  is  threatened  with  invasion  or  engaged 
in  war.  Was  the  Council  intended  to  possess  authority  to 
prohibit  this? 

ii.  The  United  States  reserves  the  right,  at  its  dis- 
cretion, to  permit  nationals  of  a  State  that  has  broken  the 
Covenant  to  continue  their  personal  business  relations 
with  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Did  the  Covenant  in- 
tend to  prevent  all  individual  business  relations  while  the 
State  of  which  they  are  nationals  is  engaged  in  a  law-suit 
with  a  possible  rival  in  trade  ? 

12.  Nothing  in  Articles  296,  297,  relating  to  debts 
and  property  rights,  shall  be  taken  to  sanction  any  illegal 
act  or  any  act  in  contravention  of  the  rights  of  citizens 
of  the  United  States.  Does  the  unmodified  treaty  have 
a  contrary  effect? 

13.  The  United  States  withholds  its  assent  to  Part 
XIII,  relating  to  labor,  unless  Congress  shall  hereafter 
make  provision  for  representation  in  the  organization  to 
be  established,  and  in  such  event  participation  shall  be 
governed  by  provisions  of  Congress.  Was  it  intended 
to  appoint  representatives  or  accept  decisions  in  this  mat- 
ter without  the  control  of  Congress? 

14.  The  United  States  assumes  no  obligation  to  be 
bound  by  any  election,  decision,  report,  or  finding  of  the 
Council  or  Assembly  in  which  any  member  of  the  League 
and  its  self-governing  dominions,  colonies,  or  parts  of 
empire,  in  the  aggregate,  have  cast  more  than  one  vote. 
Did  the  treaty  intend  that  it  should  be  under  such  an 
obligation?  * 

1  Compare  these  reservations  of  November  19,  1919,  with  those  of 
March  19,  1920,  in  Document  VIII. 


110   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

If  these  reservations  do  really  nullify  the  treaty,  they 
do  so  only  in  matters  concerning  which  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  might  find  its  constitutional  preroga- 
tives transferred  to  a  super-government  or  to  exclusive 
control  by  the  Executive.  They  do  not  in  any  respect 
prevent  the  United  States  from  doing  every  just  or  gen- 
erous act  which  is  contemplated  by  the  treaty.  Their 
effect  is  simply  to  preserve  its  independence,  in  conformity 
with  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Reservation 
is  the  preservation  of  our  American  institutions. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  reservations  proposed  by 
the  Senate  do  not  in  any  respect  absolve  the  United 
States  from  obedience  to  the  Law  of  Nations.  On  the 
contrary,  they  bring  the  conduct  of  the  Government  more 
completely  under  the  control  of  a  law-making  body  re- 
sponsible to  the  people.  Their  effect,  therefore,  is  to  im- 
pose a  more  effectual  restraint  upon  the  use  of  arbitrary 
force  in  international  relations,  except  where  it  may  be 
necessary  for  the  vindication  of  International  Law  or  the 
defense  of  rights  otherwise  left  without  protection. 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE  THROUGH  THE  LEAGUE 

The  Great  War  having  ended  in  the  defeat  of  the 
aggressors,  and  the  finality  of  the  victory  being  indisput- 
able, both  victors  and  vanquished  had  a  right,  in  Novem- 
ber, 1 91 8,  to  expect  an  early  peace,  of  which  they  had 
pressing  need. 

Both  desired  it;  and  yet,  although  the  arbitrament  of 
arms  definitely  settled  the  contest  in  a  military  sense,  the 
whole  world  is  still  suffering  because  peace  was  not 
promptly  concluded. 

As  early  as  May,  19 19,  it  was  pointed  out  that  peace 
had  been  delayed  by  the  effort  to  combine  with  a  definite 
immediate  settlement  an  immature  plan  for  the  recon- 
struction of  all  international  relations. 

The  ultimate  futility  of  this  combination  was  evident 
to  all  who  had  taken  the  pains  to  think  out  clearly  the 
problem  of  peace,  for  the  reason  that  the  two  aims  were 
essentially  disparate  and  incompatible.  The  peace  with 
Germany,  being  punitive,  was  necessarily  based  on  mili- 
tary force.  General  and  permanent  peace  must,  however, 
rest  upon  a  different  foundation.  To  express  the  differ- 
ence more  precisely,  the  peace  with  Germany  was  of 
necessity  the  imposition  of  the  will  of  the  victors  upon 
the  vanquished.  It  was  the  result  of  military  victory.  It 
implied  penalties  to  be  inflicted,  permanent  restraints  to 
be  imposed,  reparations  to  be  made,  and  a  recognized 

in 


112   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

subordination  of  the  vanquished  as  a  defeated  power. 
No  permanent  world  peace  can  be  established  upon  this 
basis;  first,  because  innocent  and  law-abiding  nations  do 
not  need  to  be  thus  subjected  to  the  control  of  a  superior 
form  of  power;  and,  secondly,  because  the  attempt  to 
maintain  the  peace  of  the  world  in  such  a  manner  neces- 
sarily involves  the  creation  of  a  super-government  claim- 
ing the  right  and  possessing  the  power  to  maintain  peace 
by  force,  regardless  of  the  self -determining  aspirations 
of  the  nations  brought  under  subjection  to  it.  Such  a 
subordination  would  involve  the  total  surrender  of  na- 
tional sovereignty  on  the  part  of  the  weaker  States,  which 
would  be  subjected  to  a  hazardous  existence  under  any 
international  system  founded  on  the  idea  of  force,  what- 
ever its  pretensions  regarding  peace  might  be.  This 
sacrifice  might  be  in  some  degree  tolerable,  if  it  placed 
those  making  the  surrender  under  the  sure  protection  of 
strict  justice ;  but  so  great  a  surrender  into  the  hands  of 
superior  power  cannot  safely  be  made,  unless  that  power 
is  defined,  limited,  and  in  some  way  made  responsible. 

In  so  far  then  as  the  mechanism  of  peace  is  merely  a 
mechanism  of  power,  it  cannot  be  a  trustworthy  guarantee 
of  general  and  permanent  peace,  because  it  is  a  constant 
challenge  to  revolt.  In  brief,  a  device  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  specific  penalties  upon  a  culprit  nation  like  Ger- 
many is  one  thing,  and  a  combination  of  free  nations, 
aiming  at  friendship  and  a  common  obedience  to  law,  is 
quite  another.  The  attempt  to  unite  them  in  one  and  the 
same  form  of  organization  is  plainly  an  effort  to  combine 
incompatible  purposes. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  it  is  conceivable  that 
world  peace  may  be  established.  The  first  is  by  the  use 
of  military  force  to  prevent  and  punish  war.    In  the  case 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         113 

of  Germany,  it  was  necessary  to  resort  to  this  method, 
because  Germany  had  decided  to  impose  her  will  by  force 
upon  other  nations,  and  that  will  had  to  be  resisted;  but 
for  the  victors  to  undertake  to  lay  down  the  law  for  the 
rest  of  the  world  and  to  impose  their  will  upon  free  na- 
tions, would  be  to  accept  and  adopt  the  very  principle 
against  which  they  were  contending,  and  would  merely  re- 
sult in  the  establishment  of  a  joint  imperialism,  exercised 
by  a  group  of  Powers,  instead  of  the  predominance  of  a 
single  Power.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  establish 
world  peace  upon  the  basis  of  force  unless  on  the  mate- 
rial side  that  force  is  great  enough  to  compel  universal 
obedience,  and  on  the  moral  side  so  just  as  to  command 
the  voluntary  respect  of  mankind  at  large.  In  brief,  no 
form  of  imperialism  can  ever  permanently  prevent  war, 
for  the  reason  that  imperialism  in  whatever  form  is 
odious  and  provocative  of  hostility. 

The  alternative  way  to  render  peace  permanent  is  by  a 
voluntary  agreement  to  conform  to  certain  rules  of  inter- 
national conduct  based  upon  the  inherent  rights  and  essen- 
tial needs  of  the  associated  nations.  Such  a  system  would 
not  be  based  on  force,  but  on  law  freely  accepted.  It 
would  have  no  need  of  force,  except  for  protection  against 
assault  and  the  vindication  of  the  law.  It  would  impose 
no  superior  authority.  Its  aim  would  be  justice  through 
understanding.  It  would  imply  the  existence  of  really 
free,  self-determining  nations,  and  it  would  not  in  any 
respect  require  subordination  on  their  part.  Its  extreme 
penalty  might  be  simply  outlawry;  that  is,  in  case  of 
crime,  expulsion  from  the  comity  of  nations  and  its  ma- 
terial advantages.  Such  a  penalty,  however,  could  find 
justification  only  on  the  ground  of  a  refusal  to  obey  the 
law  or  fulfill  a  pledge. 


114   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

If  it  be  true  that  the  latter  method  indicates  the  only 
pathway  to  general  and  permanent  peace,  then  it  must  be 
admitted  that  an  effort  to  couple  it  with  a  retributive  com- 
pact like  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  is  to  overshadow  and 
vitiate  it  by  making  it  subservient  to  the  interests  of  a 
single  group  of  Powers. 

The  reason  given  by  its  advocates  for  the  introduction 
of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  into  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  and  insistence  upon  the  necessity  of  this  as 
a  preliminary  of  peace,  is  that  the  League  is  an  indispen- 
sable instrument  for  the  execution  of  the  treaty. 

The  absurdity  of  this  is  evident  upon  the  slightest  ex- 
amination; but  the  proposition  is  not  only  absurd,  it  ex- 
poses the  wholly  incompatible  elements  of  the  treaty. 

One  simple  sentence,  embodied  in  that  document,  would 
have  provided  all  the  guarantee  necessary  for  its  execu- 
tion; namely,  that  any  attempt  to  evade  the  obligations 
of  the  treaty  or  to  make  an  unprovoked  assault  on  any 
one  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  would  be  re- 
garded as  an  offense  to  all  of  them. 

This  would  mean  that  the  solidarity  of  the  victors  in 
the  war  was  continued  and  maintained,  so  far  as  the  en- 
forcement of  the  peace  is  concerned.  More  than  this 
would  appear  to  be  superfluous.  The  invitation  to  Ger- 
many's neighbors,  neutral  in  the  war,  like  Holland,  Den- 
mark, Sweden  and  Switzerland,  to  aid  in  enforcing  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  is  not  an  invitation  to  friendship;  it 
bids  them  rather  to  risk  a  possible  future  hostility.  Re- 
liance upon  Hedjaz,  Siam,  Persia,  and  other  small  States 
to  enforce  the  treaty  adds  no  security  to  peace.  If  the 
war  has  really  been  won,  if  Germany  has  really  been 
defeated,  the  League  of  Nations  is  not  necessary  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  treaty  of  peace.    If,  on  the  contrary, 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         115 

the  war  has  not  really  been  won,  if  Germany  has  not  been 
defeated,  the  League  of  Nations  is  a  device  to  draw  the 
neutral  nations  into  an  alliance  against  Germany ;  and  it  is, 
therefore,  not  a  general  society  of  nations  founded  upon 
the  ideas  of  freedom,  equality,  and  friendship,  but  an 
effort  to  associate  the  neutral  Powers  against  a  possible 
future  foe. 

It  would  be  more  honorable  frankly  to  admit  that  the 
League  of  Nations  adds  nothing  to  the  execution  of  the 
peace  with  Germany.  To  hold  that  it  is  essential  is  vir- 
tually to  assume  that  Germany  has  not  been  defeated.  In 
any  case,  if  the  claim  is  to  be  taken  seriously,  it  shifts  the 
responsibility  for  executing  the  terms  of  the  peace  to  the 
shoulders  of  those  who  have  had  no  part  in  imposing 
them.  It  is,  in  substance,  a  demand  that  the  neutral  neigh- 
bors of  Germany  should  now  come  in  and  aid  the  victors 
in  permanently  securing  the  spoils  of  victory  and  exact- 
ing the  terms  of  a  peace  which  they  had  no  part  in 
negotiating. 

The  provisions  of  the  Peace  of  Versailles  show  clearly 
how  little  sincerity  there  is  in  the  assertion  that  the 
League  of  Nations  is  necessary  to  the  execution  of  the 
peace.  As  Senator  Moses  clearly  demonstrated  in  his 
noteworthy  speech  in  the  Senate  on  July  22d,  the  League 
of  Nations,  despite  the  intention  to  intertwine  the  Cov- 
enant with  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  in  an  inseparable 
manner,  plays  but  a  secondary  role.  It  is  to  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers,  and  not  to  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, that  Germany  renounces  her  colonies;  and  they 
have  already,  before  the  League  has  become  a  reality, 
allotted  and  distributed  them  among  themselves.  "In  like 
manner,  sums  in  gold  held  as  pledge  or  as  collateral  in 
connection  with  the  German  loans  to  the  Austro-Hun- 


116   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

garian  Government,  the  benefits  disclosed  by  the  treaties 
of  Bucharest  and  Brest-Litovsk,  and  all  monetary  instru- 
ments or  goods  received  under  these  treaties  pass  into  the 
possession  of  the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers, 
and  are  to  be  disposed  of  in  a  manner  which  these  Powers 
shall  hereafter  determine." 

It  is  not  the  League  of  Nations,  but  a  conference  of 
military  experts  of  these  same  Powers,  that  is  to  fix  the 
number  of  effectives  in  the  German  army,  and  it  is  to  these 
same  also  that  the  report  on  the  stocks  of  munitions  and 
armament  is  to  be  furnished. 

"It  is  not  the  League  of  Nations,"  continues  Senator 
Moses,  "but  the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
who  will  approve  the  location  and  restrict  the  number  of 
factories  and  works  wherein  Germany  will  be  permitted 
to  manufacture  arms,  munitions,  and  war  materials.  It 
is  to  the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  not  to 
the  League  of  Nations,  that  Germany  must  surrender  her 
surplus  war  material ;  and  it  is  these  Powers  and  not  the 
League  of  Nations  who  will  direct  the  manner  in  which 
this  surrender  will  be  effected.  And  when  the  German 
Government  shall  disclose,  as  she  must,  the  nature  and 
mode  of  manufacture  of  all  explosives,  toxic  substances, 
or  other  chemical  preparations  used  by  her  in  the  war  or 
prepared  for  the  purpose  of  being  so  used — is  it  to  the 
League  of  Nations,  is  it  to  Sir  Eric  Drummond,  that  these 
lethal  formulae  shall  be  turned  over  for  deposit  in  the 
massive  vaults  which  doubtless  will  form  part  of  the 
equipment  of  the  League  of  Nations  palace  at  Geneva? 
By  no  means!  It  is  the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  who  will  take  over  and  assimilate  this  deadly 
knowledge." 

How  little  the  League  of  Nations  was  really  expected 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         117 

to  serve,  or  could  even  be  made  to  serve,  the  purposes  of 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  in  executing  the  treaty- 
is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  these  Powers  reserved 
to  themselves  and  decided  not  to  entrust  to  the  League  of 
Nations  nearly  all  the  important  functions.  This  is  suf- 
ficiently shown  without  going  into  particulars  by  the  pro- 
portion of  the  activities  thus  reserved  and  those  entrusted 
to  the  League.  "The  Principal  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers,"  says  Senator  Moses,  "figure  76  times ;  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  figure  45  times — a  total  of  121. 
Whereas  the  League  of  Nations  figures  altogether  only  57 
times,  and  of  these  21  refer  to  its  nebulous  connection 
with  the  administration  of  the  Saar  Valley;  18  in  con- 
nection with  the  labor  clauses  of  which  the  League  is 
supposed  to  be  the  special  champion,  and  only  3  to  Dan- 
zig, in  relation  to  which  we  have  been  told  the  League  is  a 
prime  necessity — leaving  only  15  references  to  general 
activity  for  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  entire  253 
pages  which  constitute  the  treaty  apart  from  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  itself." 

The  demand  of  Clemenceau  for  a  separate  treaty  of 
alliance  with  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  for  the 
protection  of  France  reveals  the  utter  lack  of  confidence 
on  the  part  of  French  statesmen  in  the  efficiency  of  the 
League  of  Nations  in  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles. With  keenness  of  perception,  although  great 
power  of  discernment  was  not  necessary  to  grasp  the 
truth,  it  was  from  the  first  clearly  seen  that,  instead  of 
adding  to  the  security  of  France  against  her  former 
enemy,  the  League  only  divides  and  obscures  the  re- 
sponsibility of  her  allies  and  associates  in  the  war.  What 
Monsieur  Bourgeois  demanded  was  an  international  force 
that  could  not  only  offer  real  protection  but  could  be 


118   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

held  responsible  for  it.  Failing  in  this,  an  Anglo-French 
and  a  Franco- American  guarantee  were  necessary.  This 
guarantee  the  President  felt  it  desirable  to  hold  out  a 
prospect  of  receiving ;  and  in  his  delayed  message  of  July 
29th,  laying  this  latter  treaty  before  the  Senate,  he  said : 
"I  was  moved  to  sign  this  treaty  by  considerations  which 
will,  I  hope,  seem  as  persuasive  and  as  irresistible  to  you 
as  they  have  to  me.  We  are  bound  to  France  by  ties  of 
friendship  which  we  have  always  regarded  and  shall 
always  regard  as  peculiarly  sacred.  .  .  .  She  now  de- 
sires that  we  should  promise  to  lend  our  great  force  to 
keep  her  safe  against  the  Power  she  has  had  most  reason 
to  fear."  What  is  this  but  a  confession  that  France 
might  justly  have  expected  that  a  pledge  to  secure  her 
safety  would  be  written  into  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  it- 
self, and  that  this  was  not  done? 

There  is,  in  fact,  no  pledge  of  security  in  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  according  to  the  President's 
interpretation  of  Article  X,  given  to  the  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee  of  the  Senate  at  the  White  House  Con- 
ference. This  article,  he  claims,  relates  only  to  the  ulti- 
mate preservation  of  "territorial  integrity,"  and  contains 
no  obligation  to  prevent  "invasion  for  warlike  purposes." 
This,  it  is  true,  is  a  strained  and  even  violent  attempt  to 
make  Article  X  appear  less  exacting  than  it  is;  but,  if 
there  be  no  promise  of  protection  against  invasion  in  this 
article,  it  is  not  to  be  found  anywhere  in  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles. 

It  is  probably  with  distinct  recognition  of  this  that  the 
President  says,  in  his  message  on  the  Franco-American 
special  treaty:  "It  is,  therefore,  expressly  provided  that 
this  treaty  shall  be  made  the  subject  of  consideration  at 
the  same  time  with  the  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany, 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         119 

that  this  special  arrangement  shall  receive  the  approval 
of  the  Council  of  the  League,  and  that  this  special  provi- 
sion for  the  safety  of  France  shall  remain  in  force  only 
until,  upon  application  of  one  of  the  parties  to  it,  the 
Council  of  the  League,  acting  if  necessary  by  a  majority 
vote,  shall  agree  that  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  afford  her  sufficient  protection." 

Note  the  plain  implications  of  this  extraordinary  state- 
ment. It  is  this  Franco-American  compact  only,  and,  by 
inference,  the  Anglo-French  compact  which  accompanies 
it,  that  are  to  give  to  France  the  security  which  the 
League  of  Nations  does  not  afford;  and  by  the  terms  of 
this  message  will  not  give,  until  "the  Council  of  the 
League,  acting  if  necessary  by  a  majority" — although  by 
the  Covenant  unanimity  is  required  for  such  an  act — 
"shall  agree  that  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  afford  sufficient  protection"! 

It  is  here  candidly  admitted  that  such  protection  as  the 
League  may  offer  is  not  only  future  but  contingent.  It 
is  not  actual.  Suppose  the  Council  never  takes  this  action. 
But  on  what  principle  is  a  majority  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  at  any  time  to  be  entrusted  with  the  power  to 
determine  when  an  obligation  of  the  United  States  shall 
cease?  What  new  strength,  or  solidity,  or  defensive 
power,  or  authority  in  the  matter  is  this  League  to 
acquire?    And  how  is  it  to  acquire  it? 

If  the  League  does  not  and  cannot  protect  France,  of 
what  value  is  it  as  an  instrument  for  executing  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles?  Suppose  Germany  should  suddenly  refuse 
to  fulfill  her  obligations  under  the  treaty,  what  would  the 
League  do  about  it?  According  to  the  President's  inter- 
pretation, they  would  merely  "advise  upon  it"  and  wait 
to  see  if  any  one  was  ready  and  disposed  to  act ! 


120   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

We  may,  therefore,  wholly  abandon  and  reject  the 
pretension  that  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
is  necessary  to  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 
I  think  it  has  been  clearly  and  irrefutably  shown  by  the 
President  himself  that  the  Covenant  has  no  vital  relation 
to  the  treaty.  It  is  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  graft  upon 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  that  "general  association"  which  the 
President  foreshadowed  in  his  fourteenth  point :  "A  gen- 
eral association  of  nations  must  be  formed  under  specific 
covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording  mutual  guarantees 
of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity  to  great 
and  small  States  alike." 

The  President  believed  that  this  could  not  be  accom- 
plished unless  it  was  consummated  as  a  part  of  the  Treaty 
of  Peace.  He  considered  that,  because  he  had  publicly 
made  this  proposal,  he  was  authorized  to  insist  upon  it. 
He  has  himself  expressed  this  conviction  and  has  stated 
his  reason  for  entertaining  it. 

In  the  President's  speech  at  Pueblo,  on  September  25, 
1919,  he  said  to  his  audience:  "I  had  gone  over  there 
with,  so  to  say,  explicit  instructions.  Don't  you  remember 
that  we  laid  down  14  points  which  should  contain  the 
principles  of  settlement?  They  were  not  my  points.  In 
every  one  of  them  I  was  conscientiously  trying  to  read 
the  thought  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and  after 
I  uttered  those  points  I  had  every  assurance  given  me 
that  could  be  given  me  that  they  did  speak  the  moral 
judgment  of  the  United  States  and  not  my  single  judg- 
ment." 

On  such  evidence  as  this  paragraph  contains  the  Presi- 
dent maintained  that  he  had  a  mandate  from  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  insist  upon  his  fourteenth  point  as  a  part 
of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.     "Then  when  it  came  to  that 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         121 

critical  period  just  a  little  less  than  a  year  ago,"  he  con- 
tinues, "when  it  was  evident  that  the  war  was  coming  to 
its  critical  end,  all  the  nations  engaged  in  the  war  accepted 
those  14  principles  explicitly  as  the  basis  of  the  armistice 
and  the  basis  of  the  peace.  In  those  circumstances  I 
crossed  the  ocean  under  bond  to  my  own  people  and  to 
the  other  governments  with  which  I  was  dealing.  The 
whole  specification  of  the  method  of  settlement  was  writ- 
ten down  beforehand,  and  we  were  architects  building  on 
those  specifications." 

The  Covenant  of  the  League,  it  would  appear  from 
this,  was  written  into  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  not  as  a 
means  for  the  execution  of  that  treaty, — so  often  insisted 
upon  by  the  President  and  his  adherents  as  necessary  to 
this  purpose  but  which  function  he  admits  it  does  not  per- 
form,— but  simply  to  fulfill  an  engagement  previously 
made  by  the  authority  of  the  American  people! 

It  is  in  place,  therefore,  to  inquire  more  particularly  as 
to  the  origin  and  nature  of  that  engagement. 

The  assumption  is  here  made  that  "we,"  the  American 
people,  "laid  down  14  points  which  should  contain  the 
principles  of  settlement."  "They  were  not  my  points," 
the  President  says. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  know  the  details  of  this  gen- 
erously accorded  joint  authorship  of  the  "fourteen,"  and 
especially  to  learn  through  what  particular  medium  the 
President  "read  the  thought  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States."  Stated  in  this  fashion,  it  can  hardly  be  con- 
sidered a  valuable  contribution  to  the  accuracy  of  telep- 
athy ;  and  it  does  not  add  to  our  confidence  in  the  Presi- 
dent's capacity  for  weighing  evidence  to  be  told  that  the 
testimony  of  his  own  consciousness  was  sufficient  to  give 
him  "every  assurance  that  could  be  given"  that  he  had 


122   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

spoken  the  mind  of  the  United  States  in  uttering  the 
"fourteen."  He  does  not  even  pretend  to  have  consulted 
any  one,  and  he  apparently  overlooks  entirely  the  election 
returns  of  191 8,  when  he  asked  to  be  an  "unembarrassed 
spokesman."  With  equal  subjectivity  of  thought  he  ap- 
pears either  never  to  have  known,  or  wholly  to  have  for- 
gotten, the  outburst  of  protest  in  the  United  States 
against  making  the  "fourteen"  the  conditions  of  the  armis- 
tice, and  the  loud  cry  for  "Unconditional  surrender"  as 
the  only  acceptable  preliminary  of  peace. 

It  has  been  repeatedly  asserted,  and  I  think  it  has  never 
been  denied,  that  the  fourteenth  point,  regarding  the 
"general  association,"  had  in  view  a  compromise  peace;  in 
which,  after  sharing  in  the  negotiations  on  equal  terms, 
Germany  would  have  a  place  in  the  newly  constructed 
international  system. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  "fourteen"  date  from 
a  time  when  the  President's  idea  of  a  "peace  without 
victory"  was  still  prevailing  in  his  thoughts  regarding  the 
termination  of  the  war.  In  the  autumn  of  1918  the  con- 
ditions had  wholly  changed.  The  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  were  victorious  in  the  field.  Germany  was  de- 
feated. Even  admitting  that  the  "fourteen"  had  once 
constituted  a  desirable  basis  for  peace  with  Germany,  that 
time  had  passed.  The  Allies  knew  it  and  acted  upon  it. 
They  accepted  the  "fourteen,"  with  qualifications,  be- 
cause they  wished  to  retain  the  interest  and  aid  of  Amer- 
ica, but  took  pains  to  demonstrate  in  the  terms  of  the 
armistice  the  complete  surrender  of  Germany  as  a  con- 
sequence of  her  defeat.  They  then  proceeded  to  dictate 
the  terms  of  peace  regardless  of  the  "fourteen,"  and  re- 
tained the  President's  adherence  to  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles by  permitting  him  artificially  to  intertwine  their 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         123 

draft  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  with  the 
Treaty  of  Peace.  It  was  the  sole  gratification  that  was 
allowed  him. 

The  object  in  according  this  gratification  was  to  retain 
the  participation  and  support  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  and  it  could  be  obtained  in  no  other 
way.  What  the  Allies  wanted  was  simply  a  defensive  alli- 
ance. They  could  get  it  only  in  the  form  of  a  League  of 
Nations.  Whether  they  really  have  it  in  that  form  re- 
mains to  be  seen.  What  is  more  important  to  them  and 
to  the  whole  world  is  the  confidence  and  approval  of  the 
American  people.  With  these,  whatever  documents  may 
be  signed  or  left  unsigned,  they  have  everything  they 
should  desire.  Without  these,  they  have  nothing.  The 
only  thing  of  value  to  them  is  the  perpetuation  of  the 
Entente,  and  that  must  be  of  a  character  which  free  na- 
tions can  cheerfully  accept  and  loyally  honor. 

Looking  back  over  all  the  transactions,  it  is  evident  that 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  not  a  real  in- 
strument for  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  and 
was  merely  tied  on  to  that  treaty  for  the  purpose  of 
formally  fulfilling  the  promises  of  the  Allies  to  regard 
the  "fourteen"  as  a  basis  of  negotiation.  Incidentally, 
however,  it  perpetuates  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  a  hope 
of  ultimately  abrogating  some  of  its  provisions. 

The  German  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Herr 
Mueller,  is  reported  to  have  said:  "The  German  Gov- 
ernment will  do  everything  in  its  power  to  live  up  to  the 
treaty  until  our  opponents  themselves  agree  to  rescind  its 
most  objectionable  clauses  or  until  the  League  of  Nations 
takes  the  revision  of  the  treaty  in  hand.  This  is  one  of 
the  chief  reasons  why  henceforth  the  League  of  Nations 


124   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

idea  must  be  the  basic  principle  of  our  conduct  of  for- 
eign affairs." 

Germany  well  understands  and  recalls  the  original  de- 
sign of  the  "fourteen"  as  a  basis  for  a  compromise  peace. 
She  recognizes  the  fact  that  the  President  failed  to  carry 
out  the  "settlement"  which  the  "fourteen"  contemplated. 
She  remembers  with  bitterness  that  the  expectations  she 
entertained  when  she  asked  for  an  armistice,  in  order  to 
discuss  peace  on  the  basis  of  compromise,  have  been  dis- 
appointed, and  she  considers  that  the  President's  prom- 
ises have  not  been  kept.  But  she  remembers,  and  will  not 
suffer  it  to  be  forgotten,  that  there  was  to  be  a  "general 
association  of  nations,"  which  cannot  really  exist  until 
she  has  a  place  in  it ;  and  when  she  has  her  place,  she  be- 
lieves, the  League  of  Nations  will  take  in  hand  "the  re- 
vision of  the  treaty"!  If  Germany  becomes  a  member 
of  the  League,  under  Article  XI,  she  can  bring  to  the 
attention  of  the  League,  and  demand  action  upon  it,  any 
cause  that  threatens  war.  If  the  pressure  of  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  upon  the  German  people — 
and  there  are  many  very  serious  and  onerous  obligations 
lasting  through  an  entire  generation — should  seem  to 
threaten  war,  Germany,  as  a  member  of  the  League,  could 
press  for  a  change  in  the  treaty;  and  until  Germany  is 
thus  included  in  the  League  the  fourteenth  point  has  not 
been  accepted. 

"My  hope  is  in  the  League,"  says  Heir  Noske,  the 
German  Minister  of  National  Defense.  And  yet  this 
hope  may  be  subject  to  sudden  disillusionment.  Without 
trie  consent  of  the  five  Great  Powers,  Germany  cannot 
become  a  member  of  the  League.  The  provisions  of  the 
Covenant  effectually  block  the  realization  of  that  "gen- 
eral association  of  nations"  that  was  to  stabilize  the  re- 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         125 

constructed  world.  Instead  of  promoting  it,  the  Cov- 
enant actually  prevents  it;  for  it  is  inconceivable  that 
France  will,  until  the  terms  of  peace  are  fully  executed, 
welcome  Germany  into  the  sheepfold.  To  force  her  to 
do  so  would  virtually  destroy  the  Peace  of  Versailles. 

We  have  then,  I  think,  from  every  point  of  view  the 
right  to  conclude  that  from  the  beginning  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  instead  of  contributing  to  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  peace,  has  effectually  delayed 
and  obstructed  it.    It  has  eclipsed  the  peace. 

During  the  long  discussion  in  the  Senate  regarding  the 
ratification  of  the  Peace  of  Versailles,  there  has  never 
been  a  moment  when  the  treaty  would  not  have  been 
promptly  ratified  had  it  not  been  for  the  presence  of  the 
Covenant  in  the  treaty.  It  is  the  League  of  Nations,  and 
that  alone,  that  has  occasioned  controversy  and  led  to 
violent  opposition.  It  has  strained  the  relations  between 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  and  greatly  endangered 
the  Entente.  It  has  displaced  more  immediate  issues  and 
delayed  peace.  It  has  made  continued  peace  less  certain, 
even  when  proclaimed,  so  long  as  strife  over  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  Covenant  is  prolonged.  It  is  essential  that 
they  should  at  once  be  made  clear  or  definitely  declined. 
And  yet,  after  all  the  commotion  it  has  caused,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  has  no 
natural  connection  with  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  It  was 
made  a  part  of  it  because  the  President  declared  to  his 
colleagues  in  the  Peace  Conference  that  he  was  "under 
bonds"  to  his  own  people,  that  he  bore  a  mandate  from 
them  demanding  a  League  of  Nations,  and  that  he  would 
not  dare  return  to  them  without  it. 

The  President,  no  doubt,  believed,  and  perhaps  with 
reason,   that   some   international   understanding,   which 


126    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

might  be  designated  as  a  "League  of  Nations,"  would 
receive  the  approbation  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
He  not  only  assured  his  colleagues  at  Paris  of  this,  but 
declared  that  it  was  positively  demanded  and  must  con- 
stitute a  part  of  the  settlement.  With  this  assurance,  at 
the  first  plenary  session  of  the  Conference,  on  January 
25,  1919,  it  was  formally  resolved,  that  "this  League 
should  be  treated  as  an  integral  part  of  the  general  Treaty 
of  Peace." 

The  consequences  of  this  acceptance  of  the  President's 
insistence  were  apparently  not  realized  until,  on  February 
14th,  the  first  draft  of  a  "Constitution  of  a  League  of 
Nations"  was  completed.  There  was  no  discussion  in  the 
plenary  session,  but  it  was  promised  for  a  later  time.  The 
little  States  amidst  their  fears  had  entertained  high  hopes.^ 
These  were  disappointed.  Objection  was  at  once  raised 
by  the  smaller  nations  that  the  document  created  a  super- 
government,  in  fact  an  imperial  corporation,  existing 
nominally  in  the  interest  of  peace,  but  in  reality  having 
for  its  purpose  the  domination  of  the  world  by  a  small 
group  of  Powers.  To  the  amazement  of  Europe,  opposi- 
tion came  largely  from  the  United  States,  which  had  been 
represented  as  demanding  this  alleged  "League  of  Na- 
tions" as  a  condition  of  peace! 

It  is  important  to  note  the  nature  of  this  opposition. 
It  was  not  based  on  the  idea  that  the  peace  with  Ger- 
many should  not  be  guaranteed,  or  that  no  international 
organization  was  desired,  or  upon  a  rejection  of  the  terms 
of  peace  exacted  of  Germany,  for  none  were  at  that  time 
definitely  proposed.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  complained 
that  peace  was  delayed  by  the  new  construction,  that  peace 
should  be  immediately  concluded,  and  that  the  formation 
of  a  League  of  Nations  should  then  be  taken  up  delib- 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         127 

erately.  Thirty-nine  Senators,  more  than  a  third  of  the 
whole  number  required  to  ratify  the  treaty,  and  therefore 
a  sufficient  number  to  prevent  its  ratification,  signed  the 
"Round  Robin"  declaring  "that  it  is  the  sense  of  the 
Senate  that  the  negotiations  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  should  immediately  be  directed  to  the  utmost  ex- 
pedition of  the  urgent  business  of  negotiating  peace  terms 
with  Germany,  satisfactory  to  the  United  States  and  the 
nations  with  whom  the  United  States  is  associated  in  the 
war  against  the  German  Government,  and  the  proposal 
for  a  League  of  Nations  to  insure  the  permanent  peace 
of  the  world  should  then  be  taken  up  for  careful  and 
serious  consideration." 

The  same  eagerness  for  peace  and  the  same  disposi- 
tion to  improve  the  organization  of  international  relations 
have  been  manifested  in  the  United  States  by  critics  of 
the  Covenant  proposed  at  Paris.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
President  has  persisted  in  his  determination  that  this 
Covenant,  unmodified,  shall  constitute  a  part  of  the  Treaty 
of  Peace. 

The  President's  challenge  to  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States — his  co-equal  in  the  exercise  of  the  treaty-making 
power,  without  whose  advice  and  consent  no  treaty  can 
be  made — and  his  open  attack  upon  the  Senate  for  not 
yielding  to  his  decisions,  have  been  sufficiently  considered 
in  a  previous  volume.  It  has  also  been  noted  that  when, 
after  his  declaration  that  the  Covenant  would  be  so  inex- 
tricably inter  wined  with  the  Treaty  of  Peace  that  they 
could  not  be  separated,  upon  his  arrival  in  Paris,  on  March 
14th,  finding  that  immediate  peace  had  been  decided  upon 
in  his  absence,  he  took  measures  to  put  an  end  to  this  plan. 
Since  that  episode  was  recorded  some  new  disclosures 
have  been  made.    Mr.  Ray  Stannard  Baker,  in  his  sym- 


128   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

pathetic  account  of  "What  Wilson  did  at  Paris,"  now  in- 
forms us:  "Though  the  details  were  not  then  known — 
and  are  not  yet  publicly  known — a  resolution,  fathered  by 
Mr.  Balfour,  had  actually  been  adopted  by  the  Council 
of  Ten,  sitting  in  President  Wilson's  absence,  providing 
for  an  immediate  preliminary  treaty  containing  practically 
all  the  settlements  involved,  not  only  military  but  financial 
and  economic,  including  the  establishment  of  all  new 
boundaries  and  determining  responsibility  for  the  war. 
Practically  the  only  thing  omitted  was  the  League  of 
Nations!" 

"Now  this  whole  procedure,"  comments  Mr.  Baker, 
"was  contrary  to  the  long-held  and  often  asserted  policy 
of  the  President,  and  it  endangered  the  most  important  of 
the  fourteen  points  accepted  by  all  nations  as  the  basis  of 
settlement,  the  fourteenth  of  which  declares  that  'a  gen- 
eral association  of  nations  must  be  formed.' " 

When  the  President  discovered  that  peace  was  to  be 
made  without  including  the  League  of  Nations,  with 
"stunning  directness  and  audacity,"  on  March  15th, 
twenty-four  hours  after  his  arrival  in  Paris,  he  issued  a 
statement  to  the  press  that  the  decision  that  the  establish- 
ment of  a  League  of  Nations  should  be  made  an  integral 
part  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  was  of  final  force  and  that  no 
change  was  contemplated. 

"This  bold  act,"  continues  the  writer,  "fell  like  a  bomb- 
shell in  Paris;  and  in  Europe.  A  shot  from  Big  Bertha 
could  not  have  caused  greater  consternation.  It  over- 
turned the  most  important  action  of  the  Conference  dur- 
ing the  President's  absence;  and  it  apparently  destroyed 
the  popular  expectation  of  an  early  peace." 

Mr.  Baker  regards  this  achievement  as  one  of  the 
President's  most  notable  victories,  but  does  not  hesitate  to 


THE  ECLIPSE  OF  PEACE         129 

report  that  the  Daily  Express  of  London  demanded  that 
the  British  Government  refuse  to  support  him  in  this 
"hold-up";  and  that  Monsieur  Pichon,  the  French  For- 
eign Minister,  publicly  expressed  his  criticism  of  the 
President's  intervention. 

Having  triumphed  over  the  Peace  Conference  in  his 
determination  that  there  should  be  no  peace  without  a 
League  of  Nations,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  President 
should  hold  that  there  can  be  no  League  of  Nations  which 
does  not  conform  to  his  will. 

The  statesmen  at  Paris  were  ready  in  March,  19 19, 
to  declare  immediate  peace,  for  which  the  whole  world 
was  longing;  but  since  that  time  there  has  been 
projected  across  the  luminary  of  peace  the  silhouette  of 
a  solitary  implacable  figure,  sternly  forbidding  the  proc- 
lamation that  the  Great  War  is  ended,  unless  it  conforms 
to  the  mandate  imposed  by  a  single  will. 


VI 

THE  COVENANT  OR  THE  CONSTITUTION? 

Somewhat  tardily,  but  none  the  less  clearly,  the  Amer- 
ican people  are  coming  to  understand  that  the  funda- 
mental question  regarding  the  League  of  Nations  is  not, 
Shall  we  participate  in  some  kind  of  international  un- 
derstanding? but,  Shall  our  conduct  as  a  nation  be  con- 
trolled by  our  own  Constitution  or  by  an  unnecessary  in- 
ternational agreement  that  overrules  it? 

So  intelligent  an  observer  as  Viscount  Grey  of  Fallo- 
don,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Washington,  although 
accustomed  to  move  in  a  different  political  atmosphere 
from  that  created  by  a  written  constitution,  could  not 
fail  to  note  the  wide  difference  between  these  two  ques- 
tions, or  to  be  convinced  that  the  Senate's  discussion  of 
the  League  of  Nations  has  not  revolved  about  mere  par- 
tisan interests. 

It  was  perhaps  made  easier  for  Lord  Grey  to  attain 
to  this  point  of  view  because,  in  1914,  before  Great 
Britain  was  committed  to  war,  he  had  personally  recog- 
nized the  self-evident  principle  on  which  the  whole  issue 
turns,  and  which  he  afterward  so  admirably  stated  in 
the  words:  "You  cannot,  you  should  not,  pledge  a 
democracy  in  such  a  matter  without  consulting  it,  with- 
out clearly  knowing  its  mind."  And  to  this  axiomatic 
statement  he  added,  "I  could  not  be  sure  that  on  any 
point  of  interest  the  British  democracy  was  willing  to  go 

130 


COVENANT  OR  CONSTITUTION?   131 

into  a  great  war.  And  what  a  cruel  disappointment  to 
another  nation  if  I  had  given  a  pledge  and  it  had  taken 
certain  dispositions  on  that  pledge,  and  the  pledge  had 
not  been  kept  because  the  people  did  not  endorse  it!  A 
friendly  nation  might  thus  be  involved  in  a  great  calam- 
ity and  might  with  justice  make  the  reproach  that  we  in- 
volved them  in  that  calamity,  for  without  our  pledge  they 
might  have  submitted  to  a  diplomatic  humiliation;  but 
relying  on  our  pledge,  they  had  stood  firm  and  so  en- 
countered destruction.  Until  Belgium  was  invaded,  I 
was  not  sure  that  the  British  people  would  make  war 
and  I  gave  no  pledge.  When  Belgium  was  invaded  it 
became  a  question  of  honor,  and  I  knew  that  the  people 
would  keep  that." 

"You  cannot,  you  should  not,  pledge  a  democracy  in 
such  a  matter  without  consulting  it,  without  clearly 
knowing  its  mind" — here,  in  brief,  is  the  constructive 
principle  on  which  the  exercise  of  the  war  power  is  based 
in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  The  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations  is  not  founded  upon  that 
principle.  It  is  a  pledge  to  act,  and  it  makes  all  neces- 
sary preparations  to  act,  upon  the  opposite  principle — 
namely,  that  if  the  people  were  consulted,  if  their  mind 
were  clearly  sought  at  the  moment  of  action,  perhaps 
they  would  not  choose  to  act  at  all!  In  order  to  secure 
their  action — this  is  the  theory  of  the  Covenant — they 
must  be  bound  beforehand,  while  the  circumstances  are 
yet  unknown  and  only  generally  stated.  A  solemn  pledge 
must  be  given  in  their  name,  and  to  avoid  the  possible 
calamity  of  their  breaking  it  execution  must  be  confided 
to  a  dominant  authority  who  can  remove  the  subject 
from  all  debate. 

It  was  a  stroke  of  good  fortune  that  a  statesman  of 


132   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Lord  Grey's  principles  and  perspicacity  was  sent  to  Wash- 
ington during  the  long  debate  on  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 
He  was  able  promptly  to  comprehend  its  meaning,  be- 
cause he  perfectly  understands  the  principle  involved. 
This  he  has  now  clearly  explained  to  his  own  country- 
men, and  his  explanation  supplies  the  ground  for  a  cor- 
dial understanding  of  the  American  situation  regarding 
the  League  of  Nations.  "The  Senate,"  he  points  out, 
"by  the  American  Constitution,  is  an  independent  body, 
an  independent  element  in  the  treaty-making  power.  Its 
refusal  to  ratify  the  treaty  cannot  expose  either  itself 
or  the  country  to  a  charge  of  bad  faith  or  of  repudiation; 
nor  is  it  fair  to  represent  the  United  States  as  holding 
up  the  treaty,"  he  continues,  "solely  from  motives  of 
party  politics,  thereby  sacrificing  the  interests  of  other 
nations  for  this  petty  consideration." 

It  is,  in  truth,  to  Lord  Grey's  mind,  as  much  in  the 
ultimate  interest  of  other  nations  as  in  that  of  the  United 
States  that  "reservations"  should  be  made  to  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations  wherever  they  are  neces- 
sary to  indicate  clearly  what  the  United  States  will  or 
will  not  do;  for  it  is  only  thus  that  the  Powers  asso- 
ciated in  the  League  can  know  what  to  expect,  and  thus 
avoid  the  calamity  of  counting  upon  action  where  it  may 
eventually  be  refused.  Nor  is  it  to  his  mind  a  ground 
of  reproach  to  this  nation  that  in  constituting  the  Gov- 
ernment— a  government  based  in  this  case  wholly  on 
delegated  authority — the  people  should  have  placed  it  be- 
yond the  power  of  any  individual  to  pledge  them  in  a 
matter  so  grave  as  the  automatic  creation  of  a  state  of 
war  without  consulting  their  authorized  representatives. 

It  is  a  service  to  the  whole  world  to  point  out,  as 
Lord  Grey  has  done,  in  his  letter  to  the  London  Times, 


COVENANT  OR  CONSTITUTION?   133 

that  "the  American  Constitution  not  only  makes  possi- 
ble, but  under  certain  conditions  renders  inevitable,  a 
conflict  between  the  executive  and  the  legislature."  If, 
for  example,  the  President  should  promise  to  another  na- 
tion something  which  the  Congress  did  not  approve,  such 
a  conflict  would  arise,  and  it  was  intended  in  planning 
the  structure  of  our  Government  that  in  such  a  case  it 
should  arise;  for  such  a  conflict  furnishes  the  most  ef- 
fective method  of  clearly  ascertaining  the  mind  of  the 
American  people  and  obtaining  their  consent,  which  other- 
wise might  be  arbitrarily  assumed  where  it  did  not  exist, 
even  in  so  grave  a  matter  as  being  involved  in  war. 

As  Lord  Grey  reads  the  document,  "It  would  be  pos- 
sible, if  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  stands, 
for  a  President  in  some  future  years  to  commit  the 
United  States,  through  its  American  representative  on 
the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  to  a  policy  which 
the  legislature  at  that  time  might  disapprove. 

"That  contingency,"  he  continues,  "is  one  which  can- 
not arise  in  Great  Britain  where  the  Government  is  daily 
responsible  to  the  representative  authority  of  the  House 
of  Commons,  and  where,  in  case  of  conflict  between  the 
House  of  Commons  and  the  Government,  the  latter  must 
either  immediately  give  way,  or  public  opinion  must  de- 
cide between  them  and  assert  itself  by  an  immediate  gen- 
eral election.  But  in  the  United  States  it  is  otherwise. 
The  contingency  is  within  the  region  of  practical  poli- 
tics. They  have  reason,  and  if  they  so  desire  the  right, 
to  provide  against  it." 

Inevitably,  to  the  mind  of  an  Englishman,  the  major- 
ity of  a  representative  legislative  body  is  entitled  to  be 
considered  as  an  authoritative  organ  for  interpreting  the 
popular  will.     This  is  the  very  essence  of  representative 


134.    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

government  as  it  is  understood  in  Great  Britain.  Ac- 
cording to  the  British  Constitution  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  that  any  power  in  government  can  do  more  than 
temporarily  obstruct  the  operation  of  this  authority. 

A  careful  examination  of  the  "reservations"  adopted 
by  the  majority  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  as 
a  condition  of  ratifying  the  treaty  containing  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations,  will  show  that,  in  the 
main,  they  are  designed  to  secure  precisely  that  legis- 
lative supervision  over  the  policies  and  decisions  of  the 
Executive  which  automatically  exists  in  all  countries  hav- 
ing what  is  called  a  "responsible  government."  If,  for 
example,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain  should, 
under  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  issue 
instructions  to  the  British  representative  in  the  Council 
when  its  members  "advise  upon"  the  course  to  be  taken 
under  Article  X  or  Article  XI,  authorizing  acts  of  war, 
and  the  House  of  Commons  should  consider  the  action 
taken  not  authorized  under  the  Covenant  by  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  or  not  expedient,  the  House  could 
express  its  disapproval;  and  if  this  were  not  heeded,  there 
would  be  an  appeal  to  the  country  and  perhaps  a  change 
of  ministry.  In  France,  under  similar  circumstances,  a 
change  would  be  certain. 

In  the  United  States  nothing  like  this  could  occur.  As 
pointed  out  in  a  previous  chapter,  under  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  as  it  stands,  when  action  is 
automatically  called  for  by  the  provisions  of  the  Cove- 
nant, the  President,  alone,  acting  under  the  authoriza- 
tion 9oi  the  treaty,  would  instruct  the  representative  of 
the  United  States  what  course  to  take  in  the  Council,  and 
could  then,  without  interference  by  the  Congress,  and 
even  without  its  knowledge  of  what  was  ordered  by  him, 


COVENANT  OR  CONSTITUTION?   135 

begin  to  carry  out  the  Council's  decision.  If  that  action 
included  acts  of  war,  such  as  the  dispatch  of  troops  to 
a  foreign  country,  and  the  Executive's  authority  to  do 
this  were  challenged,  he  could  reply  that  a  declaration  of 
war  by  Congress  was  not  necessary,  since  war  was  au- 
tomatically provided  for  in  the  Covenant  and  actually 
existed;  and,  if  it  were  further  objected  that  he  was  act- 
ing without  constitutional  authorization  in  conducting  a 
campaign,  it  could  be  answered  that  his  powers  were 
implied  by  the  obligations  of  a  treaty,  which  must  be 
recognized   as   "the   supreme  law   of  the  land" 

There  was,  no  doubt,  a  period  in  the  history  of  the 
United  States  when  such  pretensions  and  such  reasoning 
would  have  seemed  fantastic,  but  that  day  has  passed. 
The  time  has  arrived  when  men  supposed  to  be  well 
versed  in  Constitutional  Law  do  not  hesitate  to  declare 
it  "strange"  to  hold  that  the  powers  of  Government  in 
the  United  States  are  necessarily  derived  from  the  Con- 
stitution. A  State,  it  is  contended,  being  "sovereign," 
its  Government  is  sovereign!  Its  agents  do  not  need  to 
seek  an  explicit  delegation  of  power.  Armed  in  the  full 
panoply  of  national  sovereignty,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  represents  the  will  of  the  people  in  its 
majestic  plenitude,  and  has  not  to  ask  a  specific  authori- 
zation for  his  specific  acts,  but  may  rather  pursue  any 
course,  adopt  any  policy,  and  take  any  action  that  is  not 
explicitly  forbidden  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  Even  where  that  implied  omnipotence  appears 
to  be  limited,  the  limitation  is  nugatory  unless  a  means 
of  enforcing  the  restriction  of  power  is  definitely  pro- 
vided! The  only  practical  restraint  upon  the  undefined 
power  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  a  refusal 
to  obey  his  decrees  on  the  part  of  some  constitutionally 


136    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

authorized  department  of  the  Government,  like  the  legis- 
lative or  the  judiciary;  and  even  these  he  may  very  pro- 
foundly influence,  in  the  first  instance  by  appeals  to  the 
electorate  and  by  his  supremacy  as  a  party  dictator,  and 
in  the  second  by  his  power  of  appointment. 

This  abnormal  growth  of  executive  power  is  the  re- 
sult of  many  causes.  In  its  origin  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  was  a  government  of  restricted,  co- 
ordinated, and  balanced  powers  definitely  delegated.  It 
was  a  system  designed  to  secure  the  citizen  and  the  sepa- 
rate States  from  the  oppression  which  governments  were 
accustomed  to  impose,  and  always  tend  to  impose  unless 
they  are  restrained.  In  the  contest  for  increased  power 
between  the  legislative  and  the  executive  branches  of  gov- 
ernment, the  latter  had  the  advantage  at  every  point.  The 
fundamental  law  restrained  the  functions  of  legislation, 
but  could  hardly  affect  the  realm  of  policy,  in  which  the 
President  claims  an  unrestricted  field.  So  long  as  the 
President  can  be  plausible  he  can  lead  the  nation ;  and  in 
realms  where  the  popular  mind  is  not  instructed  almost 
anything  can  be  made  to  seem  plausible  by  an  adroit 
rhetorician  like  President  Wilson,  whose  method  is  thus 
described  in  a  passage  quoted  by  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon  in  his 
book  on  "The  Peace  Conference" :  "President  Wilson  is 
conscious  of  his  power  of  persuasion.  That  power  en- 
ables him  to  say  one  thing,  do  another,  describe  the  act 
as  conforming  to  the  idea,  and,  with  act  and  idea  in  exact 
contradiction  to  each  other,  convince  the  people,  not  only 
that  he  has  been  consistent  throughout,  but  that  his  act 
cannot  be  altered  without  peril  to  the  nation  and  danger 
to  the  world.  We  do  not  know  which  Mr.  Wilson  to  fol- 
low— the  Mr.  Wilson  who  says  he  will  not  do  a  thing  or 
the  Mr.  Wilson  who  does  that  precise  thing."     To  this 


COVENANT  OR  CONSTITUTION?  137 

might  be  added,  that  to  those  who  have  committed  them- 
selves body  and  soul  to  a  party  leader,  what  he  says  or 
what  he  does  is  of  no  importance  to  them.  The  only 
important  thing  is  to  follow  him! 

The  fact  that  the  United  States  is  a  constitutionally 
governed  country  has  had  little  influence  either  upon  the 
process  of  framing  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions or  in  the  effect  of  it  upon  the  European  mind.  In 
truth,  it  has  hardly  been  present  to  the  consciousness  of 
some  American  advocates  of  the  Covenant,  and  has  been 
brought  home  to  them  for  the  first  time  by  Lord  Grey's 
recognition  and  proclamation  of  the  fact.  Not  only  so, 
but  the  fact  itself  may  be  regarded  as  open  to  question; 
for,  while  it  is  indisputable  that  the  Constitution  still  ex- 
ists and  is  rightfully  the  basis  of  our  whole  system  of  gov- 
ernment, it  cannot  be  contended  that  its  provisions  have 
recently  controlled  public  action  either  in  its  letter  or  its 
spirit. 

The  evidence  all  goes  to  show,  and  new  evidence  is 
daily  coming  to  light,  that  at  the  Peace  Conference  at 
Paris  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  was  virtually 
a  sealed  book  both  to  the  Supreme  Council  and  to  the 
American  delegation. 

As  regards  the  Supreme  Council,  it  has  not  come  to 
public  knowledge  that  any  American  constitutional  ques- 
tion was  ever  raised  there.  The  personality  of  the  Presi- 
dent, the  American  plenipotentiary,  "acting  in  his  own 
name  and  by  his  own  proper  authority,"  was  so  com- 
pletely in  the  foreground  that  everything  else  American 
was  left  in  the  shadow  of  obscurity.  What  the  effect  of 
this  was  is  evident  from  Dr.  Dillon's  revelation  of  the 
state  of  Lloyd  George's  mind  regarding  the  powers  of  the 
President.    "In  the  course  of  a  walk,"  writes  Dr.  Dillon 


138   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

in  the  book  already  quoted,  "Mr.  George  expressed  sur- 
prise when  informed  that  in  the  United  States  the  war- 
making  power  was  invested  in  Congress.  'What!'  ex- 
claimed the  Premier,  'you  mean  to  tell  me  that  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  cannot  declare  war?  I  never 
heard  that  before.' " 

In  the  mind  of  at  least  one  person  connected  with  the 
American  delegation  in  Paris  an  almost  equally  exag- 
gerated conception  of  the  President's  power  prevailed.  I 
am  credibly  informed  that,  upon  one  occasion  when  an 
item  of  the  treaty  was  under  discussion,  it  was  observed 
by  one  who  examined  the  proposal,  that  the  Senate  would 
never  ratify  a  document  containing  it;  whereupon  its 
proponent  replied  with  much  indignation:  "The  Senate? 
What  has  the  Senate  to  do  with  it?  The  President  is 
making  this  treaty,  and  when  he  goes  home  and  puts  it 
up  to  the  people,  the  Senate  will  find  it  has  nothing  to 
say!" 

This  person,  no  doubt,  felt  that  he  had  the  President 
himself  as  an  authority  for  his  statement.  "The  old  or- 
der changeth"  has  been  the  keynote  of  Mr.  Wilson's 
whole  administration.  This  was  the  title  of  the  first 
chapter  of  his  book  on  "The  New  Freedom,"  published 
in  1912,  in  the  first  paragraph  of  which  we  are  informed 
"that  there  is  one  great  basic  fact"  which  underlies  all 
the  questions  that  now  occupy  the  public  mind.  "That 
singular  fact  is  that  nothing  is  done  in  this  country  as 
it  was  done  twenty  years  ago."  In  the  next  chapter  he 
attacks  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  as  having 
been  made  "under  the  dominion  of  the  Newtonian  the- 
ory" of  the  universe,  and  repudiates  its  system  of  "checks 
and  balances"  as  no  longer  acceptable.  Thus  far,  how- 
ever, he  has  proposed  no  substitute  except  his  own  per- 


COVENANT  OR  CONSTITUTION?  139 

sonal  will.  At  the  height  of  his  enthusiasm  he  openly 
announced  that  unless  his  recommendations  were  heeded 
all  governments  were  about  to  be  overthrown.  To  prove 
it,  he  appealed  to  the  Italian  people,  with  a  result  that  is 
well  known.  "His  implied  claim  to  legislate  for  the  world 
and  to  take  over  its  moral  leadership,"  writes  Dr.  Dillon, 
"earned  for  him  the  epithet  of  'Dictator,'  and  provoked 
such  epigrammatic  comments  among  his  own  country- 
men and  the  French  as  this :  'Louis  XIV  said :  /  am  the 
State!  Mr.  Wilson,  outdoing  him,  exclaimed:  /  am  all 
the  States!' " 

Mr.  Wilson  undoubtedly  never  said  this,  but  neither 
did  Louis  XIV  say  what  is  attributed  to  him.  These 
legends  are  only  the  impressions  created  put  into  words. 
Both  rulers  have  shown  the  same  hostility  to  "checks 
and  balances." 

Undoubtedly  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  as 
seen  from  Paris  appeared  a  matter  of  little  consequence. 
To  the  President's  mind  the  League  of  Nations  was,  as 
he  has  said,  "greater  than  the  Senate,  and  greater  than 
the  Government."  As  for  the  Senate,  he  appears  to  have 
believed  up  to  the  time  of  his  final  return  to  the  United 
States  that  it  would  require  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  to 
change  in  any  respect  the  treaty  he  would  lay  before  it, 
for  it  apparently  did  not  occur  to  him  that  that  body 
could  refuse  to  accept  it  in  some  form.  The  cause  was 
so  great,  the  longing  for  peace  was  so  intense,  the  achieve- 
ment of  the  Conference  was  so  impressive,  that  no  one, 
he  believed,  could  resist  his  determination  to  force  the 
assent  of  the  Senate.  Accordingly,  the  "Round  Robin" 
proclaiming  the  constitutional  prerogative  of  the  Senate 
as  a  participant  in  the  process  of  treaty-making  was  re- 
ceived with  silent  contempt.    From  that  moment  the  issue 


140   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

was  which  should  predominate,  a  Covenant  elaborated  in 
a  foreign  capital  by  the  political  heads  of  five  Great  Pow- 
ers, or  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

When  it  became  apparent  that  the  Senate  was  resolved 
to  maintain  its  position,  having  failed  to  destroy  the  op- 
position to  the  treaty  by  negotiations  with  individual  Sen- 
ators, the  President  turned  to  the  people  demanding  their 
direct  action.  It  was,  in  effect,  an  invitation  to  the  elec- 
torate to  aid  him  in  destroying  the  independence  of  those 
they  had  deliberately  chosen  to  represent  them, — the  sub- 
stitution of  direct  for  representative  government.  "I 
challenge  the  opponents  of  this  treaty,"  exclaimed  the 
President  at  Denver,  "to  show  cause  that  it  should  not 
be  ratified.  I  challenge  them  to  show  cause  why  there 
should  be  any  hesitation  in  ratifying  it.  I  do  not  under- 
stand covert  processes  of  opposition.  It  is  time  that  we 
knew  where  we  stand,  for  observe,  my  fellow-citizens, 
the  negotiation  of  treaties  rests  with  the  Executive  of  the 
United  States." 

Briefly  stated,  it  was  to  be  this  treaty  or  no  treaty. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  were  suddenly  made 
aware  where  they  stood.  They  then  realized,  as  they  had 
not  before,  that  the  Senate  was  defending  the  Consti- 
tution against  the  assault  of  a  public  officer  who  refused 
to  respect  its  provisions  and  undertook  to  coerce  a  co- 
equal branch  of  the  Government.  He  was  right  in  claim- 
ing that  he  had  power  to  make  treaties,  but  he  denied 
the  very  authority  from  which  that  power  was  derived 
when  he  declined  to  make  a  treaty  "by  and  with  the  ad- 
vice and  consent  of  the  Senate." 

I  have  said  in  an  earlier  paragraph  of  this  chapter  that 
the  main  purpose  of  the  reservations  adopted  by  a  major- 
ity of  the  Senate  is  to  secure  legislative  supervision  over 


COVENANT  OR  CONSTITUTION?  141 

the  policies  and  decisions  of  the  Executive  in  relation  to 
foreign  countries.  The  President  perfectly  understands 
this,  and  it  is  because  he  opposes  this  purpose  that  he 
declares  the  reservations  would  "nullify  the  treaty,"  and 
advises  his  adherents  in  the  Senate  to  vote  against  them. 

Let  us  note  the  effect  of  these  reservations. 

i.  The  United  States,  declares  the  first  of  them,  shall 
be  the  sole  judge,  in  case  of  withdrawal  under  Article  I, 
as  to  whether  its  obligations  under  the  Covenant  have 
been  fulfilled. 

The  need  for  this  was  apparent  from  the  fact  that  in 
the  separate  Franco-American  treaty  proposed  by  the 
President,  it  was  not  the  United  States,  but  the  League 
of  Nations,  that  was  to  determine  when  the  obligations 
of  that  treaty  ceased.  If  so  important  a  decision  as  this 
could,  at  the  President's  instigation,  be  left  to  the  League 
of  Nations,  was  there  no  reason  for  this  reservation  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  privilege  of  withdrawal  by  a 
member  depended  upon  the  fulfillment  of  "all  its  inter- 
national obligations  and  all  its  obligations  under  this 
Covenant"?  It  was  the  Council  of  the  League,  and  not 
the  United  States  itself,  that  was  here  explicitly  recog- 
nized by  the  President  as  the  judge  on  this  subject. 

2.  The  United  States,  runs  the  second  reservation, 
assumes  no  obligations  under  Article  X,  unless  in  any 
particular  case  the  Congress  shall  provide  for  the  em- 
ployment of  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States. 

If,  as  the  President  claims,  this  "takes  the  heart  out 
of  the  Covenant,"  the  heart  of  the  Covenant  is  that  the 
President,  and  not  the  Congress,  determines  the  action 
to  be  taken.  "The  Council,"  said  the  President  at  Pueblo, 
"advises,  and  it  cannot  advise  without  the  vote  of  the 


142   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

United  States.  Why  gentlemen  should  fear  that  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States  would  be  advised  to  do  some- 
thing that  it  did  not  want  to  do  I  frankly  cannot  im- 
agine, because  they  cannot  even  be  advised  to  do  anything 
unless  their  own  representative  has  participated  in  the  ad- 
vice." Precisely.  But  who  is  "their  own  representative"  ? 
The  President  of  the  United  States,  over  whom  they 
have  no  control!  What  the  reservation  aims  to  do  is  to 
assert  the  control  of  Congress  over  the  action  to  be  taken. 
And  on  what  principle  can  it  be  said  that  the  reservation 
destroys  the  obligation  of  the  Covenant,  if  by  an  adverse 
vote  in  the  Council  the  same  effect  can  be  produced? 
Clearly,  the  only  difference  is  that,  in  the  one  case,  the 
Congress  is  to  have  a  voice ;  while  in  the  other  the  Presi- 
dent alone  determines  the  action  to  be  taken! 

3.  No  mandate  shall  be  accepted  by  the  United  States 
except  by  action  of  Congress.  It  is  believed  that  the  ac- 
ceptance of  mandates  by  the  United  States  was  already 
understood  at  Paris.  Is  it  not  right  that  Congress  should 
have  a  voice  in  this  matter? 

4.  The  United  States  reserves  the  right  to  decide  what 
questions  are  of  a  domestic  character. 

Evidently,  under  the  Covenant,  so  important  a  ques- 
tion as  that  of  Labor  is  not  regarded  as  a  domestic  but 
as  an  international  question,  and  provision  is  made  for 
treating  it  as  such.  Is  it  not  prudent  for  the  United 
States  to  reserve  the  decision  in  such  matters  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people? 

5.  The  United  States  will  not  submit  to  arbitration 
or  inquiry  questions  depending  upon  or  relating  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

Unless  it  is  the  design  of  the  Covenant  that  such  ques- 
tions be  arbitrated,  in  what  manner  does  this  reservation 


COVENANT  OR  CONSTITUTION?  143 

nullify  the  treaty?  Unfortunately,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
language  employed  in  Article  XXI  places  every  "regional 
understanding" — past,  present,  or  future,  open  or  secret 
— upon  the  same  footing  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which 
is  in  its  essential  nature  a  protest  against  the  collusions 
of  foreign  Powers  for  "spheres  of  influence,"  the  better 
known  name  for  "regional  understandings."  Certainly, 
after  this  unwarranted  confusion,  it  is  desirable  to  take 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  out  of  this  doubtful  category  and 
restore  it  to  its  rightful  place  as  an  American  national 
policy  which  is  not  a  subject  for  international  action. 

It  would  be  superfluous  to  consider  in  detail  each  of 
the  remaining  reservations.  The  important  point  to  note 
is  that  nearly  all  are  intended  to  reserve  to  the  Congress 
powers  which  the  Constitution  accords  to  it  and  of  which 
the  Covenant  seems  in  some  manner  to  deprive  it.  Among 
them  the  one  declaring  that  "the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  shall  provide  by  law  for  the  appointment  of  the 
representatives  of  the  United  States  in  the  Council  and 
Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  members  of  com- 
missions" is  plainly  a  restraint  on  the  action  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive. This  caution  has  been  necessitated  by  the  at- 
tempt of  the  President  to  absorb  the  whole  of  the  treaty- 
making  power  and  to  ignore  the  legislative  control  of 
foreign  affairs  which  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  a 
really  responsible  government. 

The  fourteenth  reservation  is  the  result  of  an  endeavor 
to  solve  the  problem  created  on  account  of  assigning  six 
votes  to  the  British  Empire,  by  limiting  the  manner  in 
which  they  are  to  be  used  rather  than  by  denying  to  the 
self-governing  colonies  a  direct  right  of  representation 
in  the  League.  Lord  Grey  touches  this  delicate  question 
with  calmness  and  consideration.     It  is  significant  that 


144   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

he  raises  no  objection  to  the  solution  proposed  in  this 
reservation  and  considers  that  no  collision  is  likely  to 
arise  from  it. 

The  only  real  and  persistent  objector  to  the  reserva- 
tions is  the  President  of  the  United  States,  who  sees  in 
the  power  to  control  the  action  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  no  rejection  of  the  obligations  of  the  treaty  so 
long  as  this  power  is  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Executive; 
but  the  moment  the  action  of  Congress  is  substituted, 
and  instead  of  its  "own  representative,"  the  President, 
Congress  itself  undertakes  to  act,  the  obligations  of  the 
Covenant  are  ignored,  the  "heart  of  the  treaty"  is  cut 
out,  and  the  whole  scheme  is  "nullified"  1 


VII 

THE  NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW  * 

At  this  time,  more  than  at  any  other  since  the  revolu- 
tionary movements  of  the  eighteenth  century,  there  is 
a  widespread  upheaval  of  the  established  order,  accom- 
panied by  very  radical  demands  for  social  change.  Unlike 
that  earlier  revolutionary  movement,  which  was  actuated 
by  a  general  desire  to  substitute  the  rule  of  law  for  a 
regime  of  arbitrary  power,  the  present  movement  tends 
to  ignore,  and  even  to  challenge,  a  system  of  established 
law,  municipal  and  international. 

The  conclusion  of  the  Great  War,  in  which  our  coun- 
try was  unexpectedly  called  to  participate  for  the  defense 
of  the  legal  rights  of  our  fellow-citizens  and  the  dignity 
of  law  itself,  and  in  which  it  has  borne  such  an  effective 
part,  has  left  the  world  in  a  condition  of  impoverish- 
ment, unrest,  and  uncertainty  that  creates  a  state  of  deep 
anxiety  in  every  thoughtful  mind. 

We  are  confronted  with  a  world-community  which  at 
present  possesses  no  generally  accepted  and  enforceable 
world-law.  I  speak  of  a  "world-community,"  because  the 
achievements  of  inventive  genius  in  establishing  human 
control  over  the  forces  of  nature  have  so  nearly  annihi- 
lated space  and  so  accelerated  the  possibilities  of  time, 
that  the  old  isolation  is  no  longer  possible.     There  is 

*This  chapter  consists,  in  substance,  of  an  address  delivered  be- 
fore the  American  Bar  Association,  at  Boston,  September  4,  1919. 

145 


U6    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

no  mountain  so  high,  no  ocean  so  wide,  as  to  furnish 
an  impassable  barrier  between  nations.  The  day  of  for- 
tified frontiers  has  passed  away  forever.  The  air  has 
become  a  highway  of  swift  invasion.  This  change  of 
international  relationship  has  occurred  so  suddenly  that 
it  is  difficult  to  appreciate  its  significance.  Little  more 
than  fifty  years  ago,  Bismarck  said:  "The  Orient  lies 
so  far  away  that  I  do  not  even  read  the  reports  of  our 
ambassador  at  Constantinople";  but,  to-day,  by  the  air 
route,  the  Golden  Horn  is  nearer  to  Berlin  in  time  than 
Paris  by  the  through  express. 

The  experience  of  the  war  has  taught  us  that  hence- 
forth no  nation  can  preserve  its  seclusion  and  live  apart. 
Actively  or  passively,  its  life  is  affected  by  the  needs, 
the  animosities,  and  the  purposes  of  other  nations.  What- 
ever our  theories  of  national  policy  may  be,  we  cannot 
escape  some  kind  of  relation  with  every  other  nation  of 
the  world.  Our  argosies  will  be  afloat  on  every  sea,  and 
there  will  be  no  port  that  will  deny  them  admission.  The 
important  question  is,  What  shall  be  the  basis  of  those 
relations?  Shall  we  base  them  upon  a  combination  of 
world-wide  power,  or  shall  we  base  them  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  free  cooperation  under  the  regulation  of  ac- 
cepted law? 

When  we  consider  how  incalculable  the  relations  of  na- 
tional power  have  become,  how  mutable  and  how  epheme- 
ral they  have  been,  with  what  fatality  the  weak  have 
always  been  subjected  to  the  will  of  the  strong,  and  how 
imperiously  the  strong  have  always  ruled  the  weak,  we 
seem  to  be  compelled  to  accept  the  conclusion  that  every 
form  of  power  is  a  danger  and  not  a  safeguard,  unless 
it  is  both  responsible  to  a  legally  organized  community 
and  under  its  control.    Underlying  the  whole  problem  of 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         147 

international  intercourse  and  obligation,  therefore,  is  the 
question  of  the  stability,  the  integrity,  and  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  national  units  which  compose  the  world  of 
States  with  which  we  have  to  deal. 

If  the  world-community  is  ever  to  possess  a  world- 
law,  it  will  depend  upon  the  legal  structure  and  purposes 
of  the  States  by  which  that  law  is  to  be  maintained.  We 
cannot  expect  international  peace  or  lawful  procedure, 
unless  the  nations  are  capable  of  securing  obedience  to  law 
within  their  own  jurisdiction,  and  are  so  organized  and 
so  controlled  as  to  admit  and  execute  their  legal  obliga- 
tions to  one  another.  The  fundamental  issue  of  world 
order  is  not,  therefore,  the  possibility  of  forming  a  union 
of  Powers  strong  enough  to  impose  its  will  upon  other 
States,  which  would  in  effect  destroy  their  responsibility, 
but  the  question  whether  the  Powers  entering  into  such 
a  combination  are  disposed  to  bind  themselves  to  the 
acceptance  and  observance  of  definite  legal  principles,  ir- 
respective of  their  commercial  interests  and  military 
strength.  Here  is  the  test  by  which  any  such  proposal 
must  be  judged;  for  States  based  upon  the  idea  of  law, 
existing  to  enforce  the  law,  and  charged  with  responsi- 
bility for  the  protection  of  rights  under  the  law,  would 
change  their  whole  aim  and  character  if  they  partici- 
pated in  any  combination  of  power  not  itself  controlled 
by  law. 

We  must,  then,  repudiate,  as  inconsistent  with  the  na- 
ture of  a  truly  constitutional  State,  any  form  of  inter- 
national association  that  does  not  assume  as  its  first 
postulate  the  authority  of  International  Law  over  all  na- 
tions, regardless  of  their  magnitude,  commercial  interests, 
or  military  efficiency.  In  this  one  respect,  all  sovereign 
States — great  or  small,  rich  or  poor,  powerful  or  weak 


148   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

— stand  upon  the  same  footing,  and  must  be  subordinated 
to  a  common  law.  No  union  of  forces  aiming  at  pre- 
ponderance of  power  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the 
commerce  of  the  world  can  meet  this  test.  No  mutually 
defensive  alliance  of  Great  Powers  designed  to  estab- 
lish a  permanent  control  of  subject  nations  can  face  this 
conception  of  law.  Here  the  jurist  and  the  politician 
must  part  company.  They  do  not  speak  the  same  lan- 
guage, nor  think  the  same  thought.  The  one  has  in  mind 
the  erection  of  an  institution  of  justice,  created  by  the 
common  consent  of  nations;  the  other,  the  preservation 
of  empire  and  the  exploitation  of  the  defenseless,  by 
collusion  with  compliant  co-partners  and  the  suppression 
and  ultimate  extinction  of  possible  rivals. 

The  attitude  towards  these  antithetical  and  irrecon- 
cilable conceptions  of  international  relationship  assumed 
by  different  nations  will  depend  upon  their  idea  of  the 
nature  of  the  State  as  a  political  institution.  If  the 
State  is  arbitrary  power,  and  its.chief  end  is  to  extend 
its  jurisdiction  and  increase  its  possessions,  then  the 
idea  of  any  universal  principle  of  equity  limiting  its  ac- 
tivities and  nullifying  its  aspirations  seems  hostile  to  its 
purpose  of  existence.  In  that  case,  its  statesmen  will 
think  first  of  the  means  of  extending  power;  by  war,  if 
the  nation  be  a  military  one;  by  supremacy  on  the  sea, 
the  great  highway  of  trade,  if  the  nation  possesses  mari- 
time interests;  by  diplomacy,  if  there  are  still  possibilities 
of  national  development  through  secret  bargains  and  a 
distribution  of  "compensations."  In  an  age  when  the 
cost  and  liabilities  of  war  are  great,  such  nations  will 
naturally  be  deeply  interested  in  peace.  They  will  be 
eager  even  to  enforce  peace;  because  an  enforced  peace, 
under  the  aegis  of  predominant  power,  is  the  condition  of 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         149 

securing  and  augmenting  the  wealth  which  war,  like  a 
pestilence  or  a  cyclone,  would  ruin  or  sweep  away.  But 
they  will  hesitate  to  commit  themselves  to  the  observance 
•of  any  definite  law,  or  the  judgment  of  any  judicial  tri- 
bunal, which  is  not  under  their  influence;  and  yet  they 
will  be  eager,  in  order  to  appear  fair  and  honest,  to 
profess  their  attachment  to  justice,  taking  care,  however, 
to  accept  no  legal  obligations  which  they  cannot  in  some 
way  evade. 

In  this  description  of  a  State  whose  being  and  end  is 
power,  I  am  not  thinking  of  Treitschke's  famous  defi- 
nition, or  of  the  Prussianized  German  Empire  as  the  only 
example  of  it.  It  applies  to  every  really  imperial  power, 
whatever  its  pretensions  of  democracy  may  be,  which 
aims  at  colonial  expansion,  holds  subject  peoples  under 
its  absolute  control,  and  thwarts  their  efforts  to  obtain  the 
privilege  of  self-government. 

I  shall  not,  in  this  anxious  and  troubled  time,  attempt 
to  specify  particular  governments,  much  less  particular 
peoples.  I  do,  however,  call  attention  to  the  fact,  that 
governments  change,  and  that  they  are  always  composed 
of  men.  No  man  can  with  certainty  predict  what  the 
government  of  any  European  State  will  be  ten  or  even 
five  years  from  now.  It  would  be  an  error  to  suppose 
that  imperialism  is  essentially  dynastic.  Its  present  phase 
is  that  of  race  domination  and  economic  control.  Im- 
perialism is  not  so  much  a  form  of  government  as  it  is  a 
lust  for  power.  The  greatest  danger  to  the  peace  of  the 
world  to-day  is  the  menace  of  the  socialized  State;  which 
is  based  on  a  crassly  materialistic  philosophy,  and  if  gen- 
erally realized  would  transform  whole  nations  into  in- 
dustrial and  commercial  corporations  claiming  absolute 


150    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

sovereign  authority,  pitted  against  one  another  in  rivalry 
to  possess  the  wealth  of  the  world. 

I  am  making  these  statements  with  no  purpose  of  dis- 
paraging any  nation.  I  am  making  them  because  they 
apply  to  all  nations;  whose  governments  change,  and 
whose  unregulated  power  is  subject  to  the  impulses,  the 
passions,  the  interests,  and  the  ambitions  of  men.  I  am 
making  them  because,  to  my  mind,  there  is  incalculable 
danger  to  human  rights,  to  liberty,  to  national  inde- 
pendence, and  to  national  honor,  in  any  partnership  of 
power  that  looks  toward  mutual  advantage  over  other 
nations,  and  is  not  itself  under  a  rule  of  law.  I  shall 
here  make  no  specifications;  for  we  are  here  to  discuss 
principles,  not  characters.  The  law  knows  no  distinc- 
tions. It  singles  out  no  objects  of  attack.  Forms  of 
government  are  not  its  master,  they  are  its  instruments. 
Democracies  that  choose  power,  and  not  law,  as  their 
governing  principle  may  be  as  absolute  and  as  arbitrary 
as  any  single  autocratic  ruler,  and  much  more  difficult  to 
withstand. 

It  is  the  challenge  to  law,  in  whatever  form  it  comes, 
that  constitutes  the  danger.  And  yet  it  is  challenged. 
Arbitrary  power  knows  no  law.  Those  who  represent 
such  power  see  in  law,  what  it  is,  their  persistent  enemy. 
Such  men — statesmen,  demagogues,  and  class  protago- 
nists— seek  for  colleagues  and  alliances,  as  the  necessary 
aids  to  the  execution  of  their  private  policies.  They  are 
anxious  to  engage  in  their  adventures,  and  to  incriminate 
by  partnership  the  innocent,  the  unsuspecting,  and  the  in- 
experienced. For  this  they  shelter  their  designs  by  pro- 
fessions of  virtue,  loyalty,  and  devotion  to  high  ideals. 
But  the  test  may  always  be  applied,  if  there  is  a  dispo- 
sition to  apply  it.     In  its  international  application  the 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         151 

formula  is:  What  relics  of  imperialism  are  you  ready 
to  abandon?  Are  you  ready  to  accept,  without  qualifi- 
cation, a  body  of  law  based  on  universally  received  axioms 
of  equity,  axioms  which  you  impose  upon  your  own  na- 
tionals in  all  their  civil  and  criminal  relations?  Are 
you  willing  to  modify  the  doctrine  that  the  State  is  power, 
by  admitting  that  the  State  is  power  wholly  subject  to 
fundamental  principles  of  law? 

There  is  a  conception  of  the  State  radically  different 
from  the  imperial  conception  I  have  described.  It  was 
foreshadowed  by  a  philosophy  of  enlightenment  that  dis- 
closed the  insolence  and  usurpation  of  power  unregulated 
by  law,  and  demanded  the  abolition  of  it;  but  its  logical 
conclusions  were  first  embodied  in  an  actual  form  of 
government  by  the  American  colonies  in  the  last  quarter 
of  the  eighteenth  century. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked,  and  yet  I  have  never  heard 
it  emphasized,  that,  in  declaring  their  independence  of 
the  British  crown,  those  colonies  uttered  a  protest,  not 
primarily  against  the  right  to  tax,  nor  yet  against  the 
withholding  of  representation  in  the  law-making  body, 
which  were  secondary,  but  against  the  King's  refusal 
to  grant  the  colonies  a  government  based  on  law.  The 
first  charge  "submitted  to  a  candid  world,"  to  use  the 
language  of  the  Declaration,  is:  "He  has  refused  his 
assent  to  laws  of  immediate  and  pressing  importance  and 
necessary  for  the  public  good."  That  was  the  gravamen 
in  that  terrible  indictment.  It  runs  through  all  the  twelve 
subsequent  accusations  of  misrule,  ascending  through  the 
entire  gamut  of  complaint  with  increasing  intensity,  de- 
claring among  other  things,  "He  has  obstructed  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice,  by  refusing  his  assent  to  laws 
for  establishing  judiciary  powers";  and  ending  with  the 


152    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

climax,  as  if  it  were  the  acme  of  perversity,  "he  has 
combined  with  others  to  subject  us  to  a  jurisdiction  for- 
eign to  our  Constitution,  and  unacknowledged  by  our 
laws,  giving  his  assent  to  their  acts  of  pretended  legis- 
lation." The  claim  to  law,  as  the  most  precious  posses- 
sion of  citizenship,  recurs  at  intervals  throughout  the  re- 
mainder of  the  indictment.  Three  times,  in  the  midst  of 
the  fourteen  additional  specifications  of  usurpation,  the 
writer  of  the  Declaration  returns  to  his  demand  for  un- 
perverted  law  as  the  one  central  purpose  of  the  docu- 
ment. 

On  its  constructive  side,  the  same  spirit  animates  the 
thought  "All  men  are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with 
certain  unalienable  rights" — which  implies  that  the  true 
source  of  law  is  in  the  nature  of  man,  and  not  in  the 
possession  of  arbitrary  power;  and,  hence,  "to  secure 
these  rights,  governments  are  instituted  among  men,  de- 
riving their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned." 

It  seems  like  resorting  to  commonplace  to  repeat  these 
familiar  words;  and,  in  fact,  it  would  be,  were  they 
not  usually  repeated  in  a  manner  so  mechanical  as  to 
obscure  their  deep  significance.  Since  these  expressions 
became  a  part  of  our  breviary  of  patriotism,  our  foreign 
contacts  have  been  numerous  and  intimate,  particularly 
those  of  the  educated  world  with  the  German  universi- 
ties. Through  that  influence  and  a  dread  of  provincial- 
ism, the  precepts  of  a  contradictory  philosophy  have 
been  introduced  into  our  political  thinking.  It  is  the  om- 
nipotent state,  not  the  moral  attribute  of  human  per- 
sonality, it  is  contended,  that  is  the  true  source  of  law. 
Law  is,  therefore,  to  be  imposed  from  above,  not  derived 
from  the  nature  of  that  which  it  is  to  govern.     Estab- 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         153 

lished  and  maintained  by  military  power,  the  State  exists 
for  itself,  and  is  the  sole  creator  of  rights.  As  master 
and  proprietor,  the  State  not  only  commands  without 
limit,  but  may  expropriate  without  consent. 

Under  the  plea  of  superior  national  efficiency,  these  po- 
litical and  economic  doctrines  now  offer,  in  democratic 
countries,  an  easy  opportunity  for  class  control.  As 
State  supremacy,  in  its  socialized  form,  has  grown  in 
favor,  men  have  gradually  abandoned  the  venerable  doc- 
trine of  "Natural  Rights,"  which,  in  substance,  is  sim- 
ply the  axiom  that  there  are  in  human  personality  in- 
herent claims  to  just  treatment,  an  axiom  on  which,  in 
the  end,  all  jural  conceptions  rest,  and  upon  which  the 
whole  structure  of  the  American  system  of  law  and  gov- 
ernment is  founded. 

To  the  practicing  lawyer  this  doctrine  is  naturally  of 
little  interest.  He  wins  no  cases  by  it,  except  perhaps 
when  he  appeals  to  the  sentiment  of  justice,  still  un- 
defined, but  a  living  fountain  of  righteousness,  in  the  rea- 
son and  the  conscience  of  a  jury.  His  interest  is  in 
actual  statutes,  judicial  decisions,  and  the  accepted  pre- 
cepts of  the  Common  Law  which  the  great  English  judges 
— the  finest  ornament  of  English  life  and  character — 
developed  through  their  interpretation  of  customs  by 
which  generations  of  men  had  found  it  possible  to  live 
and  work  together.  Small,  indeed,  would  be  the  retain- 
ers that  clients  would  pay  for  disquisitions  on  the  "rights 
of  man";  and  yet  the  doctrine  of  "Natural  Rights"  will 
live  in  the  hearts  of  men  as  long  as  human  nature  en- 
dures and  can  find  a  voice.  To  the  lawyer  it  may  be 
nothing,  but  to  the  people  it  is  everything. 

The  honest  client  comes  to  his  lawyer  in  the  faith  that 
civilization  has  provided  a  way  to  give  him  justice.    His 


154    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

lawyer  may  know  that,  through  his  client's  ignorance  of 
what  justice  really  is,  or  through  the  law's  imperfection, 
his  hope  may  not  be  realized.  The  difference  is  that  the 
client's  idea  of  right  is  subjective,  the  lawyer's  knowl- 
edge is  objective.  The  distinction  between  "inherent 
rights"  and  "legal  rights"  is,  therefore,  evident.  Looked 
at  historically,  we  see  that  rights  have  generally  been 
treated  as  if  they  were  not  inherent,  but  merely  the 
gracious  gifts  of  governments — concessions  of  privilege 
from  the  throne  of  power.  The  founders  of  the  Ameri- 
can State  revolted  against  this  idea  of  law.  They  were 
anxious  about  their  inherent  rights,  and  meant  to  make 
some  of  them  at  least  legal  rights.  In  England,  long 
before  that  time,  the  "Commons"  had  obtained  through 
their  power  to  control  the  purse,  the  privilege  of  making 
laws,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  King  and  the  Lords, 
and  this  was  also  the  proud  heritage  of  the  colonists; 
but  no  inherent  right  of  man,  as  man,  had  ever  anywhere 
received  a  formal  legal  guarantee  by  any  government. 
Even  Magna  Charta  had  not  done  that;  for,  under  it, 
nothing  was  reserved  to  the  individual  which  the  "law  of 
the  land"  could  not  take  away.  But  the  American  bills 
of  rights  demanded  certain  specific  guarantees  as  the  con- 
dition of  their  consent  to  government.  Believing  these 
rights  to  be  theirs  by  virtue  of  their  nature  as  men,  they 
could  not  permit  government  either  to  withhold  or  ac- 
cord them.  They,  therefore,  created  a  government  which 
was  bound,  by  the  charter  that  gave  it  being,  to  respect 
and  protect  life,  liberty,  the  enjoyment  of  property,  re- 
ligious freedom,  free  speech,  and  free  assembly,  when 
not  hostile  or  treasonable  to  the  government  instituted 
to  give  them  protection. 

This  was  an  entirely  new  conception  of  governmental 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         155 

authority.  It  founded  the  State  upon  a  fundamental  law, 
to  which  all  legislation  must  conform.  It  was  intended 
to  forbid  and  prevent  government  by  arbitrary  decree. 
It  affirmed  that  there  are  "Natural  Rights"  which  all  law 
makers  must  respect,  and  which  even  majorities  cannot 
legally  override  unless  they  have  first  torn  to  shreds  and 
utterly  destroyed  the  charters  of  liberty  in  our  State  and 
Federal  Constitutions — a  danger  to  which  our  liberties 
are  always  exposed. 

Whatever  may  be  held  regarding  the  authority  of 
"Natural  Rights,"  there  are  certain  fundamental  human 
claims  to  just  treatment  and  to  strong  protection,  so 
clear,  so  urgent,  and  so  indisputable  in  their  outcry  for 
recognition  and  security,  that  the  undertone  of  their 
pleading  runs  through  all  the  free  expressions  of  the  hu- 
man mind  since  thought  began  to  be  recorded. 

There  was  superb  wisdom  in  embodying  in  the  Federal 
Constitution  two  provisions  which  had  never  before  been 
united  in  any  federal  system:  (i)  The  reservation  to 
the  people  of  certain  rights  which  could  not  be  legally 
taken  away  by  legislative  action;  and  (2)  the  creation 
of  a  judicial  tribunal  with  power  to  interpret  the  funda- 
mental law,  and  thus  prevent  legislative  encroachments 
upon  the  inherent  rights  which  it  was  designed  to  safe- 
guard against  the  danger  of  invasion  by  any  power 
within  the  State.  For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the 
world,  the  humblest  citizen  was  guaranteed  protection 
even  against  the  government  itself. 

It  is  in  this  new  and  original  conception  of  human 
government  that  we  find  the  essence  of  what  we  are 
pleased  to  call  "Americanism," — the  substitution  of  law 
for  arbitrary  power  and  the  restriction  of  force  to  the 
execution  and  vindication  of  the  law. 


156   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Carried  into  the  sphere  of  international  relations,  this 
conception  implies  that  nations  also  are  rightly  subject 
to  the  rule  of  law  and  not  to  the  rule  of  arbitrary  force. 
As  rights  are  inherent  in  human  personality,  so  they  are 
inherent  in  all  self-governing  and  responsible  communi- 
ties, whose  relations  should  be  regulated  by  principles  of 
justice,  which  alone  can  give  authority  to  independent 
and  sovereign  States. 

Founded  upon  the  idea  of  law,  and  existing  under  the 
protection  of  law,  the  United  States  of  America,  more 
perhaps  than  any  other  sovereign  Power,  has  aimed  to 
establish  its  relations  with  other  governments  on  the 
basis  of  law;  and  has  instinctively  shrunk  from  extend- 
ing them,  even  when  provoked  by  the  turbulence  and  in- 
solence of  comparatively  impotent  neighbors,  on  a  basis 
of  preponderant  power.  In  all  the  international  councils 
in  which  we  have  as  a  nation  hitherto  participated,  our 
Government  has  endeavored  to  establish  law  as  a  standard 
for  the  conduct  of  sovereign  States.  Being  itself  a  crea- 
tion of  law,  it  has  appeared  natural  to  base  its  foreign 
relations  upon  it.  Very  early  in  our  history,  Interna- 
tional Law  was  adopted  as  a  part  of  our  legal  system. 
The  reasons  for  it  are  obvious.  It  had  not  only  been 
accepted  in  the  Common  Law  which  we  inherited  from 
England,  but  was  expressly  recognized  and  appealed  to 
in  our  foreign  negotiations  and  in  our  courts.  Not  only 
this,  but  the  principles  advocated  by  the  great  writers 
on  the  Law  of  Nations  were  identical  with  those  upon 
which  our  conception  of  the  true  nature  of  the  State  was 
founded.  Grotius,  Pufendorf,  Burlamaqui,  and  Vattel 
were  favorite  authors  with  Adams,  Hamilton,  Franklin, 
and  other  colonial  statesmen,  before  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  and  were  constantly  consulted  both  in  the 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         157 

Continental  Congress  and  in  the  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion of  1787.  They,  too,  believed  in,  and  advocated, 
"Natural  Rights,"  and  found  in  them  a  foundation  for 
a  Law  of  Nations  far  more  extended,  and  even  more 
authoritative,   than  the  customary  usages   of  the  time. 

International  Law  created  through  the  treaty-making 
power  has  always  seemed  to  American  statesmen  the  very 
perfection  of  legislation,  because  it  is  founded  entirely 
upon  free  agreement,  and  not  at  all  upon  compulsion; 
and,  besides,  under  the  American  Constitution,  it  is,  in 
its  final  determination  at  least,  the  work  of  an  elected 
representative  law-making  body.  No  method  could  be 
devised  that  would  render  the  law,  when  thus  agreed 
upon,  more  completely  the  expression  of  the  mind  and 
purpose  of  the  peoples  in  whose  behalf  it  is  made.  The 
fact  that  such  law-making  treaties  are  now  habitually 
negotiated  in  all  constitutional  States  by  responsible  min- 
istries, themselves  members  of  the  legislatures  of  the 
countries  they  represent,  adds  immensely  to  the  perfection 
of  this  method  of  procedure.  Here  is  a  process  by  which 
a  complete  system  of  world-law  can  eventually  be  cre- 
ated; and  it  can  be  accomplished  as  soon  as  the  Great 
Powers  are  prepared  to  act  under  a  rule  of  law. 

In  the  present  international  situation,  therefore,  we 
turn  with  more  than  usual  solicitude  to  inquire  what 
prospect  of  such  an  achievement  lies  before  us. 

This  interest  is  further  accentuated  by  the  fact  that 
the  object  of  our  participation  in  the  Great  War  as  a 
belligerent  nation  was  the  preservation  of  the  rights  of 
our  fellow-citizens  secured  to  them  under  International 
Law.  No  other  official  reason  for  engaging  in  the  war 
has  ever  been  given.  We  had,  as  a  Government,  remained 
neutral,  even  in  the  presence  of  ruthless  atrocities,  until 


158   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

a  further  effort  to  preserve  neutrality  would  have  been 
dishonorable,  and  a  shameful  neglect  of  the  constitutional 
duty  of  "common  defense."  It  had  become  apparent  that, 
unless  we  took  part  in  the  struggle,  there  would  soon  be 
no  rule  of  law  by  the  consent  of  the  governed  anywhere 
in  the  world. 

It  is  nowhere  disputed,  that  we  entered  into  the  war 
for  the  preservation  of  international  rights  which  the 
Law  of  Nations  accorded  us,  which  had  been  brutally 
violated,  and  were  placed  in  perpetual  jeopardy.  Other 
objects,  not  contemplated  in  the  declaration  of  war,  have 
been  permitted  to  obscure  the  real  reason  for  our  engag- 
ing in  it,  and  have  entirely  subordinated  that  reason  in 
the  settlements  of  peace.  With  these  objects  I  do  not 
here  propose  to  deal ;  but  it  is  of  importance  to  note,  that, 
in  advising  the  Congress  on  April  2,  19 17,  that  Ger- 
many's course  be  declared  to  be  one  of  war  against  the 
United  States,  the  reason  for  accepting  the  challenge 
was  stated  by  the  President  in  the  following  words: 
"International  Law  had  its  origin  in  the  attempt  to  set 
up  some  law  which  would  be  respected  and  observed 
upon  the  seas,  where  no  nation  had  right  of  dominion 
and  where  lay  the  free  highways  of  the  world.  By  pain- 
ful stage  after  stage  has  that  law  been  built  up,  with 
meager  enough  results,  indeed,  after  all  was  accomplished 
that  could  be  accomplished,  but  always  with  a  clear  view, 
at  least,  of  what  the  heart  and  conscience  of  mankind 
demanded.  This  minimum  of  right  the  German  Gov- 
ernment has  swept  aside  under  the  plea  of  retaliation  and 
necessity."  In  a  later  passage  of  his  message,  the  Presi- 
dent further  specified  the  reason  for  the  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war,  by  saying:  "The  German 
Government  denies  the  right  of  neutrals  to  use  arms  at 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         159 

all  within  the  areas  of  the  sea  which  it  has  proscribed, 
even  in  the  defense  of  those  rights  which  no  modern  pub- 
licist has  ever  before  questioned  their  right  to  defend." 

Here  is  the  reason,  the  only  officially  stated  reason, 
why  the  United  States  became  a  belligerent  in  the  Great 
War. 

We  turn  then  with  more  than  historical  interest  to 
inquire  what  have  been  the  fortunes  of  International  Law 
in  the  settlements  of  peace. 

An  examination  of  the  fourteen  conditions  of  peace 
proposed  by  the  President  on  January  8,  1918,  eight 
months  after  the  declaration  of  war,  discloses  the  fact 
that  there  is  in  these  rubrics  no  reference  to  Interna- 
tional Law  as  having  been  violated,  or  as  something  to 
be  vindicated  and  reestablished.  In  fact,  it  is  not  there 
stated  that  the  United  States  ever  had  any  reason  for 
entering  the  war,  unless  that  may  be  implied  in  the  sec- 
ond rubric,  which  demands  "absolute  freedom  of  naviga- 
tion upon  the  seas,  outside  territorial  waters,  alike  in 
peace  and  in  war" ;  a  principle  for  which  our  enemy  pro- 
fessed to  be  contending. 

In  the  proposal  of  a  League  of  Nations,  made  on  Sep- 
tember 27,  1918,  the  restoration  of  the  Law  of  Nations 
was  not  included  among  the  five  objects  to  be  obtained 
in  the  peace.  In  the  correspondence  with  the  Imperial 
German  Government  regarding  terms  of  peace,  which  led 
up  to  the  acceptance  of  the  armistice,  and  in  the  armis- 
tice itself,  International  Law  was  not  made  a  subject  of 
discussion. 

That  the  vindication  of  violated  law  required  not  only 
a  peace  of  victory,  but  a  peace  distinctly  punitive  of  such 
violations,  is  clearly  evident.  Was  it  not  for  that  crime 
that  Germany  was  to  be  punished? 


160   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

In  some  vague  sense,  I  suppose,  there  is  a  general  im- 
pression among  the  people  in  Germany  that  the  rest  of 
the  world  has  united  in  condemning  the  conduct  of  the 
Imperial  Government,  and  that  the  terms  of  peace  im- 
posed upon  them  are  an  attempt  to  punish  its  offenses; 
but  there  are  reasons  for  thinking  that  the  prevailing  sen- 
timent among  them  is  simply  one  of  regret  that,  with  all 
their  boasted  strength,  they  were  too  feeble  to  win  the 
war,  coupled  with  resentment  that  they  were  denied  the 
compromise  peace  which  they  expected.  In  brief,  the 
national  mind  has  not  been  lifted  out  of  the  conviction 
that  the  problem  of  national  existence  is  purely  and 
solely  a  problem  of  power. 

It  would  have  been  an  impressive  demonstration  of 
the  justice  of  the  punishment  inflicted  upon  the  German 
nation  and  its  allies,  if,  at  the  time  of  the  virtual  sur- 
render under  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  there  had  been 
publicly  read  at  Berlin,  from  the  balcony  of  the  palace 
where  William  the  Second  falsely  proclaimed  a  war  to 
preserve  Germany  from  invasion — which  many  Germans 
still  believe  was  a  justified  defense — the  speech  of  Chan- 
cellor Bethmann-Hollweg,  in  which  he  confessed  that 
the  invasion  of  Belgium  was  a  violation  of  International 
Law,  with  a  proclamation  that  it  was  for  this,  the  illegal 
use  of  the  submarine,  and  other  ruthless  violations  of 
solemnly  accepted  law,  that  the  terms  of  the  peace  of  Ver- 
sailles were,  in  the  name  of  the  law,  to  be  visited  upon 
the  nation  that  had  supported  these  atrocities. 

Taking  into  account  the  circumstances  in  which  the 
war  was  begun  by  Germany,  and  the  purposes  of  the 
Central  Governments  and  their  allies,  severe  penalties 
based  on  the  principle  of  reparation  alone  were  plainly 
merited.     But  there  is  a  higher  point  of  view  than  this. 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         161 

It  is  not  merely  that  the  Belgians,  the  French,  and  others 
were  irreparably  wronged  and  injured.  Beyond  and 
above  this,  an  offense  was  committed  against  what  is  most 
sacred  in  human  civilization,  namely,  the  authority  of 
accepted  law  and  the  solemn  pledge  to  observe  it.  It  is 
upon  this  ground,  and  upon  this  ground  only,  that  the 
German  people,  who  before  the  penalties  are  fully  in- 
flicted will  have  produced  an  entirely  new  generation, 
and  will  number  a  hundred  million  of  deeply  resentful 
recalcitrants,  could  be  made  to  understand  that  their 
punishment  involves  not  merely  material  damages  as  in 
a  civil  matter,  but  a  crime  against  the  dignity  and  sanc- 
tity of  law  itself.  If  it  were  understood  and  believed  in 
Germany  that  the  United  States,  and  perhaps  other 
powers  signatory  of  the  peace,  had  taken  up  arms,  not 
for  gain,  not  because  they  were  rivals,  not  for  any  ad- 
vantage over  the  German  people,  but  solely  to  vindicate 
the  law — which  was  their  law  as  well  as  ours — it  could 
have  no  other  effect  than  to  strengthen  whatever  law- 
abiding  spirit  may  exist  in  the  noblest  minds,  and  to  set 
them  irrevocably  against  the  military  autocracy  that  in- 
duced them  by  false  pretenses  to  perpetrate  this  national 
crime. 

I  would  not  be  understood  as  stressing  what  may  seem 
to  many  a  merely  technical  point.  What  I  wish  to  ac- 
centuate is,  that  a  punitive  peace  is  an  impossible  peace, 
in  the  present  state  of  the  world,  unless  it  is  also,  in  some 
sense,  a  constructive  peace.  You  cannot  expect  that 
eighty  million  people,  composing  a  great  and  capable  in- 
dustrial nation,  hedged  in  by  States  less  potent  in  num- 
bers and  not  more  capable  in  military  efficiency,  will  be 
content  to  go  on,  for  more  than  a  whole  generation,  pay- 
ing heavy  indemnities,  excluded  from  every  prospect  of 


162   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

colonial  possessions — especially  a  warlike  people  that 
lately  entertained  a  dream  of  world-dominion — unless 
they  are  permanently  either  held  down  by  a  superior  mili- 
tary force,  or  see  in  their  compliance  with  the  penalty 
the  operation  of  some  system  of  justice,  offering  to  them 
an  open  path  of  honorable  and  equal  opportunity  of  life. 

It  is  no  part  of  my  present  purpose  to  discuss  this 
problem  of  power,  further  than  to  say  that  a  punitive 
peace  can  be  made  really  effective  only  upon  condition 
that  it  inaugurates  a  new  era  of  justice,  as  well  of  peace, 
in  which  the  vanquished  equally  with  the  victors  will  be 
the  beneficiaries  when  the  penalty  is  paid. 

We  turn  then  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  to  inquire 
to  what  extent  this  condition  is  fulfilled;  and  discover, 
to  our  disappointment,  that  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  which  we  are  told  is  to  be  the  instrument  for 
the  maintenance  of  peace,  contains  no  declaration  that 
sovereign  States  as  such  possess  any  rights  whatever. 
We  find  in  it  no  provision  of  law  by  which  their  conduct 
toward  one  another  may  be  judged ;  no  method  by  which 
a  weak  State  may  legally  enforce  its  right  against  a 
Great  Power,  if  that  Power  is  indisposed  to  recognize 
its  claim ;  no  reference  to  that  "rapidly  increasing  statute 
book  of  the  law  of  nations,"  as  the  corpus  juris  solemnly 
established  in  the  Hague  Conventions  has  been  called, 
and  no  reference  to  the  violations  of  it  during  the  war. 

I  am  trying  to  make  these  statements  with  absolute 
precision,  because  it  is  popularly  believed  that  this  Cove- 
nant was  designed  to  do  all  that  it  has  failed  to  do.  It 
is  true  that  there  is,  in  the  Preamble,  a  reference  to  "un- 
derstandings of  International  Law";  but  it  contains  no 
pledge  to  observe  the  law,  or  to  adopt  it  as  a  judicial 
rule,  or  to  accept  it  otherwise  than  as  a  subject  of  sepa- 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         163 

rate  "understandings."  It  is,  indeed,  provided,  in  Article 
XIV,  that  "the  Council  shall  formulate  and  submit  to 
the  members  of  the  league  for  adoption  plans  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  permanent  court  of  international  jus- 
tice" ;  but  there  is  no  promise  to  accept  its  decisions,  and 
it  will  be  competent  to  hear  only  such  disputes  "of  an 
international  character  which  the  parties  thereto  shall  sub- 
mit to  it." 

On  the  other  hand,  matters  of  vital  national  conse- 
quence are  to  be  entrusted  to  the  purely  diplomatic  de- 
cisions of  the  Council  or  the  Assembly,  such  as  the  im- 
portant question  whether  an  issue  is,  or  is  not,  one  of 
International  Law;  and,  under  Article  XV,  these  bodies, 
unregulated  by  any  law  or  rules  of  procedure,  are  charged 
with  judicial  functions,  possessing  power  to  make  an 
award  which  bars  one  disputant  from  further  asserting 
or  defending  his  right  if  the  other  accepts  the  decision. 

I  shall  not  here  undertake  to  discuss  the  powers  pos- 
sessed by  this  League,  regarding  which  there  are  wide 
differences  of  opinion.  It  is,  however,  of  vital  importance 
to  recognize  the  indisputable  fact,  that  this  Covenant  not 
only  makes  no  advance  in  the  development  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  but  wholly  overlooks  the  status  attained  by 
it,  through  the  work  of  the  great  international  congresses 
since  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815.  As  an  eminent 
authority  has  said,  "For  almost  a  century  the  Society  of 
Nations  had  been  working  its  way  toward  an  interna- 
tional legislature,  and  had  almost  reached  its  goal.  It 
began  by  the  recognition  of  express  consent  as  a  source 
of  the  laws  which  regulate  the  intercourse  of  states,  side 
by  side  with  the  tacit  consent  embodied  in  binding  cus- 
toms. Then  an  organ  was  slowly  evolved  for  the  formal 
annunciation  and  registration  of  that  express  consent. 


164   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

This  organ  was  a  periodical  assemblage  of  representatives 
of  the  governments  of  all  civilized  states.  In  1907  its 
membership  was  almost  complete.  .  .  .  Then  came  the 
day  when  the  firm  foundations  of  the  earth  rocked  be- 
neath our  feet,  and  the  light  of  the  sun  of  progress  was 
quenched  in  the  red  mist  of  war."  x 

We  had  believed,  until  the  cataclysm  came,  that  a  So- 
ciety of  Nations  really  existed,  with  the  possibility  of  a 
legislature  based  on  free  consent,  a  growing  system  of 
law,  and  a  rudimentary  judiciary.  Since  19 14,  there  has 
been  only  retrogression  and  no  sign  of  future  progress. 
A  Great  Power,  leading  others  in  its  train,  bade  defiance 
to  this  whole  system.  Unfortunately,  the  nations  had 
not  realized  that  they  had  a  common  interest  in  main- 
taining it;  until,  one  by  one,  they  were  drawn  into  the 
vortex  of  violence  that  was  destroying  it.  A  terrible  ex- 
perience has  taught  the  world  that,  unless  this  highest 
and  most  endangered  community  of  interest  among  na- 
tions can  be  reestablished  and  supported  by  organized 
defense,  we  shall  again,  in  some  form,  be  subjected  to  the 
insolence  and  havoc  of  arbitrary  power. 

There  is  then  a  vital  necessity  for  the  continued  union 
and  consultation  of  the  Powers  which  have  been  the  vic- 
tors in  the  Great  War ;  but  it  is  equally  essential  that  their 
aim  should  be  the  rehabilitation  and  enforcement  of  law, 
rather  than  a  combination  of  legally  unregulated  forces. 

The  Supreme  Council  of  the  Conference  at  Paris  has, 
apparently,  not  been  deeply  impressed  with  this  necessity. 
Allowance  must,  perhaps,  be  made  for  the  fact  that  it  is 
a  political,  not  a  juridical  body.  It  has  not  considered  its 
decisions  subject  to  any  rule  of  law.  It  has  set  no  limits 
to  its  jurisdiction,  and  has  not  been  solicitous  regarding 
1 T.  J.  Lawrence,  The  Society  of  Nations,  pp.  70,  71. 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         165 

the  source  of  its  authority.  It  has  considered  itself  em- 
powered, as  representing  the  victors,  not  only  to  make 
terms  for  the  vanquished,  which  was  its  prerogative,  but 
to  coerce  independent  sovereign  States,  fix  their  boun- 
daries, and  determine  their  destinies. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  it  was  the  violations  of  Inter- 
national Law  that  brought  the  United  States  into  the  war, 
the  slight  consideration  given  to  it  in  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  has  created  astonishment  in  the  minds 
of  American  jurists.  Noting  that  no  provision  was  made 
for  it  in  the  future,  in  March,  1919,  during  the  period 
when  the  Covenant  was  undergoing  revision,  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  members  of  this  Association  proposed, 
among  other  suggestions,  an  amendment  to  the  Covenant, 
reading : 

"The  Executive  Council  shall  call  a  general  confer- 
ence of  the  Powers  to  meet  not  less  than  two  years  or 
more  than  five  years  after  the  signing  of  this  convention 
for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  the  condition  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  and  agreeing  upon  and  stating  in  authorita- 
tive form  the  principles  and  rules  thereof. 

"Thereafter  regular  conferences  for  that  purpose  shall 
be  called  and  held  at  stated  times." 

That  recommendation,  having  been  approved  by  a  com- 
mittee composed  of  some  of  the  most  eminent  members 
of  the  American  Bar,  and  by  the  Executive  Council  of 
the  American  Society  of  International  Law,  was,  upon 
request  of  the  Department  of  State,  forwarded  to  Paris. 

From  the  fact  that  this  proposal  led  to  no  action,  I  shall 
not  draw  the  inference  that  it  received  no  attention.  The 
source  from  which  it  came  could  hardly  permit  of  its 
being  treated  in  that  manner.  I  am,  therefore,  compelled 
to  believe,  until  further  enlightened,  that  it  was  consid- 


166   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

ered  inexpedient  for  the  Conference  to  recognize  any  in- 
ternational law-making  authority  outside  the  limits  of  the 
League  itself.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  a  reversal  of  the  whole 
theory  of  legislation  by  consent.  Either,  in  the  purpose 
of  the  Conference,  there  is  to  be  no  review  and  revision 
of  International  Law,  or  such  revision  is  to  be  exclusively 
the  work  of  the  League,  a  separate  corporation  in  the 
Society  of  Nations;  and,  therefore,  incapable  of  making 
law  for  that  society  without  its  consent. 

It  is  a  part  of  the  theory  of  this  League  that,  hence- 
forth, there  are  to  be  no  neutral  nations,  and  hence  no 
neutral  rights;  rights  of  which  the  President  said,  in  his 
appeal  for  a  declaration  of  war,  that  no  modern  publicist 
had  ever  before  questioned  them,  or  the  right  to  defend 
them;  rights  for  the  defense  of  which  this  country  has 
more  than  once  engaged  in  war. 

Until  it  is  assured  of  the  protection  of  all  its  rights,  no 
free  nation,  great  or  small,  can  wisely  surrender  either  its 
right  of  self-defense  or  its  right  to  remain  neutral  in  the 
quarrels  of  others.  No  combination  of  Great  Powers  it- 
self unregulated  by  fixed  principles  of  law  can  give  this 
assurance. 

I  offer  no  criticism  upon  an  effort  to  preserve  the  peace 
of  the  world  by  the  consultation  and  cooperation  of  the 
Great  Powers,  or  an  organized  agreement  on  their 
part  to  pursue,  condemn,  and  punish  an  outlaw,  even 
though  the  culprit  may  claim  the  prerogatives  of  a  sov- 
ereign State.  Such  an  agreement  is  imperatively  de- 
manded; but  it  should  be  dedicated  without  equivocation 
or  reserve  to  the  service  of  the  law,  which  it  should  aim  to 
reestablish,  to  render  more  perfect,  and  to  enforce  when- 
ever it  is  threatened  with  violation. 

The  whole  world  cries  out  for  peace,  for  order,  for  the 


NATIONS  AND  THE  LAW         167 

protection  and  the  reinvigoration  of  honest  industry.  We 
have  been  told  that  America  is  to  save  the  world  and 
rescue  civilization  from  dissolution.  I  believe  that,  while 
there  are  limits  to  national  responsibility,  our  country 
has  a  great  part  to  play  in  this  sublime  achievement,  but 
we  must  do  it  in  our  way ;  in  the  way  that  has  made  us, 
in  a  little  more  than  a  century,  the  most  unified,  the  most 
virile,  and  the  most  potent  single  Power  in  the  world. 
And  when  we  ask  ourselves  what  it  is  that  has  given  us 
this  unity,  this  virility,  and  this  potency,  the  answer  is, 
that  we  have  founded  this  nation  upon  principles  of  law, 
and  upon  the  guarantees  of  individual  rights  under  the 
law.  That  is  our  great  contribution  to  civilization;  and 
if  we  are  to  be  of  use  to  other  nations,  old  or  new,  our 
first  thought  must  be  to  remain  our  own  masters,  to  pre- 
serve our  independence,  to  control  our  own  forces  as  a 
nation  by  our  own  laws,  and  to  protect  from  any  form  of 
detraction  or  perversion  that  heritage  of  organized  liberty 
which  has  given  us  peace  at  home  and  prestige  abroad. 


VIII 

THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM 

The  founders  of  our  Republic  well  expressed  their 
purpose  in  declaring  that  they  wished  it  to  be  "a  govern- 
ment of  laws  and  not  of  men." 

We  have,  however,  abundant  historical  illustration  of 
the  method  by  which  a  government  of  laws  may  be  trans- 
formed into  a  government  of  men.  It  consists  in  ap- 
pealing to  the  confidence  of  the  electors  in  the  superior 
wisdom  and  authority  of  the  Executive,  and  the  displace- 
ment of  representative  legislative  action  by  confiding  the 
decision  of  public  questions  to  one  person  and  a  few  per- 
sonally appointed  agents  who  are  the  creatures  of  his  will. 

It  seldom  happens  that  this  transformation  occurs  by 
a  single  sudden  coup  d'etat.  It  is  usually  progressive 
rather  than  immediate,  proceeding  by  easy  stages.  Thus, 
previous  to  the  French  revolution  of  1848,  Louis  Bona- 
parte was  the  most  advanced  advocate  of  democratic  ideas 
in  France.  He  wrote  and  spoke  most  ardently  of  the 
neglected  rights  of  the  working  classes  and  the  extinction 
of  pauperism  by  political  reforms.  The  State,  according 
to  his  programme,  was  to  be  completely  reorganized  in 
the  interest  of  the  oppressed.  On  December  10th  of  that 
year,  Louis  Bonaparte  was  chosen  by  a  large  popular  vote 
President  of  the  new  French  Republic.  In  a  short  time 
he  asked  to  be  entrusted  with  remodeling  the  constitution 
of  France,  in  order  to  embody  in  it  the  conception  of  the 

168 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM    169 

people's  rule.  The  Assembly  opposed.  He  then  de- 
manded that  the  people  of  France  be  the  arbiter  between 
the  Assembly  and  himself  "by  invoking  the  solemn  judg- 
ment of  the  only  sovereign  I  recognize  in  France,  the 
people."  So  great  was  the  confidence  in  him  that  a 
plebiscite  was  taken  which  registered  7,439,216  yeas  and 
only  640,737  noes.  Four  years  later,  after  the  constitu- 
tion had  been  changed  at  the  pleasure  of  the  popular 
President,  the  people  were  invited  to  reestablish  the 
imperial  office  with  Louis  Bonaparte  as  sole  candidate. 
The  answer  was — or  at  least  was  officially  announced  to 
be — that  7,824,189  Frenchmen  recorded  an  affirmative 
vote,  and  only  253,145  ventured  to  oppose.  Personality 
had  completely  triumphed  over  principles,  and  the  work 
of  the  revolution  was  thus  undone  by  the  establishment 
of  the  Second  Empire,  with  Napoleon  III  in  the  place  of 
Napoleon  I. 

Under  cover  of  an  appeal  to  the  "will  of  the  people" 
an  irresponsible  power  was  evoked,  stimulated  by  private 
interests,  and  guided  by  personal  control.  The  people 
knew  nothing  of  the  effect  of  the  constitution  that  would 
be  framed  for  them.  Wholly  without  knowledge,  they 
were  called  upon  to  build  upon  faith.  No  doubt  the 
faith  was  genuine,  but  it  proved  to  be  ill  founded.  They 
surrendered  blindly  to  a  leader  only  to  discover  that  they 
had  created  a  master.  It  cannot  be  held  that  a  vote  in 
such  a  case  is  an  expression  of  public  opinion.  An  opin- 
ion requires  elements  of  judgment,  and  a  sound  opinion 
implies  complete  enlightenment.  Without  deliberate  and 
free  discussion  public  opinion,  in  a  proper  sense,  cannot 
exist.  Mere  social  unrest  and  vague  aspirations  do  not 
constitute  opinion,  they  only  furnish  motive  power  for 
promoting  the  schemes  of  a  demagogue  who  promises  to 


170   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

secure  what  the  most  vocal  of  the  people  say  they  desire. 
To  leave  the  decision  of  any  great  public  question  to  the 
volition  or  control  of  a  single  individual  is  the  abdication 
of  public  opinion. 

The  disposition  to  resort  to  such  abdication  is  strongest 
when  the  subject  under  consideration  is  too  intricate  for 
the  ordinary  mind;  but  the  complexity  of  the  question 
to  be  determined  presents  the  best  possible  reason  for  re- 
ferring it  to  many  experts  rather  than  to  any  single  per- 
son, for  it  is  thus  more  certain  to  be  considered  from  all 
points  of  view  both  of  public  interest  and  of  private  judg- 
ment. The  American  people,  possessing  from  the  be- 
ginning a  larger  experience  in  self-government  than  the 
French  possessed  in  185 1,  would  never  have  thought  for 
a  moment  of  confiding  to  one  person,  however  trusted,  so 
grave  a  task  as  framing  a  constitution;  and  it  is  im- 
probable that  any  American  statesman  at  any  past  period 
of  our  history  as  a  nation  would  ever  have  been  willing 
to  take  the  responsibility  of  such  an  attempt,  even  if  he 
were  empowered  to  undertake  it.  Guided  by  a  sound  in- 
stinct, the  founders  of  the  nation  were  unwilling  to  en- 
trust so  important  an  undertaking  even  to  their  ordinary 
legislative  bodies;  and,  to  crown  their  system  of  repre- 
sentative government,  they  called  into  being  for  the  first 
time  the  constitutional  convention,  a  body  composed  of 
carefully  selected  men  fitted  to  perform  this  specific  task. 

In  like  manner,  in  framing  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  the  founders  had  the  wisdom  to  provide 
that  in  the  responsible  work  of  making  treaties  with  for- 
eign nations — which  they  dignified  by  including  treaties 
in  "the  supreme  law  of  the  land" — power  should  not  be 
entrusted  to  a  single  person,  even  though  he  might  have 
been  chosen  as  head  of  the  nation.    On  the  contrary,  ex- 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM     171 

press  provision  was  made  for  the  "advice  and  consent" 
of  a  body  of  men  possessing  knowledge  and  experience  in 
such  matters.  Not  only  this,  but  even  in  this  body  a 
great  preponderance  of  opinion  was  made  necessary  be- 
fore such  consent  could  be  given. 

For  this  caution  there  was  a  double  reason.  It  was 
necessary  to  guard  against  misadventure  not  only  in  the 
interest  of  the  country  as  a  whole,  but  to  secure  by  an 
equal  representation  of  the  States  the  rights  and  the  in- 
terests of  each  one  of  them.  When  it  is  considered  how 
possible  it  would  be  for  a  single  person,  if  the  power  were 
exclusively  in  his  own  hands,  to  impose  upon  the  nation 
contractual  relations  with  foreign  Powers  which,  though 
advantageous  to  one  or  several  portions  of  the  nation, 
might  be  extremely  detrimental  to  others,  it  is  evident 
that  this  division  of  power  was  not  only  wise  and  just, 
regarded  as  a  principle,  but  certain  to  be  insisted  upon  by 
statesmen  farseeing  enough  to  realize  the  immense  con- 
sequences involved  in  the  exercise  of  the  treaty-making 
power. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  a  little  disconcerting  that  a  Chief 
Executive  of  the  United  States,  sworn  to  obey  the  Con- 
stitution in  which  such  foresight  is  expressed,  should 
for  a  moment  be  tempted  to  disregard  so  important  a 
provision,  and  it  is  much  more  surprising  that  he  should 
attempt  in  any  manner  or  degree  to  thwart  its  operation. 
Having  conscientiously  performed  the  part  assigned  to 
him  by  the  only  authority  on  the  subject,  he  might  reason- 
ably be  expected  to  leave  his  co-partners  in  the  process 
of  treaty-making  to  the  free  and  untrammeled  perform- 
ance of  their  part. 

Although  the  participants  in  the  treaty-making  process 
have  often  in  the  course  of  our  history  as  a  nation  dif- 


172   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

fered  widely  in  their  views  of  the  expediency  of  proposed 
treaty  engagements,  the  constitutionally  authorized  pro- 
cedure has  never  until  recently  been  departed  from.  The 
Senate  has  modified  treaties  to  a  point  at  which  it  was 
necessary  to  abandon  them  or  negotiate  the  acceptance  of 
changes,  and  the  President  has  not  only  yielded  to  such 
changes  but  undertaken  fresh  negotiations ;  but  never  has 
a  treaty  been  submitted  to  the  direct  action  of  the  elector- 
ate as  a  means  of  forcing  either  the  Senate  or  the  Presi- 
dent to  yield  to  the  other.  For  such  direct  action  the  Con- 
stitution, which  is  clear  and  specific  in  delegating  final 
authority  in  the  treaty-making  process,  has  made  no  pro- 
vision, nor  does  it  appear  even  to  have  been  contemplated 
as  a  possibility. 

When,  therefore,  President  Wilson,  having  personally 
negotiated  a  treaty  involving  a  reversal  of  the  traditional 
policies  of  the  United  States,  extending  far  beyond  the 
usual  conditions  of  making  peace,  and  even  setting  up  a 
mechanism  of  super-government  capable  of  acting  with 
and  upon  sovereign  States  in  a  manner  which  subordi- 
nates the  constitutional  powers  of  Congress,  and  having 
failed  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Senate  to  its  ratifica- 
tion, appeals  to  the  electorate  as  a  means  of  enforcing 
acceptance  of  the  treaty,  he  is  proposing  a  course  of  action 
which  is  extra-constitutional,  anti-constitutional,  and 
legally  futile.  It  is  extra-constitutional,  because  the 
"great  and  solemn  referendum"  to  which  he  makes  ap- 
peal is  nowhere  provided  for  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States;  it  is  anti-constitutional,  because  it  is  a  re- 
sort to  a  procedure  which  sets  aside  the  explicit  and  final 
constitutional  authority  for  making  treaties;  and  it  is 
futile,  because  a  popular  vote  on  the  subject,  if  favorable 
to  the  ratification  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM    173 

tions  would  have  no  binding  legal  force  without  a  formal 
amendment  to  the  Constitution.  Until  that  is  accom- 
plished the  Senate  cannot  be  legally  compelled  to  ratify  the 
treaty;  and  a  majority  of  the  members,  believing  as  they 
do  that  the  unmodified  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions is  in  conflict  with  the  Constitution,  could  not  con- 
scientiously yield  to  a  constitutionally  unauthorized  pro- 
cedure and  give  their  advice  and  consent  to  ratify  the 
treaty  so  long  as  the  Constitution  they  have  sworn  to  sup- 
port remains  unchanged. 

The  proposal  of  a  plebiscite,  therefore,  raises  two  in- 
teresting questions :  ( I )  What  would  be  the  legal  or  moral 
value  of  a  majority  popular  vote  on  the  subject?  and  (2) 
what  would  be  the  effect  upon  the  system  of  constitu- 
tional and  representative  government  of  resorting  to  such 
a  method? 

The  President  proposes  to  force  the  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  including  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  without  a  change,  by  a  plebiscite  in  connec- 
tion with  a  presidential  election.  Having  publicly  de- 
clined to  accept  the  action  of  the  Senate,  he  demands  a 
popular  vote  supporting  his  defiance  of  the  Senate's  con- 
stitutional prerogative. 

His  position  on  this  point  is  unmistakable.  He  is  will- 
ing to  have  the  treaty  ratified  only  in  the  form  in  which, 
"in  his  own  name  and  by  his  own  proper  authority,"  he 
signed  it  at  Paris.  In  his  letter  of  November  19,  1919, 
addressed  to  Senator  Hitchcock,  the  leader  of  his  party, 
he  said :  "I  sincerely  hope  that  the  friends  and  supporters 
of  the  treaty  will  vote  against  the  Lodge — that  is,  the 
Senate  majority — resolution  of  ratification."  On  Jan- 
uary 8,  1920,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Chairman  of  his 


174   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

party's  National  Committee,  he  made  his  attitude  still 
more  explicit  in  the  following  words : 

"Personally,  I  do  not  accept  the  action  of  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States  as  the  decision  of  the  Nation. 

"I  have  asserted  from  the  first  that  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  people  of  this  country  desire  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty,  and  my  impression  to  that  effect  has 
recently  been  confirmed  by  the  unmistakable  evidences  of 
public  opinion  given  during  my  visit  to  seventeen  of  the 
States. 

"I  have  endeavored  to  make  it  plain  that  if  the  Senate 
wishes  to  say  what  the  undoubted  meaning  of  the  League 
is  I  shall  have  no  objection.  There  can  be  no  reasonable 
objection  to  interpretations  accompanying  the  act  of  rati- 
fication itself.  But  when  the  treaty  is  acted  upon,  I  must 
know  whether  it  means  that  we  have  ratified  or  rejected  it. 

"We  cannot  rewrite  this  treaty.  We  must  take  it  with- 
out changes  which  alter  its  meaning,  or  leave  it,  and  then, 
after  the  rest  of  the  world  has  signed  it,  we  must  face 
the  unthinkable  task  of  making  another  and  separate 
treaty  with  Germany. 

"But  no  mere  assertions  with  regard  to  the  wish  and 
opinion  of  the  country  are  credited.  If  there  is  any  doubt 
as  to  what  the  people  of  the  country  think  on  this  vital 
matter,  the  clear  and  single  way  out  is  to  submit  it  for 
determination  at  the  next  election  to  the  voters  of  the 
Nation,  to  give  the  next  election  the  form  of  a  great  and 
solemn  referendum,  a  referendum  as  to  the  part  the 
United  States  is  to  play  in  completing  the  settlements  of 
the  war  and  in  the  prevention  in  the  future  of  such  out- 
rages as  Germany  attempted  to  perpetrate." 

The  President  refuses  to  accept  the  advice,  and  he  de- 
mands that  the  treaty  be  ratified  without  the  consent  of 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM    175 

the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  Unable  to  dominate  its 
action  or  to  obtain  its  assent  by  argument,  he  declares  that 
the  Senate  must  take  the  treaty  as  it  was  written,  or  leave 
it.  The  Senate's  advice  and  consent  are  then  to  be 
ignored.  It  may,  if  it  pleases,  offer  its  "interpretations," 
but  these  are  to  have  no  authority.  In  no  case  are  they 
to  be  inserted  in  the  act  of  ratification.  They  may  "ac- 
company" it  as  casual  comments,  but  there  must  be  no 
alteration  in  its  meaning.  He  understands  perfectly  that 
if  such  comments  coincide  with  the  plain  meaning  of  the 
text,  they  are  superfluous;  and  if  they  do  not  coincide, 
they  would  be  ridiculous. 

Even  after  the  plain  intimations  already  given  that  the 
accession  of  the  United  States  to  the  League  of  Nations 
with  the  Senate's  reservations  would  be  gladly  accepted 
by  the  Allied  Powers,  the  President  attempts  to  warn 
against  even  the  slightest  reservation  regarding  the  Cov- 
enant, by  declaring  that  "we  must  face  the  unthinkable 
task  of  making  another  and  separate  peace  with  Ger- 
many" ;  when  he  knows  that,  as  Germany  is  not  a  mem- 
ber of  the  League,  and  has  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
formation  of  it,  she  would  have  nothing  to  say  regarding 
it.  There  is  not  in  the  entire  Treaty  of  Versailles  a  single 
line  that  prevents  the  League,  which  possesses  the  explicit 
right  of  self-amendment,  from  making  any  changes  its 
members  may  think  it  expedient  to  make  in  its  powers  or 
its  conditions  of  membership. 

Seeing  clearly  that,  without  some  means  of  escape,  the 
responsibility  for  preventing  the  ratification  of  any  treaty 
must  fall  upon  himself,  unless  he  recognizes  the  constitu- 
tional rights  of  the  Senate,  President  Wilson  is  now  look- 
ing for  an  avenue  of  retreat.  He  finds  it,  as  Louis  Bona- 
parte found  it,  when  he  demanded  that  the  people  over- 


176   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

rule  the  Assembly,  in  the  form  of  a  plebiscite;  and,  to 
serve  a  double  purpose,  he  affirms  that  "the  clear  and 
single  way  out  is  to  submit  it  (the  treaty)  for  determi- 
nation at  the  next  election  to  the  voters  of  the  Nation, 
to  give  the  next  election  the  form  of  a  great  and  solemn 
referendum." 

On  his  part,  this  is  an  ingenious  proposal.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  is  a  desperate  attempt  to  test  the  continuation  of 
the  personal  leadership  of  his  party;  on  the  other,  what- 
ever the  outcome,  the  result  could  be  utilized  as  a  means 
of  escape  from  the  responsibility  which  the  Allies  and  the 
history  of  his  administration  will  place  upon  him,  if  now 
that  he  has  created  the  present  international  situation,  he 
cannot  make  good  the  promises  made  in  Paris,  but  by  his 
own  act  prevents  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles. 

Secluded  from  contact  with  the  present  condition  of 
the  public  mind,  as  Mr.  Wilson  is,  having  so  long  disre- 
garded his  electoral  slogan  of  "common  counsel,"  as  he 
indisputably  has,  and  recalling  the  triumphal  journeys  in 
which  he  was  once  the  object  of  so  much  popular  adula- 
tion, it  was  not  unnatural  that  he  should  cherish  the  be- 
lief that  he  could  greatly  embarrass  his  opponents  by  con- 
fronting them  in  an  electoral  campaign.  In  19 18  he 
stood  almost  alone  in  believing  that  the  majority  of  his 
countrymen  would  gladly  make  him  their  "unembarrassed 
spokesman  in  affairs  at  home  and  abroad."  They  had 
made  him  a  dictator  during  the  war ;  would  they  not  fol- 
low him  also  in  peace,  and  even  renounce,  as  they  had  so 
long  held  in  abeyance,  their  party  affiliations  in  order  to 
do  so? 

But  more  is  involved  than  a  final  test  of  leadership. 
The  projected  reorganization  of  the  world  is  languishing. 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM     177 

To  stand  once  more  before  the  world  as  an  "unembar- 
rassed spokesman"  would  be  an  unprecedented  victory, 
but  at  present  Mr.  Wilson  finds  himself  in  an  extremely 
embarrassing  position.  He  himself  has  demanded  a 
"great  and  solemn  referendum"  to  force  upon  the  Senate 
a  treaty  which  it  will  not  accept;  and  yet  he  has  himself 
threatened  to  withdraw  it,  and  to  cancel  all  his  efforts  for 
peace,  if  the  action  of  the  Supreme  Council  does  not  please 
him. 

History  will  ask,  Who  is  responsible  for  the  refusal  to 
make  peace?  Mr.  Wilson  would  put  the  responsibility, 
if  he  could,  on  the  Senate;  but  the  Senate  is  anxious  to 
make  peace,  and  is  ready  to  ratify  a  treaty  of  peace  that 
will  leave  the  institutions  and  the  liberties  of  America  un- 
impaired. It  is,  in  truth,  very  anxious  about  it.  If  the 
President  refuses  to  accept  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate  as  to  the  terms  of  peace,  will  he  not  be  responsible 
for  a  failure?  He  thinks,  however,  that  he  sees  a  way  to 
place  the  responsibility  elsewhere. 

The  situation  reminds  one  of  the  advice  Kaiser  William 
II  gave  to  the  late  Czar  of  Russia  after  he  had  lost  the 
war  with  Japan.  Let  others,  he  advised,  bear  the  odium 
of  the  disappointment  caused  by  the  failure  of  the  war 
through  letting  them  take  the  responsibility  of  making 
peace!  Hide  behind  your  people  by  letting  them  have 
their  way !  A  plebiscite  is  a  double  resource  for  an  auto- 
crat. If  it  sustains  him,  he  becomes  a  hero.  If  it  de- 
cides against  him,  he  receives  applause  for  yielding  to  the 
will  of  the  people.  It  is  a  great  game,  in  which  every  loss 
is  a  gain,  because  even  defeat  affords  a  new  opportunity 
of  escaping  the  odium  of  having  broken  pledges  too  ad- 
venturously made. 

Apart  from  the  President,  the  only  persons  who  want 


178   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

"a  great  and  solemn  referendum"  are  the  so-called  "Irrec- 
oncilables,"  who  wish  nothing  so  much  as  to  defeat  the 
treaty.  Do  they  not  see  that  they  are  playing  into  the 
President's  hands?  Without  a  plebiscite  either  he  himself 
must  defeat  his  own  treaty  or  accept  a  modification  of  it 
that  would  make  it  safe  for  the  country  and  its  institu- 
tions. That  he  will  never  accept  any  reservation,  "mild" 
or  otherwise,  he  has  positively  declared  in  his  letter  of 
March  8th  to  Senator  Hitchcock.  More  emphatically 
than  ever  before,  it  is  henceforth,  "This  treaty,  or  no 
treaty."  The  "Battalion  of  Death"  honestly  believes,  and 
its  judgment  is  perhaps  correct,  that  a  referendum  would 
result  in  disapproval  of  the  unmodified  treaty.  But 
would  that  disapproval  involve  a  disapproval  of  the  reser- 
vations also?  Would  that  be  a  victory  of  American  na- 
tionalism, for  which  the  "Irreconcilables"  profess  to 
stand?  Do  they  really  wish  that  there  shall  be  no  treaty, 
or  that  there  shall  be  henceforth  no  international  associa- 
tion? They  might  by  raising  this  issue  divide  the  coun- 
try, but  they  would  lose  on  that  platform.  There  must  be 
some  kind  of  a  treaty.  There  must  be  some  kind  of  better 
international  organization.  The  people  may  not  know  pre- 
cisely what  either  should  be,  but  it  is  certain  that  they 
will  demand  both  a  peace  with  Germany  which  other  na- 
tions will  help  to  sustain  and  a  world  ruled  by  law. 

If  there  is  to  be  a  plebiscite,  it  must  be  upon  alternative 
propositions.  What  are  they  to  be?  If  the  President 
could  force  a  vote  on  the  simple  questions,  this  treaty,  or 
no  treaty;  this  League,  or  no  international  organization; 
and  could  make  it  a  party  issue,  that  would  be  in  itself 
a  victory  for  him.  Even  if  he  were  defeated,  he  could 
say,  "I  did  the  best  I  could.  I  am  now  relieved  of  further 
responsibility.    I  bow  to  the  will  of  the  people." 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM     179 

But  the  issue  cannot  fairly  be  thus  stated.  The  real 
issue  is,  This  League,  or  a  better  international  organiza- 
tion in  which  the  United  States  can  heartily  cooperate. 

If  the  subject  is  to  be  forced  into  party  politics,  this 
is  the  only  form  it  can  justly  take.  The  political  parties 
in  the  United  States  cannot  be  aligned  on  any  other 
ground.  They  may  by  violent  procedure  be  divided,  but 
the  opponents  of  President  Wilson's  attitude  can  never 
be  united  on  the  alternative  of  this  treaty  or  no  treaty. 
An  attempt  to  force  this  would  be  an  alliance  with  the 
President's  unwavering  supporters. 

Events  have  made  it  evident  that  the  President's  devo- 
tion to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  is  by  no  means  steadfast.  He  has 
clearly  intimated  to  his  former  colleagues  in  the  Supreme 
Council  at  Paris  that,  unless  his  authority  is  recognized 
and  his  decisions  are  complied  with,  he  will  withdraw 
the  treaty  from  the  Senate.  He  has  not  hesitated  to  say 
this,  even  though  he  would  have  to  "face  the  unthinkable 
task  of  making  another  and  separate  peace  with  Ger- 
many"! A  treaty  with  reservations,  the  President  pro- 
fesses, he  will  not  have;  but  the  policy  of  those  acting 
under  his  orders  is  not  clear.  While  Mr.  Wilson  is  mak- 
ing his  protest  against  reservations,  his  principal  spokes- 
man in  the  Senate — not  altogether  "unembarrassed,"  it 
is  true — while  contending  that  an  amendment  would  kill 
the  treaty,  has  not  hesitated  to  offer  one  under  the  cover 
of  a  reservation.  Whatever  the  motive,  the  fact  is  in- 
disputable. On  February  26th,  Senator  Hitchcock  intro- 
duced the  following  as  a  substitute  for  a  proposed  revi- 
sion of  the  reservation  on  domestic  questions : 

"That  no  member  nation  is  required  to  submit  to  the 
League,  its  Council,  or  its  Assembly  for  decision,  report, 


180   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

or  recommendation  any  matter  which  it  considers  to  be 
a  domestic  question,  such  as  immigration,  labor,  tariff,  or 
other  matters  relating  to  its  internal  or  coastwise-affairs." 

Senator  Brandegee  inquired  if  the  Senator  did  not  con- 
sider this  really  an  amendment  to  the  treaty,  "in  that  it 
changes  the  treaty  provision  as  to  all  the  other  signatory 
Powers  as  well  as  ourselves."  "All  we  are  trying  to  do 
in  the  reservation,"  he  continued,  "is  to  fix  our  duty  under 
the  treaty;  but  the  Senator's  reservation — if  that  is  the 
proper  designation  of  it — changes  the  treaty  provision 
as  to  the  duty  of  all  the  signatory  Powers  as  well  as  our- 
selves." Senator  Hitchcock  admitted  that  his  reservation 
'"changes  the  treaty,"  but  he  thought  the  change  would  be 
"pleasing  to  the  other  nations"!  Senator  Lenroot  then 
observed :  "There  is  no  Senator  upon  this  floor  who  has 
declaimed  louder  against  amending  the  treaty  and  send- 
ing it  back  to  the  different  nations  than  has  the  Senator 
from  Nebraska,  and  yet  the  Senator  from  Nebraska  now 
offers  to  the  Senate  a  clear  amendment  of  the  treaty  that 
effects  the  rights  not  only  of  the  United  States,  but  at- 
tempts to  change  the  rights  and  privileges  of  every  mem- 
ber of  the  League  as  fixed  by  the  treaty,  and  after  they 
have  ratified  the  treaty."  He  then  asked,  "Does  not  the 
treaty  provide  that  the  League  itself  shall  determine  what 
are  domestic  questions?" 

To  this  Senator  Hitchcock  answered,  "That  is  a  dubious 
question.  I  doubt  whether  it  does."  Whereupon  Senator 
Reed  inquired  if  the  Senator  from  Nebraska  would  sign 
a  treaty  of  whose  meaning  he  was  doubtful;  and  Senator 
Smith  of  Georgia  affirmed,  that  the  formula  proposed  by 
the  Senator  from  Nebraska  was  "a  clear  amendment  of 
the  treaty."  But  he  did  not  stop  with  that.  Having  so 
far  deserted  the  President's  representatives  in  the  Senate 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM     181 

as  to  wish  the  treaty  ratified  with  reservations,  Senator 
Smith  said,  speaking  of  Senator  Hitchcock's  amendment : 
"I  do  not  think  it  wise  now  for  us  to  undertake  to  amend 
the  original  document.  We  have  all  conceded  that  reser- 
vations are  the  only  mode  by  which  the  Senate  will  vote 
for  such  an  amendment  now,  and  to  present  it  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  a  reservation  is  to  offer  something  that  the 
Senator  from  Nebraska  knows  will  be  killed,  and  almost 
amounts  to  joining  the  irreconcilables  in  hindering 
action." 

If  the  Senate  should  now,  as  the  Senator  from  Georgia 
suggests,  burden  the  treaty  with  amendments  altering  for 
other  nations  the  engagements  already  agreed  to  and  rati- 
fied by  them,  and  they  should  decline  to  reopen  formal 
negotiations  for  revision,  the  President  would  no  doubt 
insist  that  the  Senate  had  not  only  made  reservations 
limiting  the  obligations  of  the  United  States — which  un- 
der the  established  procedure  of  diplomatic  practice  it  may 
do  without  rejecting  the  treaty — but  had  refused  to  ac- 
cept the  treaty  with  any  modification  that  can  be  made, 
and  had  therefore  rejected  it  altogether.  If,  as  appears, 
the  President  already  has  ground  for  being  distrustful  of 
the  result  of  the  "great  and  solemn  referendum,"  he 
might  welcome  such  a  reason  for  declaring  that  it  was  the 
Senate  that  had  made  ratification  impossible.  He  would 
then  feel  relieved  of  the  responsibility  of  himself  with- 
drawing the  treaty,  as  he  has  threatened  to  do,  if  his  will 
does  not  prevail  in  the  Serbo-Italian  settlement. 

The  reaction  of  the  President's  political  party  to  his 
idea  of  a  plebiscite  has  not  met  his  expectations.  It  is  on 
this  as  well  as  other  matters  undoubtedly  divided.  Per- 
haps he  would,  after  all,  prefer  another  way  out  of  the 
situation  he  has  created  for  himself.    If  the  responsibility 


182   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

for  a  failure  to  make  peace  could  be  thrown  upon  the 
Senate,  that  would,  in  appearance  at  least,  save  him  from 
the  reproach  of  having  made  to  the  Allies  pledges  which 
he  now  so  easily  threatens  to  withdraw. 

The  President's  attitude  on  the  Adriatic  question  is 
almost  a  declaration  that  he  believes  his  associates  in 
forming  the  League  of  Nations  cannot  be  depended  upon 
to  do  what  he  considers  should  be  done  unless  his  author- 
ity is  continually  brought  to  bear  upon  them.  Does  even 
the  President  believe  that  any  league  could  long  endure 
on  this  condition  ?  Can  what  the  European  Powers  think 
expedient  always  be  thwarted  by  the  intervention  of  a 
non-European  Power?  Would  not  reciprocity  require 
that  American  questions  should  be  subject  to  the  decisions 
of  non-American  Powers  ?  Do  the  American  people  de- 
sire either  to  exercise  and  take  the  consequences  of  exer- 
cising controlling  authority  in  European  affairs,  or  to 
submit  to  have  a  foreign  authority  exercised  upon  them- 
selves, as  reciprocity  would  require?  Can  Mr.  Wilson 
really  believe  that  the  American  people  are  going  by 
plebiscite  to  give  him  a  right  to  use  this  power  over  Euro- 
pean nations  with  the  implied  right  of  European  nations 
to  exercise  the  same  control  over  American  affairs  ? 

In  truth,  the  President  himself,  in  his  letter  of  March 
8th,  not  only  advanced  a  conclusive  argument  against  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  as  it  stands,  but  expressed  his 
own  distrust  of  the  nations  who  would  be  our  partners 
in  it.  "Militaristic  ambitions  and  imperialistic  policies," 
he  says,  "are  by  no  means  dead  even  in  the  counsels  of 
the  nations  whom  we  most  trust  and  with  whom  we  most 
desire  to  be  associated  in  the  tasks  of  peace.  Throughout 
the  sessions  of  the  Conference  in  Paris  it  was  evident 
that  a  militaristic  party,  under  the  most  influential  lead- 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM     183 

1  crship,  was  seeking  to  gain  the  ascendency  in  the  counsels 
of  France.  They  were  defeated  then  but  are  in  control 
now." 

What  is  it  then  that  the  President  demands  ?  Is  it  not 
the  authorization  by  the  American  people  to  "defeat" 
again  the  efforts  to  maintain  the  military  security  of 
France,  to  interfere  in  its  affairs,  and  in  the  affairs  of  every 
other  country,  with  a  contradictory  policy?  What  he 
asks  is  that  by  a  plebiscite  the  American  people  shall  give 
him  the  power  personally  to  control  the  policies  of  Europe, 
or  to  withdraw  our  country  from  the  League  when  his 
will  is  not  obeyed. 

One  thing  is,  however,  clear.  The  President  cannot  be 
permitted  to  urge  the  importance  of  a  "great  and  solemn 
referendum"  on  the  acceptance  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, and  especially  the  League  of  Nations,  when  he 
himself  contemplates  throwing  overboard  the  whole  work 
accomplished  at  Paris,  simply  because  his  colleagues  in 
the  Supreme  Council  will  not  accept  his  personal  dictum 
as  final.  He  may  be  right,  or  he  may  be  wrong,  in  his 
Adriatic  doctrine.  That  is  not  the  question.  The  essen- 
tial point  is  that  what  Mr.  Wilson  asks  by  this  proposed 
plebiscite  is  that  his  personal  will  shall  dominate,  not 
only  over  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  but  over  the 
Supreme  Council  and  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions also.  With  what  consistency  can  he  urge  that  our 
sacred  honor  as  a  nation  is  pledged  to  ratify  this  un- 
modified treaty,  or  that  it  is  our  duty  in  any  sense  to  do 
so,  when  he  can  so  lightly  threaten,  and  may  at  any  future 
time  decide,  if  he  has  the  power,  throw  to  the  winds  every- 
thing that  was  done  at  Paris,  because  he  does  not  per- 
sonally approve  of  some  particular  European  arrange- 
ment? 


184   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

But  there  are  other  considerations  regarding  the  con- 
sequences of  a  "great  and  solemn  referendum."  Sup- 
posing it  to  be  carried  into  a  general  election,  what  would 
be  its  legal  effect  ? 

Whatever  the  result  of  the  election  might  be,  it  would 
not  affect  either  the  personal  convictions  of  the  President 
or  of  the  Senate.  Either  might  legally  refuse  to  act 
otherwise  than  they  were  ready  to  act  before,  and  might 
properly  hold  that  the  decision  affected  only  their  suc- 
cessors. When  the  President  was  last  elected,  the  chief 
slogan  of  his  party  was,  "He  kept  us  out  of  war" ;  but 
did  that  eventually  control  his  action  ?  There  was  in  the 
election  won  with  this  watchword  nothing  that  compelled 
him  to  act  otherwise  than  he  might  deem  it  expedient  to 
act.  The  constitutional  powers  of  the  Government  in 
all  its  branches  remained  unchanged  by  the  result  of  the 
election. 

As  to  the  moral  effect  of  a  plebiscite  upon  this  question, 
we  know  from  experience  what  it  would  be.  All  the 
forces  that  have  already  been  utilized  either  to  secure  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty  or  to  defeat  it  would  continue 
to  be  employed  in  the  political  campaign,  but  upon  a 
more  extensive  scale.    What  are  some  of  those  forces? 

There  could  hardly  be  imagined  a  better  illustration  of 
the  distracting  character  of  direct  popular  action  in  the 
management  of  foreign  affairs  than  that  afforded  by  the 
controversy  over  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  United 
States.  For  several  months  Senators  were  besieged  with 
letters,  telegrams,  and  the  resolutions  of  various  associa- 
tions— from  sewing  circles  to  labor  unions  and  church 
organizations — inspired  to  this  action  to  a  great  extent 
by  an  expensive  public  propaganda,  demanding  that  the 
Senate  should  immediately  ratify  a  treaty  which  few  of 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM     185 

the  importunists  had  ever  read  and  the  real  purport  of 
which  still  fewer  understood.  A  critical  examination  of 
these  communications  would  show  that,  almost  without 
exception,  they  represented  no  accurate  knowledge,  no 
deliberate  consideration,  and  no  responsible  authority. 
They  were,  no  doubt,  in  most  instances  prompted  by 
good  motives,  among  them  a  sincere  desire  for  peace 
and  the  organization  of  means  for  the  preservation  of  it 
in  the  future,  but  without  any  adequate  appreciation  of 
the  liabilities  to  be  assumed  under  the  form  of  covenant 
proposed  or  the  consequences  involved  to  the  lives  and 
fortunes  of  the  American  people. 

In  the  communications  sent  to  the  Senate  intended  to 
influence  its  action,  serious  argument  based  on  the  inter- 
ests of  the  American  people  was  conspicuously  absent. 
Appeals  to  the  emotions  were  abundant,  but  there  were 
few  attempts  to  convince  the  intelligence  by  an  impartial 
analysis  of  a  document  which  at  first  frankly  called  it- 
self a  "constitution,"  thus  avowedly  setting  up  a  new 
political  entity  for  the  control  of  international  relations. 
Most  of  the  statements  made  were  merely  declaratory  of 
the  personal  views  and  desires  of  those  who  made  them, 
unsupported  by  reasoning  connected  with  the  world  of 
facts.  Whole  societies  were  grouped  as  being  in  favor  of 
a  treaty  which  few  of  the  members  had  studiously  ex- 
amined, often  represented  by  the  vote  of  a  small  number 
presuming  to  act  for  the  whole  membership,  and  cases 
were  not  wanting  where  the  resolution  actually  adopted 
was  denatured  and  distorted  in  the  published  report  in 
a  manner  that  misrepresented  the  action  actually  taken. 

Hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars  were  expended  in 
the  manufacture  and  expression  of  opinions  that  were 
utterly  valueless  from  a  scientific  point  of  view.    It  was 


186   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

admitted  that  the  success  of  this  effort  to  influence  by  the 
weight  of  numbers  the  decision  of  a  responsible  legislative 
body  was  exactly  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  money 
available  for  this  purpose,  and  this  was  explicitly  asserted 
in  a  frantic  appeal  for  more  funds  to  "save"  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  from  being  modified,  as  the  independent 
judgment  of  a  constitutional  partner  in  the  process  of 
treaty-making  might,  in  the  national  interest,  consider 
necessary. 

The  greatest  danger  now  menacing  this  Republic  is  the 
control  of  the  Government  by  well  organized,  persistent, 
and  vociferous  private  groups  of  men  and  women  aiming 
to  acquire  the  power  to  influence  the  action  of  public 
officers;  yet  the  whole  fabric  of  justice  rests  on  the  re- 
sponsibility of  those  entrusted  with  authority.  Having 
been  freely  chosen  by  the  ordered  procedure  legally  pro- 
vided, a  public  officer  in  the  United  States  is  not  properly 
subject  to  the  orders  or  the  intimidation  of  any  gr°uP  of 
citizens,  however  powerful;  and  he  cannot  better  display 
his  fitness  for  discharging  a  public  trust  than  by  ignoring, 
or  if  necessary  resisting,  any  attempt  by  any  group,  for 
any  purpose,  to  deflect  him  from  the  resolute  and  con- 
scientious performance  of  his  duty  as  a  public  officer  in 
matters  confided  to  his  action,  however  numerous  and 
respectable  that  group  may  be. 

If  a  few  thousand  theorists  could  deflect  the  action  of 
a  public  officer  by  a  vigorous  propaganda  of  their  private 
views  on  a  question  of  foreign  policy,  and  cause  him  to 
abandon  his  convictions  through  fear  of  personal  or  party 
unpopularity,  what  might  be  expected  when  millions  of 
men,  determined  to  secure  their  private  advantage,  even 
by  changing  the  form  of  Government,  combine  to  accom- 
plish their  purpose? 


THE  SOLEMN  REFERENDUM    187 

However  opinions  may  differ  on  this  subject,  it  can- 
not be  controverted  that  the  control  of  foreign  relations 
by  plebiscite  would  be  an  abandonment  of  the  constitu- 
tional system  now  in  force  in  the  United  States.  It  is 
right  and  proper  that  there  should  be  full  and  free  dis- 
cussion of  every  subject  of  public  importance  on  the  plat- 
form and  in  the  press,  including  the  relations  of  our 
country  to  foreign  nations;  and  this  is  necessary  to  the 
creation  and  expression  of  intelligent  public  opinion, 
which  in  legitimate  ways  should  and  will  exercise  an  in- 
fluence upon  legislation.  But  direct  action,  an  attempt  to 
bind  public  officers  against  their  will,  to  act  in  a  particu- 
lar manner  not  prescribed  by  law,  is  quite  a  different  mat- 
ter. That  is  the  substitution  of  a  new  form  of  govern- 
ment for  one  already  established.  If  it  can  be  proved  that 
direct  action  on  foreign  relations  is  preferable  to  existing 
constitutional  arrangements,  the  next  step  would  be  to 
amend  the  Constitution,  and  that  is  what  the  demand  for 
a  plebiscite  really  signifies ;  but,  if  this  step  is  to  be  taken, 
it  should  not  be  accomplished  as  an  act  of  revolution,  but 
in  the  manner  which  the  fundamental  law  prescribes,  a 
condition  which  a  plebiscite  in  an  electoral  campaign  does 
not  fulfill. 

Honestly  formulated,  the  President's  proposal  of  a 
"great  and  solemn  referendum"  submits  the  question, 
"Shall  the  President  of  the  United  States  alone  conclude 
treaties  without  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate?" 
The  next  step  might  easily  be,  Shall  the  President  make 
laws  without  the  sanction  of  Congress? 


EPILOGUE 

By  every  test  that  can  be  applied  to  the  foreign  rela- 
tions of  the  United  States  at  the  present  time,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  there  is  in  this  country  no  definite  and  settled 
policy  whatever  upon  which  any  foreign  nation  can  de- 
pend, except  perhaps  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  whatever  that 
may  imply. 

If  this  equivocal  condition  is  to  continue,  the  United 
States  will  have  lost,  probably  forever,  the  moral  leader- 
ship which  was  offered  by  the  circumstances  of  the  war, 
and  to  which  it  is  justly  entitled  by  the  nature  of  its  polit- 
ical institutions  and  its  freedom  from  the  entanglements 
of  European  national  interests  and  commitments. 

If  we  inquire  why  it  is  that  the  United  States  has  fallen 
into  this  condition  of  uncertainty,  the  answer  is  to  be 
found  in  the  history  of  procedure  recounted  in  the  pre- 
ceding pages  of  this  book.  It  is  owing  to  the  failure  to 
permit  the  free  cooperation  of  those  agencies  for  deter- 
mining foreign  policies  which  have  been  constitutionally 
prescribed  and  which,  during  a  long  period  of  our  national 
history,  were  fully  justified  by  their  results. 

The  nature  of  those  established  agencies  has  already 
been  fully  described,  and  the  reason  for  the  lack  of  co- 
operation between  them  has  been  clearly  set  forth  in  the 
foregoing  chapters.  The  determination  of  foreign  policy 
in  the  United  States  is  not  left  by  the  structure  of  our 
Government  to  any  single  person  or  small  number  of 
men,  nor  to  the  influence  of  particular  groups  of  the 

1 88 


EPILOGUE  189 

electorate.  Such  a  reference  of  decision  would  incur  the 
risk  of  partisan,  sectional,  or  entirely  arbitrary  conclu- 
sions; and  it  was  precisely  these  which  the  arrangement 
made  was  deliberately  intended  to  avoid.  The  adoption 
of  either  of  them  would  be,  in  effect,  an  abandonment  of 
the  representative  system  of  government. 

There  is,  therefore,  only  one  way  in  which  it  is  possible 
for  the  United  States  to  have  a  world  policy  of  a  definite 
kind,  such  as  other  nations,  knowing  that  this  country 
has  necessarily  a  part  to  play  in  the  settlement  of  world 
issues,  can  understand  and  to  which  they  can  adjust  them- 
selves. That  way  is  for  the  Committees  of  the  Congress 
charged  with  decisions  regarding  the  international  action 
of  the  United  States  and  the  Executive  who  has  to  carry 
them  into  effect  to  be  closely,  intelligently,  and  sympa- 
thetically associated  in  determining  what  relations  with 
other  Powers  and  what  specified  courses  of  action  are 
likely  to  prove  most  safe,  most  beneficial,  and  most  honor- 
able to  this  nation. 

I  include  here  the  Committees  of  both  Houses  of  Con- 
gress, because  each  of  them  has  a  duty  to  perform,  and 
therefore  a  right  to  be  heard,  with  regard  to  all  important 
undertakings  in  the  international  field  of  action. 

I  am  perfectly  well  aware  of  what  may  be  said  regard- 
ing the  competency  of  these  bodies  to  make  final  decisions 
and  the  improbability  that  out  of  their  conferences — 
which  would  perhaps  to  some  extent  be  tinctured  with 
political  partisanship — there  could  be  evolved  any  definite 
policies  whatever.  My  general  reply  to  these  suggestions 
is,  that  they  are  equally  valid  as  objections  to  every  form 
of  free  self-government,  and  that  they  are  obviously  far 
weightier  as  applied  to  direct  action  than  they  are  when 
applied  to  the  representative  system.    If  such  inconven- 


190   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

iences  were  permitted  to  prevail,  the  only  alternative 
would  be  recourse  to  some  form  of  personal  autocracy. 

The  remedy,  therefore,  for  all  who  are  not  willing  to 
resort  to  that  expedient,  is  to  be  found,  as  I  have  just 
affirmed,  in  the  loyal  cooperation  of  the  various  depart- 
ments of  the  Government  constitutionally  concerned  with 
international  affairs.  The  initiative  should  naturally  be 
taken  by  the  President,  who  must  be  the  active  agent  in 
all  negotiations  through  his  diplomatic  representatives  and 
those  of  other  countries  accredited  to  him;  but  it  was 
never  intended  that  decisions  should  be  merely  personal. 

If  there  is  any  advantage  to  be  had  from  the  associa- 
tion of  the  nations  through  their  representatives  in  an 
international  council,  such  for  example  as  the  Council 
of  the  League  of  Nations  is  designed  to  be,  there  is  also 
an  advantage  in  the  association  of  the  people's  repre- 
sentatives in  some  kind  of  council  within  the  nation,  in 
considering  its  international  rights,  responsibilities,  and 
obligations. 

It  is,  of  course,  possible  to  assert  that  there  should  be 
no  definite  and  settled  policy  in  foreign  affairs ;  that  the 
attitude  and  conduct  of  the  nation  should  be  left  entirely 
to  the  contingencies  of,  the  future,  in  order  that  any 
course  of  action,  or  of  inaction,  might  be  taken,  as  the 
national  advantage  may  suggest. 

There  are,  I  think,  few  serious  minds  that  would  de- 
fend a  position  so  distinctly  Machiavellian  as  this ;  which 
implies  that  there  are  no  principles  of  action  to  which  a 
nation  should  be  pledged,  or  which  it  is  its  duty  to  observe. 
It  is  precisely  this  incalculable,  evasive,  and  irresponsible 
conception  of  sovereign  authority  which  is  the  cause  of 
most  of  the  international  complications  that  have  dis- 
turbed the  peace  of  the  world.    It  was  the  want  of  a  clear, 


EPILOGUE  191 

well-informed,  and  dependable  policy  that  was  responsible 
for  the  fluctuations  of  purpose  and  long  and  perilous  hesi- 
tation on  the  part  of  the  United  States  preceding  our  en- 
trance into  the  Great  War,  which  impeded  the  timely 
action  that  might  earlier  have  settled  or  even  prevented 
it.  With  half  the  world  a  negligeable  quantity,  there  can 
never  be  international  stability. 

We  owe  it  to  ourselves  as  a  nation,  and  we  owe  it  to 
all  other  honorable  and  responsible  nations,  that  we  should 
stand  for  some  definite  things  in  the  world.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  proclaim  precisely  what  we  should  do  in  cer- 
tain circumstances,  for  that  would  depend  upon  condi- 
tions which  we  cannot  entirely  foresee ;  but  that  does  not 
hinder  us  from  framing  a  world  policy.  We  can  at  least 
indicate  some  things  which  we  would  approve  and  others 
which  we  would  disapprove,  and  we  may  as  well  frankly 
say  that  if  certain  rights — which  we  are  ready  to  recog- 
nize as  common  rights — are  violated,  we  shall  be  against 
the  aggressor  and  for  the  victim  of  aggression,  just  so 
far  as  in  the  circumstances  we  may  consider  ourselves 
able,  and  dutifully  bound,  to  act. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  here  to  frame  policies,  but  to  in- 
sist upon  the  importance  of  having  them,  and  of  giving 
them  the  value  which  clearness,  without  overstraining 
them,  can  give. 

But  the  first  step  to  this  is  the  settlement  of  the  ques- 
tion who  is  to  form  them.  And  here  I  return  to  the  prop- 
osition that  policies  should  be  framed  by  the  cooperation 
of  those  who  are  responsible  for  fulfilling  the  pledges 
which  the  policies  imply. 

Ultimately,  no  doubt,  in  a  popular  government  like 
ours,  it  is  the  voice  of  the  people  that  should  be  con- 
trolling ;  but  the  people  cannot  directly  decide  every  ques- 

r 


192   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

tion.  The  element  of  time,  apart  from  all  other  considera- 
tions, is  decisive  upon  that  point.  We  cannot  depart  from 
the  representative  principle.  We  need,  therefore,  to  see 
that  it  is  consistently  applied. 

It  should  be  a  ground  of  reproach  to  any  public  officer 
that  he  is  unwilling  to  submit  his  private  personal  will  to 
the  organized  public  will.  I  do  not  mean  a  factitious  ex- 
pression of  what  represents  itself  as  the  popular  will,  but 
the  decision  of  those  whose  deliberately  assigned  function 
it  is  to  decide.  Conformity  to  that  is  the  only  possible 
security  of  popular  self-government. 

Our  Government  is  constructed  on  that  principle.  No 
one  man,  and  no  mere  group  of  men,  can  in  the  United 
States  declare  war  on  another  nation,  no  matter  how 
hateful  it  may  be.  Only  the  representatives  of  the  whole 
people  can  do  that.  No  one  man,  and  no  mere  group  of 
men,  should  presume  to  say  that  war  should  not  end 
when  those  who  have  declared  it  believe  it  should  end. 

There  is,  it  must  be  admitted,  a  difference  between  be- 
ginning and  ending  war.  War  is  rightly  declared  when 
it  is  necessary  to  defend  national  rights  that  cannot  be 
defended  without  it.  It  is  logical  that  it  should  not  end 
until  its  purpose  has  been  accomplished.  It  is,  therefore, 
necessary  to  ascertain  that  its  purpose  has  been  accom- 
plished ;  and  the  normal  manner  of  doing  that  is  to  obtain 
an  admission  of  it,  and  the  consequences  of  the  admission, 
in  the  form  of  a  treaty  of  peace. 

To  determine  what  such  a  treaty  should  contain  is  an 
important  matter.  It  is  normally,  under  our  Constitu- 
tion, the  joint  responsibility  of  the  President  and  the 
Senate.  It  is  necessary,  and  it  was  intended,  that  with  a 
right  of  differing  personally  as  to  what  its  terms  should 
be,  acting  as  a  council  they  should  find  it  possible  to 


EPILOGUE  193 

agree  on  some  definite  terms.  This  is  the  very  purpose 
of  their  joint  action.  No  man,  acting  under  this  limita- 
tion, has  a  right  to  say,  "This  treaty,  or  no  treaty." 

There  are  those  who  say,  as  short-sighted  men  are 
likely  to  say,  when  a  practical  difficulty  arises  under  the 
Constitution,  "Let  us  amend  the  fundamental  law."  But 
the  difficulty  is  not  created  by  the  law.  It  is  occasioned 
by  an  obstinate  refusal  to  comply  with  the  spirit  of  the 
law — which  implies  close,  intelligent,  and  sympathetic 
cooperation  in  trying  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion  free  from 
the  objections  which  are  involved  in  accepting  a  dictated 
decision. 

At  the  moment  of  writing,  there  is  before  the  United 
States  as  a  nation  a  choice  between  three  courses  of  action : 

(i)  Acceptance  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  including 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  as  it  was  pre- 
pared at  Paris,  without  any  reservation; 

(2)  The  rejection  outright  of  the  Treaty  as  wholly 
inacceptable ;  and 

(3)  The  ratification  of  the  Treaty  with  reservations. 
Wrapped  up  in  this  choice  are  two  separate  issues.    The 

first  is,  Who  has  authority  to  determine  policy?  The 
second  is  the  retention  of  the  power  to  change  it,  if  the 
occasion  should  arise. 

To  demand  the  acceptance,  without  the  right  to  modify, 
of  the  terms  of  a  treaty  negotiated  by  the  Executive 
alone,  under  the  pressure  of  foreign  influences,  is  to  as- 
sume that  the  authority  of  the  Executive  in  the  determina- 
tion of  policy  is  absolute.  Such  an  assumption  is  inad- 
missible under  any  possible  interpretation  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States. 

To  accept  without  reservation  the  obligations  prescribed 
by  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  is,  as  we  have 


194,    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

seen,  to  surrender  to  the  operation  of  an  automatic  mech- 
anism, in  circumstances  wholly  incalculable,  the  entire  con- 
tent of  foreign  policy. 

No  nation  can  do  this  without  the  renunciation  of  its 
freedom  in  matters  of  a  vital  nature,  and  no  nation  really 
intends  to  make  this  renunciation.  Every  signatory  of 
the  Covenant  entertains  the  mental  reservation  that  it 
will  so  interpret  its  obligations  as  not  to  affect  its  vital 
interests. 

It  would  be  more  conducive  to  a  permanent  understand- 
ing if  such  reservations  were  explicitly  declared.  The 
ambiguity  of  treaty  engagements  is  proverbial.  The  ma- 
jority of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  has  wisely  in- 
sisted upon  being  definite.  There  has  been  no  assumption 
ot  a  right  to  alter  the  obligations,  whatever  they  may  be, 
to  which  others  have  subscribed;  but  the  endeavor  has 
been  made  to  state  with  clearness  the  extent  to  which  the 
United  States  accepts  obligations. 

This  the  Senate,  as  a  body  by  and  with  whose  advice 
and  consent  treaties  are  to  be  made,  has  a  perfect  right  to 
insist  upon;  for  a  reservation  does  not  amend  a  treaty, 
or  alter  it  for  those  who  accept  it  without  reservation, 
it  merely  limits  the  extent  to  which  the  signatory  making 
the  reservation  binds  itself  or  expects  others  to  be  bound. 
An  attempt  to  interpret  a  treaty  implies  that  its  meaning 
is  not  clear;  a  reservation  is  not  an  interpretation,  it  is  a 
limitation  of  participation.  To  say  that  a  treaty-making 
power  may  interpret,  but  not  reserve  its  commitment,  is 
to  say  that  the  meaning  is  uncertain  but  the  obligation  of 
acceptance  is  unlimited. 

The  second  alternative,  complete  rejection,  is  also  within 
the  Senate's  right ;  but  the  decision  to  enforce  it  is  a  ques- 
tion of  expediency  and  also  a  question  of  duty  to  other 


EPILOGUE  195 

nations.  A  refusal  to  be  associated  with  other  nations 
in  making  and  preserving  peace  would  be  a  repudiation 
of  the  motives  that  led  to  association  with  them  in  the 
war.  To  make  peace  without  terms  of  peace  would  be  a 
denial  that  the  war  was  justified  and  a  confession  of 
error.  To  make  terms  of  peace  without  reference  to  those 
who  were  necessary  to  winning  the  war  would  be  a  dis- 
avowal of  any  moral  solidarity  with  them  either  in  war 
or  peace. 

No  civilized  nation  can  assume  and  maintain  such  an 
isolation  as  that  without  withdrawal  from  the  Society  of 
Nations. 

It  may  be  said  that  a  total  rejection  of  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  does  not  imply  a  wish  to  separate  from  all  in- 
ternational associations,  but  only  from  such  as  this  treaty 
creates.  Theoretically,  this  may  be  true;  but  practically 
the  total  rejection  of  the  work  accomplished  in  the  Con- 
ference of  Paris,  in  which  the  President  of  the  United 
States  not  only  participated  but  played  a  leading  part, 
would  be  considered  as  proving  the  impossibility  of  any 
negotiations  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

There  could  be  no  more  fatal  act  of  national  self- 
stultification  than  a  total  repudiation  of  the  Executive  as 
an  authorized  negotiator.  It  is  as  much  the  duty  of  the 
Senate  to  admit  the  President's  Constitutional  authority 
as  it  is  his  duty  to  admit  theirs.  His  function  is  to  nego- 
tiate a  treaty  of  peace  which  can  be  ratified  "by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent"  of  the  Senate,  two-thirds  of  those 
present  concurring.  Their  duty  is  not  merely  to  refuse 
to  advise  and  consent  to  a  treaty  of  peace,  but  to  state 
what  treaty  of  peace  they  will  advise,  and  to  what  they 
will  give  their  consent.  Their  constitutional  function  is 
not  merely  negative,  it  is  positive  and  constructive;  and 


196    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

this  the  President  is  both  morally  and  legally  bound  to 
recognize  and  respect.  If  he  does  not  do  so  he  is  open 
to  a  charge  of  delinquency. 

It  is  the  third  alternative,  therefore,  which  should  be 
chosen.  The  ratification  of  the  Treaty  with  reservations 
is  clearly  the  normal  course  of  procedure.  It  recognizes 
the  right  of  the  Executive  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  peace, 
it  preserves  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  offer  its  advice  and 
accord  its  consent  to  the  terms  it  regards  as  both  neces- 
sary for  the  national  interests  and  dutiful  toward  our 
associates  in  the  war.  It  reserves  our  place  in  the  coun- 
cils of  the  nations  that  fought  together  for  a  common 
cause,  and  it  leaves  us  free  to  act  as  our  interests  and  our 
duty  may  require  us  to  act.  It  inaugurates  a  policy  of 
associated  conciliatory  procedure  in  international  affairs 
such  as  has  never  before  been  possible,  and  yet  leaves  the 
determination  of  national  policy  to  the  cooperation  of  the 
Executive  and  the  Congress,  to  whom  it  was  intended  by 
the  founders  of  our  Government  that  it  should  be  en- 
trusted. 

Like  most  other  artificial  arrangements  in  human  af- 
fairs, the  so-called  "League  of  Nations"  is  an  uncertain 
experiment.  Undoubtedly  it  has  attempted  more  than  it 
can  perform.  Its  original  purpose  was  the  military  en- 
forcement of  peace,  which  means  that  it  was  to  be  in  some 
sense  an  armed  alliance  of  the  Great  Powers  exercising 
a  super-governmental  control  over  refractory  States.  That 
conception  has  already  been  virtually  abandoned.  An- 
other conception  must  take  its  place.  That  other  con- 
ception is  the  conciliation  of  the  nations  through  the  pro- 
gressive application  of  principles  of  justice  to  be  attained 
by  the  further  development  of  International  Law  based 


EPILOGUE  197 

on  the  inherent  rights  of  responsible  sovereign  States 
and  a  united  effort  for  its  enforcement. 

The  success  of  this  undertaking  may  not  be  immediate, 
but  the  first  endeavor  should  be  to  reestablish  the  con- 
tinuity of  international  development  interrupted  by  the 
Great  War.  The  arrest  of  that  movement,  it  is  now  well 
known,  was  one  of  the  main  purposes  of  the  Powers  that 
began  the  war  by  a  denial  of  justice  to  a  small  State. 
They  saw  in  the  tribunal  at  The  Hague  the  end  of  their 
imperial  projects.  The  defeat  of  those  Powers  should 
lead  to  the  resumption  of  that  movement,  which  provision 
for  organized  conciliation  will  do  much  to  advance. 

The  central  purpose  of  the  United  States  in  interna- 
tional affairs  should  be  the  continuance  of  an  Entente 
of  Free  Nations,  aiming  at  peace  through  justice.  In 
such  an  association  the  United  States  may  well  partici- 
pate, and  the  effect  of  the  reservations  which  the  Senate 
has  proposed  as  a  condition  of  accepting  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  is,  in  reality,  to  transform  a  military  alliance 
into  such  an  entente. 

Instead  of  surrendering  the  virtual  direction  of  our 
national  policy  to  the  leadership  and  influence  of  a  coun- 
cil composed  chiefly  of  persons  representing  interests  in 
which  the  United  States  is  not  concerned,  and  over  whose 
decisions  it  would  in  some  instances  be  a  violation  of  the 
American  principles  of  government  to  exercise  control — 
as  the  full  acceptance  of  the  Covenant  implies — the  res- 
ervations preserve  the  power  of  independent  decision  upon 
its  own  affairs  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  at  the 
same  time  placing  it  in  the  hands  of  those  whom  the  peo- 
ple have  most  recently  chosen  to  represent  them. 

There  is  one  consideration  in  addition  to  our  constitu- 
tional prescriptions  that  justifies  reservations  on  the  part 


198    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

of  the  United  States  if  this  nation  is  to  participate  in  a 
league  of  nations  such  as  this  Covenant  creates.  There 
is  virtually  nothing,  as  compared  with  the  imperial  Pow- 
ers, for  which  this  nation  asks  protection.  It  makes  no 
claims  on  anything  in  Europe,  Asia,  or  Africa  except 
equal  opportunities  of  trade  and  intercourse.  Why  then 
should  it  be  expected  to  protect  the  results  of  past  rival- 
ries, conquests,  or  compensatory  arrangements?  Amer- 
ican policy  is  hardly  at  all  concerned  with  such  demands 
upon  other  nations  or  with  any  contention  between  them. 
There  is  in  American  policy  no  element  of  aggression  or 
urgency  of  unsatisfied  claims.  In  truth — and  it  is  a  state- 
ment which  those  who  are  disposed  to  criticise  the  course 
of  the  United  States  may  well  ponder — the  chief  ques- 
tion for  American  policy  to  decide  is  how  much  it  shall 
freely  grant  to  other  nations  for  which  it  expects  nothing 
in  return. 

It  is  indisputable  that,  guarded  as  it  should  be  from 
the  possibility  of  future  reproaches  for  the  non-perform- 
ance of  duty,  the  United  States  would  still  be  free  to 
render  any  service  to  the  world  which  this  nation  may  be 
justly  called  upon  to  render.  Our  national  policy  would 
then  be  the  free  expression  of  the  nation's  capacity,  op- 
portunity, and  sense  of  honor;  which,  for  nations  as  for 
individual  men,  prescribe  the  limits  of  human  responsi- 
bility. 


DOCUMENTS 


president  wilson's  "points    the    fourteen  points    of 
january  8,  i918 

i.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after 
which  there  shall  be  no  private  international  understand- 
ings of  any  kind,  but  diplomacy  shall  proceed  always 
frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 

2.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas,  outside 
territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except  as  the 
seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  international 
action  for  the  enforcement  of  international  covenants. 

(The  allied  Governments  reserved  to  themselves  complete 
freedom  on  this  point,  November  5,  and  stated  their  under- 
standing that  the  word  "restored"  in  the  paragraph  below 
dealing  with  invaded  countries  means  compensation  by  Ger- 
many for  damage  to  civilian  population  of  the  Allies  and 
their  property.  To  the  latter  point  President  Wilson  for- 
mally assented.) 

3.  The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  bar- 
riers and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  condi- 
tions among  all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace  and 
associating  themselves  for  its  maintenance. 

4.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national 
armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  domestic  safety. 

5.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjust- 
ment of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observance 
of  the  principle  that  in  determining  all  such  questions  of 

199 


200    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

sovereignty  the  interests  of  the  populations  concerned  must 
have  equal  weight  with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  govern- 
ment whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

6.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory  and  such  a 
settlement  of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will  secure 
the  best  and  freest  cooperation  of  the  other  nations  of  the 
world  in  obtaining  for  her  an  unhampered  and  unembar- 
rassed opportunity  for  the  independent  determination  of 
her  own  political  development  and  national  policy,  and 
assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into  the  society  of  free 
nations  under  institutions  of  her  own  choosing,  and,  more 
than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind  that  she  may 
need  and  may  herself  desire.  The  treatment  accorded 
Russia  by  her  sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come  will  be 
the  acid  test  of  their  good  will,  of  their  comprehension  of 
her  needs  as  distinguished  from  their  own  interests,  and  of 
their  intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy. 

7.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be  evacu- 
ated and  restored,  without  any  attempt  to  limit  the  sov- 
ereignty which  she  enjoys  in  common  with  all  other  free 
nations.  No  other  single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve 
to  restore  confidence  among  the  nations  in  the  laws  which 
they  have  themselves  set  and  determined  for  the  govern- 
ment of  their  relations  with  one  another.  Without  this 
healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  international 
law  is  forever  impaired. 

8.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed  and  the  invaded 
portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia 
in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  has  un- 
settled the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years,  should 
be  righted,  in  order  that  peace  may  once  more  be  made 
secure  in  the  interest  of  all. 

9.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be 
effected  along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 

10.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among 
the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should 
be  accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  de- 
velopment. 

(On   October   19,   the   President   notified  the  Austro- 


DOCUMENTS  201 

Hungarian  Government  which  had  requested  an  armistice 
that  certain  conditions  had  changed  since  January  8th. 
Quoting  point  10,  Secretary  Lansing's  note  said:  "Since 
that  sentence  was  written  and  uttered  to  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States,  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
has  recognized  that  a  state  of  belligerency  exists  between  the 
Czecho-Slovaks  and  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
Empires  and  that  the  Czecho-Slovak  National  Council  is  a 
de  facto  belligerent  Government  clothed  with  proper  au- 
thority to  direct  the  military  and  political  affairs  of  the 
Czecho-Slovaks.  It  has  also  recognized  in  the  fullest  man- 
ner the  justice  of  the  nationalistic  aspirations  of  the  Jugo- 
slavs for  freedom.  The  President  is,  therefore,  no  longer 
at  liberty  to  accept  the  mere  'autonomy'  of  these  peoples  as 
a  basis  of  peace,  but  is  obliged  to  insist  that  they,  and  not 
he,  shall  be  the  judges  of  what  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  will  satisfy  their  aspira- 
tions and  their  conception  of  their  rights  and  destiny  as 
members  of  the  family  of  nations.") 

11.  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be  evacu- 
ated, occupied  territories  restored,  Serbia  accorded  free  and 
secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  the  relations  of  the  several 
Balkan  states  to  one  another  determined  by  friendly  counsel 
along  historical  established  lines  of  allegiance  and  nation- 
ality, and  international  guarantees  of  the  political  and 
economic  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  sev- 
eral Balkan  states  should  be  entered  into. 

12.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire 
should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the  other  nation- 
alities which  are  now  under  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured 
an  undoubted  security  of  life  and  an  absolutely  unmolested 
opportunity  of  autonomous  development,  and  the  Darda- 
nelles should  be  permanently  opened  as  a  free  passage  to 
the  ships  and  commerce  of  all  nations  under  international 
guarantees. 

13.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  be  erected,  which 
should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  indisputably 
Polish  populations,  which  should  be  assured  a  free  and 
secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  whose  political  and  economic 


202    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

independence  and  territorial  integrity   should  be  guaran- 
teed by  international  covenant. 

14.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed 
under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording 
mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike. 

THE  FIVE  POINTS  OF  SEPTEMBER  27,    I918 

(Address  at  Metropolitan  Opera  House,  New  York) 

As  I  see  it,  the  constitution  of  that  League  of  Nations  and 
the  clear  definition  of  its  objects  must  be  a  part,  is  in  a  sense 
the  most  essential  part,  of  the  peace  settlement  itself.  .  .  . 
It  is  necessary  to  guarantee  the  peace,  and  the  peace  cannot 
be  guaranteed  as  an  after-thought. 

First,  the  impartial  justice  meted  out  must  involve  no 
discrimination  between  those  to  whom  we  wish  to  be  just 
and  those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be  just.  It  must  be 
a  justice  that  plays  no  favorites  and  knows  no  standard  but 
equal  rights  of  the  several  peoples  concerned ; 

Second,  no  special  or  separate  interest  of  any  single 
nation  or  any  group  of  nations  can  be  made  the  basis  of  any 
part  of  the  settlement  which  is  not  consistent  with  the  com- 
mon interest  of  all ; 

Third,  there  can  be  no  leagues  or  alliances  of  special 
covenants  and  understandings  within  the  general  and  com- 
mon family  of  the  League  of  Nations ; 

Fourth,  and  more  specifically,  there  can  be  no  special, 
selfish  economic  combinations  within  the  league  and  no 
employment  of  any  form  of  economic  boycott  or  exclusion 
except  as  the  power  of  economic  penalty  by  exclusion  from 
the  markets  of  the  world  may  be  vested  in  the  League  of 
Nations  itself  as  a  means  of  discipline  and  control. 

Fifth,  all  international  agreements  and  treaties  of  every 
kind  must  be  made  known  in  their  entirety  to  the  rest  of  the 
world 


II 

CORRESPONDENCE    BETWEEN    THE    UNITED    STATES    AND 
GERMANY  REGARDING  AN  ARMISTICE 

Charge  d 'Affaires  of  Switzerland  to  President  Wilson1 

Legation  of  Switzerland, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

October  6,  1918. 
Department  of 
German  Interests 

Mr.  President: 

I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith,  upon  instructions 
from  my  government,  the  original  text  of  a  communication 
from  the  German  Government,  received  by  this  Legation 
late  this  afternoon,  from  the  Swiss  Foreign  Office. 

An  English  translation  of  llAs  communication  is  also 
enclosed.  The  German  original  text,  however,  is  alone  to 
be  considered  as  authoritative. 

Please  accept,  Mr.  President,  the  assurances  of  my  high- 
est consideration. 

(Signed)  F.  Oederlin, 
Charge  d' Affaires  ad  interim  of  Switzerland, 
In  charge  of  German  interests  in  the 
United  States. 
Mr.  Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States, 
Washington. 

(Enclosure) 

Translation  of  communication  from  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  as  transmitted 

1  Official  U.  S.  Bulletin,  October  9,  1918. 

203 


204    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

by  the  Charge  a" Affaires  ad  interim  of  Switzerland,  on 
October  6,  ipi8: 

The  German  Government  requests  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America  to  take  steps  for  the  restoration 
of  peace,  to  notify  all  belligerents  of  this  request,  and  to 
invite  them  to  delegate  plenipotentiaries  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  up  negotiations.  The  German  Government  accepts, 
as  a  basis  for  the  peace  negotiations,  the  program  laid  down 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to 
Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  and  in  his  subsequent  pro- 
nouncements, particularly  in  his  address  of  September  27, 
1918.  In  order  to  avoid  further  bloodshed  the  German 
Government  requests  to  bring  about  the  immediate  conclu- 
sion of  a  general  armistice  on  land,  on  water,  and  in  the 
air. 

Max,  Prince  of  Baden, 
Imperial  Chancellor. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Charge  a" Affaires  of 
Switzerland} 

Department  of  State, 
Washington. 

October  8,  1918. 
Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge,  on  behalf  of  the  Presi- 
dent, your  note  of  October  6th,  enclosing  a  communication 
from  the  German  Government  to  the  President ;  and  I  am 
instructed  by  the  President  to  request  you  to  make  the  fol- 
lowing communication  to  the  Imperial  German  Chancellor: 

Before  making  reply  to  the  request  of  the  Imperial 
German  Government,  and  in  order  that  that  reply  shall 
be  as  candid  and  straightforward  as  the  momentous  in- 
terests involved  require,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
deems  it  necessary  to  assure  himself  of  the  exact  meaning 
of  the  note  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  Does  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  mean  that  the   Imperial  German  Government 

1  Official  U.  S.  Bulletin,  October  9,  1918. 


DOCUMENTS  205 

accepts  the  terms  laid  down  by  the  President  in  his  address 
to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  on  the  eight  of  Janu- 
ary last  and  in  subsequent  addresses,  and  that  its  object  in 
entering  into  discussions  would  be  only  to  agree  upon  the 
practical  details  of  their  application? 

The  President  feels  bound  to  say  with  regard  to  the  sug- 
gestion of  an  armistice  that  he  would  not  feel  at  liberty  to 
propose  a  cessation  of  arms  to  the  governments  with  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  associated  against 
the  Central  Powers  so  long  as  the  armies  of  those  Powers 
are  upon  their  soil.  The  good  faith  of  any  discussion  would 
manifestly  depend  upon  the  consent  of  the  Central  Powers 
immediately  to  withdraw  their  forces  everywhere  from  in- 
vaded territory. 

The  President  also  feels  that  he  is  justified  in  asking 
whether  the  Imperial  Chancellor  is  speaking  merely  for  the 
constituted  authorities  of  the  Empire  who  have  so  far  con- 
ducted the  war.  He  deems  the  answers  to  these  questions 
vital  from  every  point  of  view. 

Accept,  Sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  high  consid- 
eration. 

(Signed)  Robert  Lansing. 
Mr.  Frederick  Oederlin, 

Charge  a" 'Affaires  of  Switzerland  ad  interim, 

In  charge  of  German  interests  in  the  United  States. 


Charge  a" 'Affaires  of  Switzerland  to  the  Secretary  of 
State.1 

Legation  of  Switzerland, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Department  of 

German  Interests.  October  14,  1918. 

Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith,  upon  instructions 
from  my  government,  the  original  text,  received  this  morn- 
ing, of  a  communication  from  the  German  Government  to 

1  Official  U.  S.  Bulletin,  October     15,  1918. 


206    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  reply  to  his  commu- 
nication to  the  Imperial  German  Chancellor,  transmitted  to 
me  by  Your  Excellency  on  October  8,  1918. 

I  beg  herewith  also  to  enclose  the  English  translation  of 
this  communication,  as  transmitted  by  the  German  Legation 
in  Berne  to  the  Swiss  Foreign  Office. 

Accept,  sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  highest  con- 
sideration. 

(Signed)  F.  Oederlin, 
Charge  d' Affaires  ad  interim  of  Switzerland. 
In  charge  of  German  interests  in  the 
United  States. 
His  Excellency, 
Robert  Lansing, 
Secretary  of  State. 

(Enclosure) 

Robert  Lansing, 

Translation  of  the  reply  from  the  German  Government 
to  the  communication  of  October  8,  1918,  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States  transmitted  by  the  Charge  d' Affaires 
ad  interim  of  Switzerland  to  the  Secretary  of  State  on 
October  14,  1918: 

In  reply  to  the  question  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America  the  German  Government  hereby  de- 
clares : 

The  German  Government  has  accepted  the  terms  laid 
down  by  President  Wilson  in  his  address  of  January  the 
eighth  and  in  his  subsequent  addresses  as  the  foundations 
of  a  permanent  peace  of  justice.  Consequently,  its  object 
in  entering  into  discussions  would  be  only  to  agree  upon 
practical  details  of  the  application  of  these  terms. 

The  German  Government  believes  that  the  governments 
of  the  Powers  associated  with  the  United  States  also  accept 
the  position  taken  by  President  Wilson  in  his  addresses. 

The  German  Government,  in  accordance  with  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about 
an  armistice,  declares  itself  ready  to  comply  with  the  propo- 
sitions of  the  President  in  regard  to  evacuation. 

The  German  Government  suggests  that  the  President  may 


DOCUMENTS  207 

occasion  the  meeting  of  a  mixed  commission  for  making  the 
necessary  arrangements  concerning  the  evacuation. 

The  present  German  Government  which  has  undertaken 
the  responsibility  for  this  step  towards  peace  has  been 
formed  by  conferences  and  in  agreement  with  the  great 
majority  of  the  Reichstag.  The  chancellor,  supported  in 
all  of  his  actions  by  the  will  of  this  majority,  speaks  in  the 
name  of  the  German  Government  and  of  the  German 
people. 

Solf, 
State  Secretary  of  Foreign  Office. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Charge  d' 'Affaires  of 
Switzerland.1 


Department  of  State, 
Washington. 

October  14,  1918. 
Sir: 

In  reply  to  the  communication  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment, dated  the  12th  instant,  which  you  handed  me  to-day,  I 
have  the  honor  to  request  you  to  transmit  the  following 
answer : 

The  unqualified  acceptance  by  the  present  German  Gov- 
ernment and  by  a  large  majority  of  the  German  Reichstag 
of  the  terms  laid  down  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  his  address  to  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  on  the  eighth  of  January,  191 8,  and  in  his 
subsequent  addresses  justifies  the  President  in  making  a 
frank  and  direct  statement  of  his  decision  with  regard  to 
the  communications  of  the  German  Government  of  the 
eighth  and  twelfth  of  October,  1918. 

It  must  be  clearly  understood  that  the  process  of  evacua- 
tion and  the  conditions  of  an  armistice  are  matters  which 
must  be  left  to  the  judgment  and  advice  of  the  military 
advisers  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Allied  Governments,  and  the  President  feels  it  his  duty  to 

Official  U.  S.  Bulletin,  October  15,  1918. 


208    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

say  that  no  arrangement  can  be  accepted  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  which  does  not  provide  abso- 
lutely satisfactory  safeguards  and  guarantees  of  the  main- 
tenance of  the  present  military  supremacy  of  the  armies  of 
the  United  States  and  of  the  Allies  in  the  field.  He  feels 
confident  that  he  can  safely  assume  that  this  will  also  be  the 
judgment  and  decision  of  the  Allied  Governments. 

The  President  feels  that  it  is  also  his  duty  to  add  that 
neither  the  Government  of  the  United  States  nor,  he  is  quite 
sure,  the  governments  with  which  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  is  associated  as  a  belligerent  will  consent  to 
consider  an  armistice  so  long  as  the  armed  forces  of  Ger- 
many continue  the  illegal  and  inhumane  practices  which 
they  still  persist  in.  At  the  very  time  that  the  German 
Government  approaches  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  with  proposals  of  peace  its  submarines  are  engaged 
in  sinking  passenger  ships  at  sea,  and  not  the  ships  alone 
but  the  very  boats  in  which  their  passengers  and  crews  seek 
to  make  their  way  to  safety ;  and  in  their  present  enforced 
withdrawal  from  Flanders  and  France  the  German  armies 
are  pursuing  a  course  of  wanton  destruction  which  has 
always  been  regarded  as  in  direct  violation  of  the  rules  and 
practices  of  civilized  warfare.  Cities  and  villages,  if  not 
destroyed,  are  being  stripped  of  all  they  contain,  not  only 
but  often  of  their  very  inhabitants.  The  nations  associated 
against  Germany  cannot  be  expected  to  agree  to  a  cessation 
of  arms  while  acts  of  inhumanity,  spoliation,  and  desolation 
are  being  continued  which  they  justly  look  upon  with  horror 
and  with  burning  hearts. 

It  is  necessary,  also,  in  order  that  there  may  be  no  possi- 
bility of  misunderstanding,  that  the  President  should  very 
solemnly  call  the  attention  of  the  Government  of  Germany 
to  the  language  and  plain  intent  of  one  of  the  terms  of  peace 
which  the  German  Government  has  now  accepted.  It  is 
contained  in  the  address  of  the  President  delivered  at 
Mount  Vernon  on  the  fourth  of  July  last.  It  is  as  follows : 
"The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  anywhere  that 
can  separately,  secretly  and  of  its  single  choice  disturb  the 


DOCUMENTS  209 

peace  of  the  world ;  or,  if  it  cannot  be  presently  destroyed, 
at  least  its  reduction  to  virtual  impotency."  The  power 
which  has  hitherto  controlled  the  German  nation  is  of  the 
sort  here  described.  It  is  within  the  choice  of  the  German 
nation  to  alter  it.  The  President's  words  just  quoted  natu- 
rally constitute  a  condition  precedent  to  peace,  if  peace  is  to 
come  by  the  action  of  the  German  people  themselves.  The 
President  feels  bound  to  say  that  the  whole  process  of  peace 
will,  in  his  judgment,  depend  upon  the  definiteness  and  the 
satisfactory  character  of  the  guarantees  which  can  be  given 
in  this  fundamental  matter.  It  is  indispensable  that  the 
governments  associated  against  Germany  should  know 
beyond  a  peradventure  with  whom  they  are  dealing. 

The  President  will  make  a  separate  reply  to  the  Royal  and 
Imperial  Government  of  Austria-Hungary. 

Accept,  Sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  high  consider- 
ation. (Signed)  Robert  Lansing. 
Mr  Frederick  Oederlin, 

Charge  d' Affaires  of  Switzerland  ad  interim. 
In  charge  of  German  interests  in  the  United  States. 

Charge  d' Affairs  of  Switzerland  to  the  Secretary  of  State.1 

Legation  of  Switzerland, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Department  of 
German  Interests.  October  22,  1918. 

Sir: 

By  direction  of  my  government,  I  have  the  honor  to 
transmit  herewith  to  Your  Excellency  the  original  German 
text  of  a  communication  dated  October  20,  1918,  from  the 
German  Government,  which  has  to-day  been  received  from 
the  Swiss  Foreign  Office.  I  beg  to  also  enclose  an  English 
translation  of  the  communication  in  question  as  transmitted 
to  the  Swiss  Foreign  Office  by  the  German  Government 
with  the  request  that  it  be  forwarded  to  Your  Excellency's 
Government. 

1  Official  U.  S.  Bulletin,  October  23,  191a 


210    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Please  accept,  Sir,  the  renewed  assurance  of  my  highest 
consideration. 

(Signed)  F.  Oederlin, 
Charge  a*  Affaires  ad  interim  of  Switzerland. 
His  Excellency, 
Robert  Lansing, 
Secretary  of  State, 
Washington. 

(Enclosure.) 

Translation  issued  by  the  German  Government  of  its 
communication  dated  October  20,  1918,  transmitted  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  by  the  Charge  d' Affaires  ad  interim  of 
Switzerland  on  October  22,  1918: 

In  accepting  the  proposal  for  an  evacuation  of  the  occu- 
pied territories  the  German  Government  has  started  from 
the  assumption  that  the  procedure  of  this  evacuation  and 
of  the  conditions  of  an  armistice  should  be  left  to  the  judg- 
ment of  the  military  advisers  and  that  the  actual  standard 
of  power  on  both  sides  in  the  field  has  to  form  the  basis 
for  arrangements  safeguarding  and  guaranteeing  this  stand- 
ard. The  German  Government  suggests  to  the  President 
to  bring  about  an  opportunity  for  fixing  the  details.  It 
trusts  that  the  President  of  the  United  States  will  approve 
of  no  demand  which  would  be  irreconcilable  with  the  honor 
of  the  German  people  and  with  opening  a  way  to  a  peace 
of  justice. 

The  German  Government  protests  against  the  reproach 
of  illegal  and  inhumane  actions  made  against  the  German 
land  and  sea  forces  and  thereby  against  the  German  people. 
For  the  covering  of  a  retreat,  destructions  will  always  be 
necessary  and  are  in  so  far  permitted  by  international  law. 
The  German  troops  are  under  the  strictest  instructions  to 
spare  private  property  and  to  exercise  care  for  the  popula- 
tion to  the  best  of  their  ability.  Where  transgressions  occur 
in  spite  of  these  instructions  the  guilty  are  being  punished. 

The  German  Government  further  denies  that  the  German 
Navy  in  sinking  ships  has  ever  purposely  destroyed  life- 
boats with  their  passengers.  The  German  Government 
proposes  with  regard  to  all  these  charges  that  the  facts  be 


DOCUMENTS  211 

cleared  up  by  neutral  commissions.  In  order  to  avoid  any- 
thing that  might  hamper  the  work  of  peace,  the  German 
Government  has  caused  orders  to  be  despatched  to  all  sub- 
marine commanders  precluding  the  torpedoing  of  passenger 
ships,  without,  however,  for  technical  reasons,  being  able 
to  guarantee  that  these  orders  will  reach  every  single  sub- 
marine at  sea  before  its  return. 

As  the  fundamental  conditions  for  peace,  the  President 
characterizes  the  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  that 
can  separately,  secretly  and  of  its  own  single  choice  disturb 
the  peace  of  the  world.  To  this  the  German  Government 
replies:  Hitherto  the  representation  of  the  people  in  the 
German  Empire  has  not  been  endowed  with  an  influence 
on  the  formation  of  the  government.  The  Constitution  did 
not  provide  for  a  concurrence  of  the  representation  of  the 
people  in  decision  on  peace  and  war.  These  conditions 
have  just  now  undergone  a  fundamental  change.  The  new 
government  has  been  formed  in  complete  accord  with  the 
wishes  of  the  representation  of  the  people,  based  on  the 
equal,  universal,  secret,  direct  franchise.  The  leaders  of  the 
great  parties  of  the  Reichstag  are  members  of  this  govern- 
ment. In  future  no  government  can  take  or  continue  in 
office  without  possessing  the  confidence  of  the  majority  of 
the  Reichstag.  The  responsibility  of  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Empire  to  the  representation  of  the  people  is  being  legally 
developed  and  safeguarded.  The  first  act  of  the  new  gov- 
ernment has  been  to  lay  before  the  Reichstag  a  bill  to 
alter  the  Constitution  of  the  Empire  so  that  the  consent  of 
the  representation  of  the  people  is  required  for  decisions 
on  war  and  peace.  The  permanence  of  the  new  system  is, 
however,  guaranteed  not  only  by  constitutional  safeguards, 
but  also  by  the  unshakable  determination  of  the  German 
people,  whose  vast  majority  stands  behind  these  reforms 
and  demands  their  energetic  continuance. 

The  question  of  the  President,  with  whom  he  and  the 
governments  associated  against  Germany  are  dealing,  is 
therefore  answered  in  a  clear  and  unequivocal  manner  by 
the  statement  that  the  offer  of  peace  and  an  armistice  has 
come  from  a  government  which,  free  from  arbitrary  and 


212   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

irresponsible  influence,  is  supported  by  the  approval  of  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  German  people. 

(Signed)   Solf, 
State  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Berlin,  October  20,  1918. 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Charge  £  Affaires  of 
Switzerland} 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

October  23,  1918. 
Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  note 
of  the  twenty-second  transmitting  a  communication  under 
date  of  the  twentieth  from  the  German  Government  and  to 
advise  you  that  the  President  has  instructed  me  to  reply 
thereto  as  follows: 

Having  received  the  solemn  and  explicit  assurance  of  the 
German  Government  that  it  unreservedly  accepts  the  terms 
of  peace  laid  down  in  his  address  to  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  on  the  eighth  of  January,  1918,  and  the  prin- 
ciples of  settlement  enunciated  in  his  subsequent  addresses, 
particularly  the  address  of  the  twenty-seventh  of  Sep- 
tember, and  that  it  desires  to  discuss  the  details  of  their 
application,  and  that  this  wish  and  purpose  emanate,  not 
from  those  who  have  hitherto  dictated  German  policy  and 
conducted  the  present  war  on  Germany's  behalf,  but  from 
ministers  who  speak  for  the  majority  of  the  Reichstag  and 
for  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  German  people ;  and 
having  received  also  the  explicit  promise  of  the  present 
German  Government  that  the  humane  rules  of  civilized  war- 
fare will  be  observed  both  on  land  and  sea  by  the  German 
armed  forces,  the  President  of  the  United  States  feels  that 
he  cannot  decline  to  take  up  with  the  governments  with 
which  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  associated 
the  question  of  an  armistice. 

He  deems  it  his  duty  to  say  again,  however,  that  the  only 
armistice  he  would  feel  justified  in  submitting  for  con- 

1  Official  U.  S.  Bulletin,  October  24,  1918. 


DOCUMENTS  213 

sideration  would  be  one  which  should  leave  the  United 
States  and  the  powers  associated  with  her  in  a  position  to 
enforce  any  arrangements  that  may  be  entered  into  and 
to  make  a  renewal  of  hostilities  on  the  part  of  Germany 
impossible.  The  President  has,  therefore,  transmitted  his 
correspondence  with  the  present  German  authorities  to  the 
governments  with  which  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  associated  as  a  belligerent,  with  the  suggestion  that 
if  those  governments  are  disposed  to  effect  peace  upon  the 
terms  and  principles  indicated,  their  military  advisers  and 
the  military  advisers  of  the  United  States  be  asked  to  sub- 
mit to  the  governments  associated  against  Germany  the 
necessary  terms  of  such  an  armistice  as  will  fully  protect 
the  interests  of  the  peoples  involved  and  insure  to  the  asso- 
ciated governments  the  unrestricted  power  to  safeguard  and 
enforce  the  details  of  the  peace  to  which  the  German  Gov- 
ernment has  agreed,  provided  they  deem  such  an  armistice 
possible  from  the  military  point  of  view.  Should  such  terms 
of  armistice  be  suggested,  their  acceptance  by  Germany  will 
afford  the  best  concrete  evidence  of  her  unequivocal  accept- 
ance of  the  terms  and  principles  of  peace  from  which  the 
whole  action  proceeds. 

The  President  would  deem  himself  lacking  in  candor  did 
he  not  point  out  in  the  frankest  possible  terms  the  reason 
why  extraordinary  safeguards  must  be  demanded.  Signi- 
ficant and  important  as  the  constitutional  changes  seem  to 
be  which  are  spoken  of  by  the  German  Foreign  Secretary 
in  his  note  of  the  twentieth  of  October,  it  does  not  appear 
that  the  principle  of  a  government  responsible  to  the 
German  people  has  yet'  been  fully  worked  out  or  that  any 
guarantees  either  exist  or  are  in  contemplation  that  the  al- 
terations of  principle  and  of  practice  now  partially  agreed 
upon  will  be  permanent.  Moreover,  it  does  not  appear  that 
the  heart  of  the  present  difficulty  has  been  reached.  It  may 
be  that  future  wars  have  been  brought  under  the  control 
of  the  German  people,  but  the  present  war  has  not  been; 
and  it  is  with  the  present  war  that  we  are  dealing.  It  is 
evident  that  the  German  people  have  no  means  of  com- 
manding the  acquiescence  of  the  military  authorities  of  the 


214   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Empire  in  the  popular  will ;  that  the  power  of  the  King  of 
Prussia  to  control  the  policy  of  the  Empire  is  unimpaired ; 
that  the  determining  initiative  still  remains  with  those  who 
have  hitherto  been  the  masters  of  Germany.  Feeling  that 
the  whole  peace  of  the  world  depends  now  on  plain  speaking 
and  straightforward  action,  the  President  deems  it  his  duty 
to  say,  without  any  attempt  to  soften  what  may  seem  harsh 
words,  that  the  nations  of  the  world  do  not  and  cannot  trust 
the  word  of  those  who  have  hitherto  been  the  masters  of 
German  policy,  and  to  point  out  once  more  that  in  con- 
cluding peace  and  attempting  to  undo  the  infinite  injuries 
and  injustices  of  this  war  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  cannot  deal  with  any  but  veritable  representatives  of 
the  German  people  who  have  been  assured  of  a  genuine 
constitutional  standing  as  the  real  rulers  of  Germany.  If 
it  must  deal  with  the  military  masters  and  the  monarchical 
autocrats  of  Germany  now,  or  if  it  is  likely  to  have  to  deal 
with  them  later  in  regard  to  the  international  obligations 
of  the  German  Empire,  it  must  demand,  not  peace  negotia- 
tions, but  surrender.  Nothing  can  be  gained  by  leaving  this 
essential  thing  unsaid. 

Accept,  Sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  highest  con- 
sideration. (Signed)  Robert  Lansing. 
Mr.  Frederick  Oederlin, 

Charge  d} Affaires  of  Switzerland  ad  interim. 

In  charge  of  German  interests  in  the  United  States. 

Charge  d' Affaires  of  Switzerland  to  the  Secretary  of  State.1 

Legation  of  Switzerland, 
Washington,  D.  C. 
Department  of 

German  Interests.  October  28,  1918. 

Sir: 

I  am  instructed  by  my  government  and  have  the  honor  to 
submit  to  Your  Excellency  the  original  German  text  of  a 
communication  from  the  German  Government,  dated  Oc- 

1  Official   U.   S.   Bulletin.  October  29,   1918. 


DOCUMENTS  215 

tober  27,  1918,  which  has  to-day  been  received  from  the 
Swiss  Foreign  Office. 

I  beg  leave  also  to  enclose  an  English  translation  of  the 
above-mentioned  communication,  the  German  text  of  which, 
however,  is  alone  to  be  considered  as  authoritative. 

Accept,  sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  highest  con- 
sideration. F.  Oederlin, 

Charge  d 'Affaires  ad  interim  of  Switzerland. 

His  Excellency, 
Mr.  Robert  Lansing, 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States, 
Washington. 
Translation  of  a  communication  from  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, dated  October  27,   1918,  as  transmitted  by  the 
Charge  d' Affaires  ad  interim  of  Switzerland  on  October 
28,  1918: 

The  German  Government  has  taken  cognizance  of  the 
reply  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  The  President 
knows  the  far-reaching  changes  which  have  taken  place  and 
are  being  carried  out  in  the  German  constitutional  struc- 
ture. The  peace  negotiations  are  being  conducted  by  a  gov- 
ernment of  the  people,  in  whose  hands  rests,  both  actually 
and  constitutionally,  the  authority  to  make  decisions.  The 
military  powers  are  also  subject  to  this  authority.  The 
German  Government  now  awaits  the  proposals  for  an  armis- 
tice, which  is  the  first  step  toward  a  peace  of  justice,  as 
described  by  the  President  in  his  pronouncements. 

(Signed)  Solf, 
State  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Berlin,  October  27,  1918. 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Minister  of  Switzerland.1 

Department  of  State, 
Washington. 

November  5,  1918. 
Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  request  you  to  transmit  the  following 
communication  to  the  German  Government: 

1  Official   U.  S.  Bulletin,  October  15,  1918. 


216    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

In  my  note  of  October  23,  1918,  I  advised  you  that  the 
President  had  transmitted  his  correspondence  with  the 
German  authorities  to  the  governments  with  which  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  is  associated  as  a  belliger- 
ent, with  the  suggestion  that,  if  those  governments  were 
disposed  to  effect  peace  upon  the  terms  and  principles 
indicated,  their  military  advisers  and  the  military  advisers 
of  the  United  States  be  asked  to  submit  to  the  governments 
associated  against  Germany  the  necessary  terms  of  such  an 
armistice  as  would  fully  protect  the  interests  of  the  peoples 
involved  and  ensure  to  the  associated  governments  the 
unrestricted  power  to  safeguard  and  enforce  the  details  of 
the  peace  to  which  the  German  Government  had  agreed, 
provided  they  deemed  such  an  armistice  possible  from  the 
military  point  of  view. 

The  President  is  now  in  receipt  of  a  memorandum  of 
observations  by  the  Allied  Governments  on  this  correspond- 
ence, which  is  as  follows: 

"The  Allied  Governments  have  given  careful  con- 
sideration to  the  correspondence  which  has  passed  be- 
tween the  President  of  the  United  States  and  the  Ger- 
man Government.  Subject  to  the  qualifications  which 
follow  they  declare  their  willingness  to  make  peace 
with  the  Government  of  Germany  on  the  terms  of  peace 
laid  down  in  the  President's  address  to  Congress  of 
January,  1918,  and  the  principles  of  settlement  enunci- 
ated in  his  subsequent  addresses.  They  must  point  out, 
however,  that  clause  two  relating  to  what  is  usually 
described  as  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  is  open  to  various 
interpretations,  some  of  which  they  could  not  accept. 
They  must,  therefore,  reserve  to  themselves  complete 
freedom  on  this  subject  when  they  enter  the  peace  con- 
ference. 

"Further,  in  the  conditions  of  peace,  laid  down  in  his 
address  to  Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  the  President 
declared  that  invaded  territories  must  be  restored  as 
well  as  evacuated  and  freed.  The  Allied  Governments 
feel  that  no  doubt  ought  to  be  allowed  to  exist  as  to 
what  this  provision  implies.    By  it  they  understood  that 


DOCUMENTS  217 

compensation  will  be  made  by  Germany  for  all  damage 
done  to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allies  and  their 
property  by  the  aggression  of  Germany  by  land,  by  sea, 
and  from  the  air." 
I  am  instructed  by  the  President  to  say  that  he  is  in  agree- 
ment with  the  interpretation  set  forth  in  the  last  paragraph 
of  the  memorandum  above  quoted.    I  am  further  instructed 
by  the  President  to  request  you  to  notify  the  German  Gov- 
ernment that  Marshal  Foch  has  been  authorized  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  and  the  Allied  Governments 
to  receive  properly  accredited  representatives  of  the  German 
Government,   and  to  communicate  to  them  terms   of  an 
armistice. 

Accept,  Sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  highest  con- 
sideration. 

(  Signed)  Robert  Lansing. 
Mr.  Hans  Sulzer, 
Minister  of  Switzerland, 

In  charge  of  German  interests  in  the  United  States. 


Ill 


COVENANT    OF    THE    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS    ADOPTED    BY    THE 
PEACE  CONFERENCE  AT  PLENARY  SESSION,  APRIL  28,  I919 

In  ofder  to  promote  international  cooperation  and  to 
achieve  international  peace  and  security  by  the  acceptance 
of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,  by  the  prescription  of 
open,  just  and  honorable  relations  between  nations,  by  the 
firm  establishment  of  the  understandings  of  international 
law  as  the  actual  rule  of  conduct  among  governments,  and 
by  the  maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for 
all  treaty  obligations  in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples 
with  one  another,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  to 
this  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Article  I 

The  original  Members  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall 
be  those  of  the  Signatories  which  are  named  in  the  Annex 
to  this  Covenant  and  also  such  of  those  other  States  named 
in  the  Annex  as  shall  accede  without  reservation  to  this 
Covenant.  Such  accession  shall  be  effected  by  a  Declara- 
tion deposited  with  the  Secretariat  within  two  months  of 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  Covenant.  Notice  thereof 
shall  be  sent  to  all  other  Members  of  the  League. 

Any  fully  self-governing  State,  Dominion  or  Colony  not 
named  in  the  Annex  may  become  a  Member  of  the  League 
if  its  admission  is  agreed  to  by  two-thirds  of  the  Assembly, 
provided  that  it  shall  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere 
intention  to  observe  its  international  obligations,  and  shall 
accept  such  regulations  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  League 
in  regard  to  its  military  and  naval  forces  and  armaments. 

Any  member  of  the  League  may,  after  two  years'  notice 
of  its  intention  so  to  do,  withdraw  from  the  League,  pro- 

218 


DOCUMENTS  210 

vided  that  all  its  international  obligations  and  all  its  obliga- 
tions under  this  Covenant  shall  have  been  fulfilled  at  the 
time  of  its  withdrawal. 

Article  II 

The  action  of  the  League  under  this  Covenant  shall  be 
effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  an  Assembly  and  of 
a  Council,  with  a  permanent  Secretariat. 

Article  III 

The  Assembly  shall  consist  of  Representatives  of  the 
Members  of  the  League. 

The  Assembly  shall  meet  at  stated  intervals  and  from 
time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require  at  the  Seat  of  the 
League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  Assembly  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

At  meetings  of  the  Assembly  each  Member  of  the  League 
shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  have  not  more  than  three 
Representatives. 

Article  IV 

The  Council  shall  consist  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  of  the  British  Empire,  of  France, 
of  Italy,  and  of  Japan,  together  with  Representatives  of 
four  other  Members  of  the  League.  These  four  Members 
of  the  League  shall  be  selected  by  the  Assembly  from  time 
to  time  in  its  discretion.  Until  the  appointment  of  the  Rep- 
resentatives of  the  four  Members  of  the  League  first  se- 
lected by  the  Assembly,  Representatives  of  Belgium,  Brazil, 
Greece,  Spain  shall  be  members  of  the  Council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  Assembly,  the 
Council  may  name  additional  Members  of  the  League  whose 
Representatives  shall  always  be  members  of  the  Council; 
the  Council  with  like  approval  may  increase  the  number 
of  Members  of  the  League  to  be  selected  by  the  Assembly 
for  representation  on  the  Council. 


220   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

The  Council  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as  occasion 
may  require,  and  at  least  once  a  year,  at  the  Seat  of  the 
League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  Council  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  not  represented  on  the  Coun- 
cil shall  be  invited  to  send  a  Representative  to  sit  as  a 
member  at  any  meeting  of  the  Council  during  the  considera- 
tion of  matters  specially  affecting  the  interests  of  that 
Member  of  the  League. 

At  meetings  of  the  Council  each  Member  of  the  League 
represented  on  the  Council  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may 
have  not  more  than  one  Representative. 

Article  V 

Except  where  otherwise  expressly  provided  in  this  Cove- 
nant, or  this  Treaty,  decisions  at  any  meeting  of  the  As- 
sembly or  of  the  Council  shall  require  the  agreement  of  all 
the  Members  of  the  League  represented  at  the  meeting. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  Assembly  or 
of  the  Council,  including  the  appointment  of  Committees  to 
investigate  particular  matters,  shall  be  regulated  by  the 
Assembly  or  by  the  Council  and  may  be  decided  by  a  ma- 
jority of  the  Members  of  the  League  represented  at  the 
meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Assembly  and  the  first  meeting 
of  the  Council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

Article  VI 

The  permanent  Secretariat  shall  be  established  at  the  Seat 
of  the  League.  The  Secretariat  shall  comprise  a  Secretary 
General  and  such  secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be  required. 

The  first  Secretary  General  shall  be  the  person  named  in 
the  Annex;  thereafter  the  Secretary  General  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  Council  with  the  approval  of  the  majority  of 
the  Assembly. 


DOCUMENTS  221 

The  secretaries  and  the  staff  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be 
appointed  by  the  Secretary  General  with  the  approval  of 
the  Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at  all 
meetings  of  the  Assembly  and  of  the  Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the 
Members  of  the  League  in  accordance  with  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  expenses  of  the  International  Bureau  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union. 

Article  VII 

The  Seat  of  the  League  is  established  at  Geneva. 

The  Council  may  at  any  time  decide  that  the  Seat  of  the 
League  shall  be  established  elsewhere. 

All  positions  under  or  in  connection  with  the  League,  in- 
cluding the  Secretariat,  shall  be  open  equally  to  men  and 
women. 

Representatives  of  the  Members  of  the  League  and 
officials  of  the  League  when  engaged  on  the  business  of  the 
League  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  immunities. 

The  buildings  and  other  property  occupied  by  the  League 
or  its  officials  or  by  Representatives  attending  its  meetings 
shall  be  inviolable. 

Article  VIII 

The  Members  of  the  League  recognize  that  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  requires  the  reduction  of  national  arma- 
ments to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  national  safety 
and  the  enforcement  by  common  action  of  international 
obligations. 

The  Council,  taking  account  of  the  geographical  situation 
and  circumstances  of  each  State,  shall  formulate  plans  for 
such  reduction  for  the  consideration  and  action  of  the  sev- 
eral Governments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsideration  and  re- 
vision at  least  every  ten  years. 

After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted  by  the  several 
Governments,  the  limits  of  armaments  therein  fixed  shall 
not  be  exceeded  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Council. 


222    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  the  manufacture 
by  private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  implements  of  war  is 
open  to  grave  objections.  The  Council  shall  advise  how 
the  evil  effects  attendant  upon  such  manufacture  can  be 
prevented,  due  regard  being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those 
Members  of  the  League  which  are  not  able  to  manufacture 
the  munitions  and  implements  of  war  necessary  for  their 
safety. 

The  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  interchange 
full  and  frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of  their  arma- 
ments, their  military  and  naval  programmes  and  the  con- 
dition of  such  of  their  industries  as  are  adaptable  to  war- 
like purposes. 

Article  IX 

A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to  advise 
the  Council  on  the  execution  of  the  provisions  of  Articles 
I  and  VIII  and  on  military  and  naval  questions  generally. 

Article  X 

The  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  respect  and 
preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  existing  political  independence  of  all  Members 
of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in  case 
of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggression  the  Council  shall 
advise  upon  the  means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be 
fulfilled. 

Article  XI 

/■vny  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately  affecting 
any  of  the  Members  of  the  League  or  not,  is  hereby  declared 
a  matter  of  concern  to  the  whole  League,  and  the  League 
shall  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual 
to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations.  In  case  any  such  emer- 
gency should  arise,  the  Secretary  General  shall,  on  the  re- 
quest of  any  Member  of  the  League,  forthwith  summon  a 
meeting  of  the  Council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  friendly  right  of  each  Mem- 


DOCUMENTS  223 

ber  of  the  League  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Assembly 
or  of  the  Council  any  circumstance  whatever  affecting  in- 
ternational relations  which  threatens  to  disturb  international 
peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  nations  upon 
which  peace  depends. 

Article  XII 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  if  there  should 
arise  between  them  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture, 
they  will  submit  the  matter  either  to  arbitration  or  to  in- 
quiry by  the  Council,  and  they  agree  in  no  case  to  resort 
to  war  until  three  months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators 
or  the  report  by  the  Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  Article  the  award  of  the  arbitra- 
tors shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  the  report 
of  the  Council  shall  be  made  within  six  months  after  the 
submission  of  the  dispute. 

Article  XIII 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  whenever  any 
dispute  shall  arise  between  them  which  they  recognize  to 
be  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration  and  which  cannot 
be  satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the 
whole  subject  matter  to  arbitration. 

Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to  any 
question  of  international  law,  as  to  the  existence  of  any 
fact  which  if  established  would  constitute  a  breach  of  any 
international  obligation,  or  as  to  the  extent  and  nature  of 
the  reparation  to  be  made  for  any  such  breach,  are  declared 
to  be  among  those  which  are  generally  suitable  for  submis- 
sion to  arbitration. 

For  the  consideration  of  any  such  dispute  the  court  of 
arbitration  to  which  the  case  is  referred  shall  be  the  court 
agreed  on  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute  or  stipulated  in  any 
convention  existing  between  them. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  carry 
out  in  full  good  faith  any  award  that  may  be  rendered  and 


224    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

that  they  will  not  resort  to  war  against  a  Member  of  the 
League  which  complies  therewith.  In  the  event  of  any 
failure  to  carry  out  such  an  award,  the  Council  shall 
propose  what  steps  should  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

Article  XIV 

The  Council  shall  formulate  and  submit  to  the  Members 
of  the  League  for  adoption  plans  for  the  establishment  of  a 
Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice.  The  Court  shall 
be  competent  to  hear  and  determine  any  dispute  of  an  inter- 
national character  which  the  parties  thereto  submit  to  it. 
The  Court  may  also  give  an  advisory  opinion  upon  any 
dispute  or  question  referred  to  it  by  the  Council  or  by  the 
Assembly. 

Article  XV 

If  there  should  arise  between  Members  of  the  League  any 
dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  which  is  not  submitted  to 
arbitration  as  above,  the  Members  of  the  League  agree  that 
they  will  submit  the  matter  to  the  Council.  Any  party  to 
the  dispute  may  effect  such  submission  by  giving  notice  of 
the  existence  of  the  dispute  to  the  Secretary  General,  who 
will  make  all  necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  investigation 
and  consideration  thereof. 

For  this  purpose  the  parties  to  the  dispute  will  communi- 
cate to  the  Secretary  General,  as  promptly  as  possible,  state- 
ments of  their  case  with  all  the  relevant  facts  and  papers, 
and  the  Council  may  forthwith  direct  the  publication 
thereof. 

The  Council  shall  endeavor  to  effect  a  settlement  of  the 
dispute,  and  if  such  efforts  are  successful,  a  statement  shall 
be  made  public  giving  such  facts  and  explanations  regard- 
ing the  dispute  and  the  terms  of  settlement  thereof  as  the 
Council  may  deem  appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  is  not  thus  settled,  the  Council  either  unani- 
mously or  by  a  majority  vote  shall  make  and  publish  a 
report  containing  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute  and 
the  recommendations  which  are  deemed  just  and  proper  in 
regard  thereto. 


DOCUMENTS  225 

Any  Member  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council 
may  make  public  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute 
and  of  its  conclusions  regarding  the  same. 

If  a  report  by  the  Council  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by 
the  members  thereof  other  than  the  Representatives  of  one 
or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  Members  of  the 
League  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war  with  any  party 
to  the  dispute  which  complies  with  the  recommendations  of 
the  report. 

If  the  Council  fails  to  reach  a  report  which  is  unani- 
mously agreed  to  by  the  members  thereof,  other  than  the 
representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute, 
the  Members  of  the  League  reserve  to  themselves  the  right 
to  take  such  action  as  they  shall  consider  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  right  and  justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one  of 
them,  and  is  found  by  the  Council  to  arise  out  of  a  matter 
which  by  international  law  is  solely  within  the  domestic 
jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  Council  shall  so  report,  and 
shall  make  no  recommendation  as  to  its  settlement. 

The  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this  Article  refer  the 
dispute  to  the  Assembly.  The  dispute  shall  be  so  referred 
at  the  request  of  either  party  to  the  dispute,  provided  that 
such  request  be  made  within  fourteen  days  after  the  sub- 
mission of  the  dispute  to  the  Council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the  Assembly  all  the  provisions 
of  this  Article  and  of  Article  XII  relating  to  the  action 
and  powers  of  the  Council  shall  apply  to  the  action  and 
powers  of  the  Assembly,  provided  that  a  report  made  by 
the  Assembly  if  concurred  in  by  the  Representatives  of 
those  Members  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council 
and  of  a  majority  of  the  other  Members  of  the  League, 
exclusive  in  each  case  of  "the  Representatives  of  the 
parties  to  the  dispute,  shall  have  the  same  force  as  a 
report  by  the  Council  concurred  in  by  all  the  members 
thereof  other  than  the  Representatives  of  one  or  more 
of  the  parties  to  the  dispute. 


226   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Article  XVI 

Should  any  Member  of  the  League  resort  to  war  in 
disregard  of  its  covenants  under  Articles  XII,  XIII  or  XV, 
it  shall  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an  act 
of  war  against  all  other  Members  of  the  League,  which 
hereby  undertake  immediately  to  subject  it  to  the  severance 
of  all  trade  or  financial  relations,  the  prohibition  of  all 
intercourse  between  their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of 
the  covenant-breaking  State,  and  the  prevention  of  all 
financial,  commercial,  or  personal  intercourse  between  the 
nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and  the  nationals 
of  any  other  State,  whether  a  Member  of  the  League 
or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Council  in  such  case  to  recom- 
mend to  the  several  Governments  concerned  what  effec- 
tive military  or  naval  force  the  Members  of  the  League 
shall  severally  contribute  to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used 
to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree,  further,  that  they 
will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial  and 
economic  measures  which  are  taken  under  this  Article,  in 
order  to  minimize  the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting  from 
the  above  measures,  and  that  they  will  mutually  support 
one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures  aimed  at 
one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant-breaking  State,  and 
that  they  will  take  the  necessary  steps  to  afford  passage 
through  their  territory  to  the  forces  of  any  of  the  Members 
of  the  League  which  are  cooperating  to  protect  the  co- 
venants of  the  League. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  which  has  violated  any 
covenant  of  the  League  may  be  declared  to  be  no  longer  a 
Member  of  the  League  by  a  vote  of  the  Council  con- 
curred in  by  the  Representatives  of  all  the  other  Members 
of  the  League  represented  thereon. 

Article  XVII 

In  the  event  of  a  dispute  between  a  Member  of  the 
League  and  a  State  which  is  not  a  Member  of  the  League, 


DOCUMENTS  227 

or  between  States  not  Members  of  the  League,  the  State 
or  States  not  Members  of  the  League  shall  be  invited 
to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League 
for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon  such  conditions 
as  the  Council  may  deem  just.  If  such  invitation  is  ac- 
cepted, the  provisions  of  Articles  XII  to  XVI  inclusive 
shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications  as  may  be  deemed 
necessary  by  the  Council. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  Council  shall  im- 
mediately institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  of 
the  dispute  and  recommend  such  action  as  may  seem  best 
and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances. 

If  a  State  so  invited  shall  refuse  to  accept  the  obligations 
of  membership  in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such 
dispute,  and  shall  resort  to  war  against  a  Member  of  the 
League,  the  provisions  of  Article  XVI  shall  be  applicable 
as  against  the  State  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute  when  so  invited  refuse 
to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League 
for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  the  Council  may  take 
such  measures  and  make  such  recommendations  as  will 
prevent  hostilities  and  will  result  in  the  settlement  of  the 
dispute. 

Article  XVIII 

Every  treaty  or  international  engagement  entered  into 
hereafter  by  any  Member  of  the  League  shall  be  forth- 
with registered  with  the  Secretariat  and  shall,  as  soon  as 
possible,  be  published  by  it.  No  such  treaty  or  interna- 
tional engagement  shall  be  binding  until  so  registered. 

Article  XIX 

The  Assembly  may  from  time  to  time  advise  the  recon- 
sideration by  Members  of  the  League  of  treaties  which 
have  become  inapplicable  and  the  consideration  of  inter- 
national conditions  whose  continuance  might  endanger 
the  peace  of  the  world. 


228   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Article  XX 

The  Members  of  the  League  severally  agree  that  this 
Covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  obligations  or  un- 
derstandings inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
thereof,  and  solemnly  undertake  that  they  will  not  here- 
after enter  into  any  engagements  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  thereof. 

In  case  any  Member  of  the  League  shall,  before  becom- 
ing a  Member  of  the  League,  have  undertaken  any  obliga- 
tions inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  Covenant,  it  shall 
be  the  duty  of  such  Member  to  take  immediate  steps  to 
procure  its  release  from  such  obligations. 

Article  XXI 

Nothing  in  this  Covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the 
validity  of  international  engagements  such  as  treaties  of 
arbitration  or  regional  understandings  like  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine for  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

Article  XXII 

To  those  colonies  and  territories  which  as  a  consequence 
of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be  under  the  sovereignty 
of  the  States  which  formerly  governed  them  and  which  are 
inhabited  by  peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves 
under  the  strenuous  conditions  of  the  modern  world,  there 
should  be  applied  the  principle  that  the  well-being  and  de- 
velopment of  such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civiliza- 
tion and  that  securities  for  the  performance  of  this  trust 
should  be  embodied  in  this  Covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to  this  prin- 
ciple is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should  be  entrusted 
to  advanced  nations  who  by  reason  of  their  resources, 
their  experience,  or  their  geographical  position  can  best 
undertake  this  responsibility,  and  who  are  willing  to  ac- 
cept it,  and  that  this  tutelage  should  be  exercised  by  them 
as  Mandataries  on  behalf  of  the  League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according  to 


DOCUMENTS  229 

the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geographical 
situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  conditions  and 
other  similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish 
Empire  have  reached  a  stage  of  development  where  their 
existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  provisionally  recog- 
nized subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative  advice  and 
assistance  by  a  Mandatary  until  such  time  as  they  are 
able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes  of  these  communities 
must  be  a  principal  consideration  in  the  selection  of  the 
Mandatary. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa,  are  at 
such  a  stage  that  the  Mandatary  must  be  responsible  for 
the  administration  of  the  territory  under  conditions  which 
will  guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  or  religion,  subject 
only  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and  morals,  the  pro- 
hibition of  abuses  such  as  the  slave-trade,  the  arms  traffic 
and  the  liquor  traffic,  and  the  prevention  of  the  establish- 
ment of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases  and  of 
military  training  of  the  natives  for  other  than  police  pur- 
poses and  the  defense  of  territory,  and  will  also  secure 
equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other 
Members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  Southwest  Africa  and 
certain  of  the  South  Pacific  Islands,  which,  owing  to  the 
sparseness  of  their  population,  or  their  small  size,  or  their 
remoteness  from  the  centers  of  civilization,  or  their  geo- 
graphical contiguity  to  the  territory  of  the  Mandatary,  and 
other  circumstances,  can  be  best  administered  under  the 
laws  of  the  Mandatary  as  integral  portions  of  its  territory, 
subject  to  the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the  interests 
of  the  indigenous  population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  Mandatary  shall  render 
to  the  Council  an  annual  report  in  reference  to  the  territory 
committed  to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administration  to  be 
exercised  by  the  Mandatary  shall,  if  not  previously  agreed 
upon  by  the  Members  of  the  League,  be  explicitly  defined 
in  each  case  by  the  Council. 


280   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to  receive 
and  examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  Mandataries  and 
to  advise  the  Council  on  all  matters  relating  to  the  ob- 
servance of  the  mandates. 

Article  XXIII 

Subject  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
international  conventions  existing  or  hereafter  to  be  agreed 
upon,  the  Members  of  the  League 

(a)  will  endeavor  to  secure  and  maintain  fair  and 
humane  conditions  of  labor  for  men,  women  and 
children  both  in  their  own  countries  and  in  all  coun- 
tries to  which  their  commercial  and  industrial  re- 
lations extend,  and  for  that  purpose  will  establish 
and  maintain  the  necessary  international  organiza- 
tions ; 

(b)  undertake  to  secure  just  treatment  of  the  native  in- 
habitants of  territories  under  their  control; 

(c)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  supervision 
over  the  execution  of  agreements  with  regard  to 
the  traffic  in  women  and  children,  and  the  traffic  in 
opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs ; 

(d)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  supervision 
of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with  the  coun- 
tries in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic  is  necessary 
in  the  common  interest; 

(e)  will  make  provision  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom 
of  communications  and  of  transit  and  equitable  treat- 
ment for  the  commerce  of  all  Members  of  the 
League.  In  this  connection,  the  special  necessities 
of  the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  1914- 
1918  shall  be  borne  in  mind ; 

(f)  will  endeavor  to  take  steps  in  matters  of  interna- 
tional concern  for  the  prevention  and  control  of 
disease. 


DOCUMENTS  231 

Article  XXIV 

There  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League 
all  international  bureaux  already  established  by  general 
treaties  if  the  parties  to  such  treaties  consent.  All  such 
international  bureaux  and  all  commissions  for  the  regu- 
lation of  matters  of  international  interest  hereafter  con- 
stituted shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League. 

In  all  matters  of  international  interest  which  are  regulated 
by  general  conventions  but  which  are  not  placed  under 
the  control  of  international  bureaux  or  commissions,  the 
Secretariat  of  the  League  shall,  subject  to  the  consent  of 
the  Council  and  if  desired  by  the  parties,  collect  and  dis- 
tribute all  relevant  information  and  shall  render  any  other 
assistance  which  may  be  necessary  or  desirable. 

The  Council  may  include  as  part  of  the  expenses  of  the 
Secretariat  the  expenses  of  any  bureau  or  commission 
which  is  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League. 

Article  XXV 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  to  encourage  and 
promote  the  establishment  and  cooperation  of  duly  au- 
thorized voluntary  national  Red  Cross  organizations  having 
as  purposes  the  improvement  of  health,  the  prevention 
of  disease  and  the  mitigation  of  suffering  throughout  the 
world. 

Article  XXVI 

Amendments  to  this  Covenant  will  take  effect  when  rati- 
fied by  the  Members  of  the  League  whose  Representatives 
compose  the  Council  and  by  a  majority  of  the  Members 
of  the  League  whose  Representatives  compose  the  As- 
sembly. 

No  such  amendment  shall  bind  any  Member  of  the  League 
which  signifies  its  dissent  therefrom,  but  in  that  case  it 
shall  cease  to  be  a  Member  of  the  League. 


232    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Annex  to  the  Covenant 

I.    Original  Members  of  the  League  of  Nations 
Signatories  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace 


United  States  of  America 

Japan 

Belgium 

Cuba 

Liberia 

Bolivia 

Czecho-Slovakia 

Nicaragua 

Brazil 

Ecuador 

Panama 

British  Empire 

France 

Peru 

Canada 

Greece 

Poland 

Australia 

Guatemala 

Portugal 

South  Africa 

Haiti 

Roumania 

New  Zealand 

Hedjaz 

Serbia 

India 

Honduras 

Siam 

China 

Italy 

Uruguay 

States  Invited  to  Accede  to  the  Covenant 

Argentine  Republic  Netherlands 

Salvador 

Chile 

Norway 

Spain 

Colombia 

Paraguay 

Sweden 

Denmark 

Persia 

Switzerland 
Venezuela 

2.    First  Secretary  General  of  the  League  of  Nations 

Sir  James  Eric  Drummond 

At  the  first  meeting  of  the  Council,  on  January  16, 
1920,  at  Paris,  the  Great  Powers  represented  in  it  were  the 
British  Empire,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan;  of  the  smaller 
States,  Belgium,  Brazil,  Greece,  and  Spain. 


IV 

EX-SENATOR  ROOT'S  LETTER  TO   SENATOR   LODGE 

June  19,  1919 

"To  the  Hon.  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

"My  Dear  Senator :  You  were  good  enough  to  ask 
that,  after  studying  the  whole  of  the  proposed  treaty  with 
Germany  and  the  amendments  already  made  to  the  League 
of  Nations  part  of  it,  I  would  write  you  my  opinion  as 
to  the  amendments  and  as  to  the  action  which  would  be  wise, 
in  view  of  existing  international  conditions. 

"I  should  be  glad  to  see  the  peace  terms  and  the  League 
of  Nations  covenant  separated,  as  proposed  in  the  resolu- 
tion offered  by  Senator  Knox,  so  that  the  latter  could  be 
considered  by  the  people  of  the  country  without  coercion 
from  the  necessities  of  speedy  peace. 

"To  avoid  repetition,  I  enclose  a  copy  of  a  letter  which 
I  wrote  to  Mr.  Will  H.  Hays,  March  29,  1919,  proposing 
amendments  to  the  League  of  Nations  covenant  and  giving 
the  reasons  for  them.  Amendments  similar  in  substance 
were  proposed  at  about  the  same  time  by  many  Americans 
familiar  with  public  affairs  both  in  and  out  of  the  Senate. 
The  amendments  subsequently  made  in  the  covenant  by 
the  Paris  conference,  while  to  some  extent  dealing  with  the 
subjects  of  the  amendments  so  proposed,  are  very  inade- 
quate and  unsatisfactory. 

"Nothing  has  b^en  done  to  provide  for  the  reestablishment 
and  strengthening  of  a  system  of  arbitration  or  judicial 
decision  upon  questions  of  legal  right.  Nothing  has  been 
done  toward  providing  for  the  revision  or  development 
of  International  Law.  In  these  respects,  principles  main- 
tained by  the  United  States  without  variation  for  half  a 
century  are  still  ignored,  and  we  are  left  with  a  programme 

233 


234    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

which  rests  the  hope  of  the  world  for  future  peace  in  a 
government  of  men  and  not  of  laws,  following  the  dictates 
of  expediency,  and  not  of  right.  Nothing  has  been  done 
to  limit  the  vast  and  incalculable  obligation  which  Article 
X  of  the  Covenant  undertakes  to  impose  upon  each  member 
of  the  League  to  preserve  against  external  aggression  the 
territorial  integrity  and  political  independence  of  all  mem- 
bers of  the  League  all  over  the  world. 

"The  clause  authorizing  withdrawal  from  the  League 
on  two  years'  notice  leaves  a  doubt  whether  a  mere  charge 
that  we  had  not  performed  some  international  obligation 
would  not  put  it  in  the  power  of  the  council  to  take  juris- 
diction of  the  charge  as  a  disputed  question  and  keep  us 
in  the  League  indefinitely  against  our  will. 

"The  clause  which  has  been  inserted  regarding  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  is  erroneous  in  its  description  of  the  doctrine 
and  ambiguous  in  meaning.  Other  purely  American  ques- 
tions, as,  for  example,  questions  relating  to  immigration, 
are  protected  only  by  a  clause  apparently  empowering  the 
council  to  determine  whether  such  questions  are  solely 
within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States.  I 
do  not  think  that  in  these  respects  the  United  States  is 
sufficiently  protected  against  most  injurious  results,  which 
are  wholly  unnecessary  for  the  establishment  and  main- 
tenance of  this  League  of  Nations. 

"On  the  other  hand,  it  still  remains  that  there  is  in 
the  Covenant  a  great  deal  of  high  value  that  the  world 
ought  not  to  lose.  The  arrangement  to  make  conferences 
of  the  Powers  automatic  when  there  is  danger  of  war; 
provisions  for  joint  action,  as  of  course  by  representatives 
of  the  nations  concerned  in  matters  affecting  common  in- 
terests ;  the  agreement  for  delay  in  case  of  serious  disputes, 
with  opportunity  to  bring  the  public  opinion  of  the  world 
to  bear  on  the  disputants  and  to  induce  cool  and  deliberate 
judgment;  the  recognition  of  racial  and  popular  rights  to 
the  freedom  of  local  self-government,  and  the  plan,  indis- 
pensable in  some  form,  for  setting  up  governments  in  the 
vast  regions  deprived  by  the  war  of  the  automatic  rule 


DOCUMENTS  255 

which  has  maintained  order — all  these  ought  not  to  be  lost, 
if  that  can  possibly  be  avoided. 

"The  condition  of  Europe  requires  prompt  action.  In- 
dustry has  not  revived  there.  Its  revival  requires  raw 
materials.  To  obtain  these  credit  is  necessary,  and  for 
this  there  must  be  security  for  the  fruits  of  enterprise,  and 
for  this  there  must  be  peace.  Satan  is  finding  evil  work 
for  idle  hands  to  do  in  Europe — evil  work  that  affects  the 
whole  world,  including  the  United  States. 

"Under  these  circumstances  what  ought  to  be  done? 

"I  am  clear  that,  if  the  Covenant  has  to  be  considered 
with  the  peace  terms  included,  the  Senate  ought  to  in- 
clude in  its  resolution  of  consent  to  the  ratification  an 
expression  of  such  reservations  and  understandings  as 
will  cure  so  far  as  possible  the  defects  which  I  have 
pointed  out.  You  will  probably  be  unable  to  do  any- 
thing now  about  the  system  of  arbitration  and  the  de- 
velopment of  International  Law.  You  can,  however,  put 
into  the  resolution  of  consent  a  reservation  refusing  to 
agree  to  Article  X,  and  I  think  you  should  do  so ;  you  can 
clarify  the  meaning  of  the  withdrawal  article,  and  you  can 
also  include  in  your  resolution  the  substance  of  the  third 
amendment  which  I  proposed  in  my  letter  to  Mr.  Hays  of 
March  29,  relating  to  purely  American  questions,  and  I 
think  you  should  do  so.  These  clauses  ot  the  resolution 
shape  themselves  in  my  own  mind  as  follows : 

"The  Senate  of  the  United  States  advises  and  consents 
to  the  ratification  of  the  said  treaty  with  the  following 
reservations  and  understandings  to  be  made  a  part  of 
the  instrument  of  ratification,  viz. : 

"(1)  In  advising  and  consenting  to  the  ratification  of 
the  said  treaty  the  Senate  reserves  and  excludes  from 
its  consent  the  tenth  article  of  the  Covenant  for  the  League 
of  Nations,  as  to  which  the  Senate  refuses  its  consent. 

"(2)  The  Senate  consents  to  the  ratification  of  the 
said  treaty,  reserving  Article  X  aforesaid,  with  the  under- 
standing that  whenever  two  years'  notice  of  withdrawal 
from  the  League  of  Nations  shall  have  been  given,  as 
provided  in   Article  I,  no  claim,  charge  or  finding  that 


236    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

international  obligations  or  obligations  under  the  Covenant 
have  not  been  fulfilled,  will  be  deemed  to  render  the  two 
years'  notice  ineffectual  or  to  keep  the  power  giving  the 
notice  in  the  League  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  spec- 
ified in  the  notice. 

"(3)  Inasmuch  as,  in  agreeing  to  become  a  member  of 
the  League  of  Nations,  the  United  States  of  America  is 
moved  by  no  interest  or  wish  to  intrude  upon  or  interfere 
with  the  political  policy  or  international  administration  of 
any  foreign  State,  and  by  no  existing  or  anticipated  dangers 
in  the  affairs  of  the  American  continents,  but  accedes  to 
the  wish  of  the  European  States  that  it  shall  join  its  power 
to  theirs  for  the  preservation  of  general  peace,  the  Senate 
consents  to  the  ratification  of  the  said  treaty,  excepting 
Article  X  aforesaid,  with  the  understanding  that  nothing 
therein  contained  shall  be  construed  to  imply  a  relinquish- 
ment by  the  United  States  of  America  of  its  traditional 
attitude  toward  purely  American  questions,  or  to  require 
the  submission  of  its  policy  regarding  questions  which 
it  deems  to  be  purely  American  questions  to  the  decision 
or  recommendation  of  other  Powers. 

"This  reservation  and  these  expressions  of  understand- 
ing are  in  accordance  with  long  established  precedent  in 
the  making  of  treaties.  When  included  in  the  instrument 
of  ratification  they  will  not  require  a  reopening  of  nego- 
tiation, but  if  none  of  the  other  signatories  expressly  ob- 
jects to  the  ratification  with  such  limitations,  the  treaty 
stands  as  limited  between  the  United  States  and  the  other 
Powers. 

"If  any  doubt  were  entertained  as  to  the  effect  of  such 
action,  the  doubt  could  be  readily  dispelled  by  calling  upon 
the  four  other  principal  Powers  represented  in  the  Council 
to  state  whether  they  do  in  fact  object  to  the  entrance 
of  the  United  States  into  the  League  with  the  understand- 
ing and  reservations  stated  in  the  resolution. 

"As  to  these  limiting  clauses,  I  wish  to  say  something 
further.    As  to  Article  X : 

"First — It  is  not  an  essential  or  even  an  appropriate 
part  of  the  provisions  for  a  League  of  Nations  to  preserve 


DOCUMENTS  237 

peace.  It  is  an  independent  and  indefinite  alliance  which 
may  involve  the  parties  to  it  in  war  against  Powers  which 
have  in  every  respect  complied  with  the  provisions  of  the 
League  of  Peace.  It  was  not  included  in  General  Smuts's 
plan,  the  provisions  of  which  have  been  reproduced  almost 
textually  in  the  League  covenant.  It  stands  upon  its  own 
footing  as  an  independent  alliance  for  the  preservation 
of  the  status  quo. 

"Second — If  we  agree  to  this  article  it  is  extremely  prob- 
able that  we  shall  be  unable  to  keep  our  agreement.  Mak- 
ing war  nowadays  depends  upon  the  genuine  sympathy  of 
the  people  of  the  country  at  the  time  when  the  war  has  to 
be  carried  on.  The  people  of  the  United  States  certainly 
will  not  be  willing,  ten  years  or  twenty  years  hence,  to 
send  their  young  men  to  distant  parts  of  the  world  to  fight 
for  causes  in  which  they  may  not  believe  or  in  which 
they  have  little  or  no  interest.  If  that  is  the  attitude  of 
the  people  when  we  are  hereafter  called  upon  to  wage 
war  under  Article  X,  no  general,  definite  agreement  made 
years  before  will  make  them  disposed  to  fight,  and  we  shall 
be  in  about  the  worst  possible  position  of  having  made  an 
agreement  and  not  keeping  it.  Our  people  ought  not  to 
be  forced  into  such  a  position,  and  we  ought  not  to  make 
any  agreement  that  is  liable  to  force  them  into  such  a 
position. 

"The  recent  controversies  over  the  disposition  of  Kiau- 
chau  and  of  Fiume  illustrate  very  well  the  way  in  which 
territorial  arrangements  are  likely  to  be  made  in  councils 
of  the  great  Powers  controlled  by  expediency.  I  would 
not  vote  to  bind  our  country  to  go  into  a  war  in  years 
to  come  in  defense  of  those  arrangements. 

"If  it  is  necessary  for  the  security  of  Western  Europe, 
that  we  should  agree  to  go  to  the  support  of,  say,  France, 
if  attacked,  let  us  agree  to  that  particular  thing  plainly,  so 
that  every  man  and  woman  in  the  country  will  understand 
the  honorable  obligation  we  are  assuming.  I  am  in  favor 
of  that.  But  let  us  not  wrap  up  such  purpose  in  a  vague 
universal  obligation,  under  the  impression  that  it  really 
does  not  mean  anything  likely  to  happen. 


288    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

"Third — It  is  reported  that  Switzerland  is  much  dis- 
turbed over  the  invitation  to  join  the  League  of  Nations 
and  wishes  to  preserve  her  neutrality,  because  her  people 
are  partly  French,  partly  German  and  partly  Italian,  and 
she  wishes  to  keep  out  of  all  quarrels  which  may  involve 
these  nationalities.  In  this  country  the  census  of  1910 
showed  that  35  per  cent  (more  than  one-third)  of  our 
people  were  of  foreign  birth  or  the  children  of  foreign 
parents.  We  can  call  upon  these  people  to  stand  by  America 
in  all  American  quarrels,  but  how  can  we  control  their 
sympathies  and  their  action  if  America  interferes  in  foreign 
quarrels  and  takes  sides  in  these  quarrels  against  the  coun- 
tries to  which  they  are  attached  by  tradition  and  sentiment  ? 
How  can  we  prevent  dissension  and  hatred  among  our 
own  inhabitants  of  foreign  origin  when  this  country  in- 
terferes on  foreign  grounds  between  the  races  from  which 
they  spring?  How  can  we  prevent  bitterness  and  dis- 
loyalty toward  our  own  Government  on  the  part  of  those 
against  whose  friends  in  their  old  homes  we  have  intervened 
for  no  cause  of  our  own? 

"Article  X  confronts  us  with  consequences  very  similar 
to  those  which  Washington  had  in  mind  when  he  advised 
us  to  keep  out  of  the  quarrels  of  Europe,  and  to  keep  the 
quarrels  of  Europe  out  of  America.  It  is  by  following 
this  wise  policy  that  the  United  States  has  attained  a  posi- 
tion of  unity  and  of  disinterestedness  which  enables  her 
to  promote  peace  mightily,  because  she  is  not  a  party  to 
the  quarrels  that  threaten  to  disturb  peace.  She  is  free 
from  suspicion;  she  is  not  the  object  of  hatred  or  dis- 
trust; her  friendship  is  valued,  and  her  word  is  patent. 

"We  can  be  of  infinitely  more  value  to  the  peace  of 
the  world  by  keeping  out  of  all  the  petty  and  selfish 
quarrels  that  arise  than  we  can  by  binding  ourselves  to  take 
part  in  them.  Just  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  to  modify 
this  settled,  historic  American  policy  in  order  to  put  into 
effect  a  practical  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations  to  preserve 
peace  we  ought  to  go,  and  we  ought  not  to  go  one  step 
further.  The  step  proposed  by  Article  X  is  not  necessary 
for  such  a  plan,  and  we  ought  not  to  take  it. 


DOCUMENTS  239 

"As  to  the  statement  of  understanding  about  American 
questions  contained  in  the  foregoing  paragraph  numbered 
3  the  most  ardent  advocates  for  accepting  the  League 
covenant  exactly  as  it  stands  insist  that  the  provisions  al- 
ready inserted  about  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  other  purely 
American  questions  mean  just  what  this  proposed  resolu- 
tion says.  If  that  be  true,  then  nobody  can  object  to  the 
resolution,  which  puts  the  meaning  beyond  question.  It  is 
important  not  only  for  the  interests  of  America  but  for 
the  peace  of  the  world  that  such  provisions  should  be  free 
from  doubt  and  occasion  for  dispute.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
their  view  is  wrong,  and  the  provisions  already  inserted 
may  be  construed  not  to  mean  what  the  resolution  says, 
then  the  resolution  certainly  ought  to  be  included  in  the 
consent  to  the  ratifications. 

"There  is  one  other  thing  to  be  mentioned.  That  is  the 
recital  of  the  proposed  resolution  (No.  3),  disclaiming  any 
intention  by  the  United  States  to  intrude  upon  or  interfere 
with  the  political  policy  or  internal  administration  of  any 
foreign  State.  I  think  that  to  be  of  real  importance,  be- 
cause I  perceive  evidences  of  an  impression  in  Europe 
that  the  part  taken  by  the  representatives  of  the  United 
States  at  Paris  in  the  local  questions  and  controversies  of 
Europe  indicates  an  abandonment  by  the  United  States 
of  her  traditional  policy  and  a  wish  on  her  part  to  dictate 
to  European  States  and  control  European  affairs,  thus 
assuming  responsibility  for  those  affairs. 

"That  impression  should  be  dissipated.  It  is  not  well 
founded.  I  am  sure  that  the  people  of  the  United  States 
have  no  such  intention  or  wish.  Such  interposition  in  the 
affairs  of  Europe  as  our  representatives  have  been  engaged 
in  was  properly  but  a  temporary  incident  to  the  fact  that 
we  had  engaged  in  the  war,  and  had  therefore  to  discuss 
the  terms  of  peace;  and  we  should  make  it  clear  that  we 
neither  assume  responsibility  for  nor  intend  interference 
in  the  affairs  of  Europe  beyond  that  necessary  participa- 
tion under  the  organization  of  the  League  of  Peace  which 
we  enter  upon  by  the  request  of  the  European  nations 
themselves. 


240    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

"To  return  to  the  subject  of  arbitration  and  the  develop- 
ment of  International  Law,  I  certainly  should  not  advise 
regarding  the  League  covenant  in  its  present  form  as 
the  final  word  upon  an  organization  for  the  preservation  of 
the  peace  of  the  world.  I  think  that  when  the  Senate 
consents  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  with  some  such 
reservations  as  I  have  indicated,  it  ought  also  to  adopt  a 
separate  resolution  not  a  part  of  the  action  upon  the  treaty, 
but,  practically  at  the  same  time,  formally  requesting  the 
President,  without  any  avoidable  delay,  to  open  negotiations 
with  the  other  Powers  for  the  reestablishment  and  strength- 
ening of  a  system  of  arbitration  for  and  the  disposition 
of  international  disputes  upon  questions  of  right,  and  for 
periodical  meetings  of  representatives  of  all  the  Powers 
for  the  revision  and  development  of  International  Law. 

"I  think  that  hereafter,  when  the  life  of  Europe  has 
become  settled,  when  credit  and  industry  are  reestablished 
there,  and  governments  are  stable  and  secure,  and  we  know 
what  reduction  of  armaments  the  Powers  are  going  to 
consent  to,  the  United  States  should  insist  upon  a  revision 
of  the  League  covenant.  I  am  sure  that  the  changed  cir- 
cumstances will  then  permit  material  improvement. 

"Faithfully  yours, 

"Elihu  Root." 


\ 


THE  SENATE'S   RESERVATIONS   OF    NOVEMBER    19,    I919 

Resolved  {two-thirds  of  the  Senators  present  concurring 
therein) ,  That  the  Senate  advise  and  consent  to  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany  concluded  at 
Versailles  on  the  28th  day  of  June,  1919,  subject  to  the 
following  reservations  and  understandings,  which  are  hereby 
made  a  part  and  condition  of  this  resolution  of  ratification, 
which  ratification  is  not  to  take  effect  or  bind  the  United 
States  until  the  said  reservations  and  understandings 
adopted  by  the  Senate  have  been  accepted  by  an  exchange 
of  notes  as  a  part  and  a  condition  of  this  resolution  of 
ratification  by  at  least  three  of  the  four  principal  allied 
and  associated  powers,  to  wit,  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy, 
and  Japan: 

1.  The  United  States  so  understands  and  construes  Ar- 
ticle 1  that  in  case  of  notice  of  withdrawal  from  the 
League  of  Nations,  as  provided  in  said  article,  the  United 
States  shall  be  the  sole  judge  as  to  whether  all  its  inter- 
national obligations  and  all  its  obligations  under  the  said 
covenant  have  been  fulfilled,  and  notice  of  withdrawal  by 
the  United  States  may  be  given  by  a  concurrent  resolution 
of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 

2.  The  United  States  assumes  no  obligation  to  preserve 
the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any 
other  country  or  to  interfere  in  controversies  between  na- 
tions— whether  members  of  the  League  or  not — under  the 
provisions  of  Article  10,  or  to  employ  the  military  or 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States  under  any  article  of  the 
treaty  for  any  purpose,  unless  in  any  particular  case  the 
Congress,  which,  under  the  Constitution,  has  the  sole 
power  to  declare  war  or  authorize  the  employment  of  the 

241 


242    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

military  or  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  shall  by  act 
or  joint  resolution  so  provide. 

3.  No  mandate  shall  be  accepted  by  the  United  States 
under  Article  22,  Part  1,  or  any  other  provision  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  with  Germany,  except  by  action  of  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States. 

4.  The  United  States  reserves  to  itself  exclusively  the 
right  to  decide  what  questions  are  within  its  domestic 
jurisdiction  and  declares  that  all  domestic  and  political 
questions  relating  wholly  or  in  part  to  its  internal  affairs, 
including  immigration,  labor,  coastwise  traffic,  the  tariff, 
commerce,  the  suppression  of  traffic  in  women  and  children 
and  in  opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs,  and  all  other  do- 
mestic questions,  are  solely  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States  and  are  not  under  this  treaty  to  be  sub- 
mitted in  any  way  either  to  arbitration  or  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  council  or  of  the  assembly  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  or  any  agency  thereof,  or  to  the  decision  or 
recommendation  of  any  other  power. 

5.  The  United  States  will  not  submit  to  arbitration 
or  to  inquiry  by  the  assembly  or  by  the  council  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  provided  for  in  said  treaty  of  peace,  any 
questions  which  in  the  judgment  of  the  United  States 
depend  upon  or  relate  to  its  long-established  policy,  com- 
monly known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  said  doctrine  is 
to  be  interpreted  by  the  United  States  alone  and  is  hereby 
declared  to  be  wholly  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  said 
League  of  Nations  and  entirely  unaffected  by  any  provision 
contained  in  the  said  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany. 

6.  The  United  States  withholds  its  assent  to  Articles 
156,  157,  and  158,  and  reserves  full  liberty  of  action  with 
respect  to  any  controversy  which  may  arise  under  said 
articles  between  the  Republic  of  China  and  the  Empire 
of  Japan. 

7.  The  Congress  of  the  United  States  will  provide  by 
law  for  the  appointment  of  the  representatives  of  the 
United  States  in  the  assembly  and  the  council  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  may  in  its  discretion  provide  for  the  par- 
ticipation of  the  United  States  in  any  commission,  com- 


DOCUMENTS  243 

mittee,  tribunal,  court,  council,  or  conference,  or  in  the 
selection  of  any  members  thereof  and  for  the  appointment 
of  members  of  said  commissions,  committees,  tribunals, 
courts,  councils,  or  conferences,  or  any  other  representa- 
tives under  the  treaty  of  peace,  or  in  carrying  out  its 
provisions,  and  until  such  participation  and  appointment 
have  been  so  provided  for  and  the  powers  and  duties 
of  such  representatives  have  been  defined  by  law,  no  per- 
son shall  represent  the  United  States  under  either  said 
League  of  Nations  or  the  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany 
or  be  authorized  to  perform  any  act  for  or  on  behalf  of 
the  United  States  thereunder,  and  no  citizen  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  selected  or  appointed  as  a  member  of  said 
commissions,  committees,  tribunals,  courts,  councils,  or  con- 
ferences except  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States. 

8.  The  United  States  understands  that  the  reparation 
commission  will  regulate  or  interfere  with  exports  from 
the  United  States  to  Germany,  or  from  Germany  to  the 
United  States,  only  when  the  United  States  by  act  or 
joint  resolution  of  Congress  approves  such  regulation  or 
interferences. 

9.  The  United  States  shall  not  be  obligated  to  con- 
tribute to  any  expenses  of  the  League  of  Nations,  or  of 
the  secretariat,  or  of  any  commission,  or  committee,  or 
conference,  or  other  agency,  organized  under  the  League 
of  Nations  or  under  the  treaty  or  for  the  purpose  of  car- 
rying out  the  treaty  provisions,  unless  and  until  an  appro- 
priation of  funds  available  for  such  expenses  shall  have 
been  made  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 

10.  If  the  United  States  shall  at  any  time  adopt  any  plan 
for  the  limitation  of  armaments  proposed  by  the  council 
of  the  League  of  Nations  under  the  provisions  of  Article  8, 
it  reserves  the  right  to  increase  such  armaments  without 
the  consent  of  the  council  whenever  the  United  States  is 
threatened  with  invasion  or  engaged  in  war. 

11.  The  United  States  reserves  the  right  to  permit, 
in  its  discretion,  the  nationals  of  a  covenant-breaking  State, 
as  defined  in  Article  16  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 


244   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

Nations,  residing  within  the  United  States  or  in  countries 
other  than  that  violating  said  Article  16,  to  continue  their 
commercial,  financial,  and  personal  relations  with  the  na- 
tionals of  the  United  States. 

12.  Nothing  in  Articles  296,  297,  or  in  any  of  the  annexes 
thereto  or  in  any  other  article,  section,  or  annex  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany  shall,  as  against  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  be  taken  to  mean  any  confirmation, 
ratification,  or  approval  of  any  act  otherwise  illegal  or 
in  contravention  of  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States. 

13.  The  United  States  withholds  its  assent  to  Part  XIII 
(Articles  387  to  427,  inclusive)  unless  Congress  by  act  or 
joint  resolution  shall  hereafter  make  provision  for  repre- 
sentation in  the  organization  established  by  said  Part  XIII, 
and  in  such  event  the  participation  of  the  United  States 
will  be  governed  and  conditioned  by  the  provisions  of 
such  act  or  joint  resolution. 

14.  The  United  States  assumes  no  obligation  to  be 
bound  by  any  election,  decision,  report,  or  finding  of 
the  council  or  assembly  in  which  any  member  of  the 
League  and  its  self-governing  dominions,  colonies,  or  parts 
of  empire,  in  the  aggregate  have  cast  more  than  one  vote, 
and  assumes  no  obligation  to  be  bound  by  any  decision, 
report,  or  finding  of  the  council  or  assembly  arising  out 
of  any  dispute  between  the  United  States  and  any  member 
of  the  League  if  such  member,  or  any  self-governing 
dominion,  colony,  empire,  or  part  of  empire  united  with 
it  politically  has  voted. 

The  roll  call  resulted — yeas  39,  nays  55,  as  follows: 

YEAS— 39 

Ball  Edge  Kellogg  McNary 

Calder  Elkins  Kenyon  Nelson 

Capper  Frelinghuysen  Keyes  New 

Colt  Gore  Lenroot  Newberry 

Cummins  Hale  Lodge  Page 

Curtis  Harding  McCumber  Penrose 

Dillingham  Jones,  Wash.  McLean  Phipps 


DOCUMENTS 


245 


Shields 

Spencer            Townsend        Warren 

Smith,  Ga. 

Sterling            Wadsworth       Watson 

Smoot 

Sutherland       Walsh, 

Mass. 

NAYS- 

-55 

Ashurst 

Johnson,  S. 

Dak. 

Ransdell 

Bankhead 

Jones,  N.  Mex. 

Reed 

Beckham 

Kendrick 

Robinson 

Borah 

King 

Sheppard 

Brandegee 

Kirby 

Sherman 

Chamberlain 

Knox 

Simmons 

Culberson 

LaFollette 

Smith,  Ariz. 

Dial 

McCormick 

Smith,  Md. 

Fernald 

McKellar 

Smith,  S.  C. 

Fletcher 

Moses 

Stanley 

France 

Myers 

Swanson 

Gay- 

Norris 

Thomas 

Gerry 

Nugent 

Trammell 

Gronna 

Overman 

Underwood 

Harris 

Owen 

Walsh,  Mont, 

Harrison 

Phelan 

Williams 

Henderson 

Pittman 

Wolcott 

Hitchcock 

Poindexter 

Johnson,  Calif 

Pomerene 

NOT  VOTING— i. 


Fall 


So  the  resolution  of  ratification  was  rejected,  two-thirds 
of  the  Senators  present  not  having  voted  in  favor  thereof. 


^ 


VI 

the  president's  letter  to  senator  hitchcock 

The  White  House, 
Washington,  18,  November,  1919. 

My  dear  Senator:  You  were  good  enough  to  bring  me 
word  that  the  Democratic  Senators  supporting  the  treaty 
expected  to  hold  a  conference  before  the  final  vote  on  the 
Lodge  resolution  of  ratification  and  that  they  would  be  glad 
to  receive  a  word  of  counsel  from  me. 

I  should  hesitate  to  offer  it  in  any  detail,  but  I  assume 
that  the  Senators  only  desire  my  judgment  upon  the  all- 
important  question  of  the  final  vote  on  the  resolution  con- 
taining the  many  reservations  by  Senator  Lodge.  On  that 
I  cannot  hesitate,  for,  in  my  opinion,  the  resolution  in  that 
form  does  not  provide  for  ratification  but,  rather,  for  the 
nullification  of  the  treaty.  I  sincerely  hope  that  the  friends 
and  supporters  of  the  treaty  will  vote  against  the  Lodge 
resolution  of  ratification. 

I  understand  that  the  door  will  probably  then  be  open  for 
a  genuine  resolution  of  ratification. 

I  trust  that  all  true  friends  of  the  treaty  will  refuse  to 
support  the  Lodge  resolution. 

Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

(Signed)  Woodrow  Wilson. 
Hon.  G.  M.  Hitchcock, 

United  States  Senate. 


246 


VII 

THE    SWISS   RESERVATION    OF    NEUTRALITY 

(From  the  New  York  Tribune,  Feb.  16,  1920) 

The  admission  of  Switzerland  to  the  League  of  Nations 
demonstrates  that  the  council  of  the  League  has  no  invin- 
cible opposition  to  membership  with  reservations.  In  order 
to  let  Switzerland  in  the  council  has  to  annul  several  spe- 
cific provisions  of  the  Covenant. 

Article  1  provides  that  the  original  members  of  the  League 
shall  be  the  signatories  of  the  treaty  with  Germany  and 
such  neutral  nations,  named  in  the  annex  to  Part  1,  "as 
shall  accede  without  reservation  to  the  Covenant."  Switzer- 
land was  one  of  the  neutrals  named.  Article  1  also  provides 
that  these  neutrals  must  deposit  a  declaration  of  accession 
"within  two  months  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Cove- 
nant." 

Switzerland's  constitution  makes  it  impossible  for  her  to 
deposit  such  a  declaration  within  two  months,  for  her  Gov- 
ernment has  to  submit  the  question  of  departing  from  the 
Swiss  policy  of  neutrality  to  a  vote  of  the  people,  and  this 
vote  cannot  be  taken  within  the  period  fixed.  Nevertheless 
Switzerland  was  received  into  the  League  last  Friday. 

But  the  council  didn't  stop  merely  with  suspending  the 
rules  of  admission.  It  permitted  Switzerland  to  make 
sweeping  reservations  to  Article  10,  often  described  as  "the 
heart  of  the  Covenant,"  and  to  Article  16,  relating  to  the  co- 
ercion to  be  employed  against  a  covenant-breaking  State. 
Switzerland  has  pursued  for  centuries  a  policy  of  absolute 
neutrality — of  non-interference  in  the  quarrels  of  Europe. 
She  desires  to  remain  a  neutral — at  least  in  the  military 
sense.  Although  willing  to  make  some  sacrifices  in  order  to 
enter  the  League,  she  insists  that  her  military  forces  must 

247 


248   AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

never  be  used  offensively  against  nations  which  the  league 
may  want  to  discipline. 

She  therefore  refuses  to  accept  any  obligation  "to  pre- 
serve, as  against  external  aggression,  the  territorial  integrity 
and  political  independence  of  other  members  of  the  League," 
if  that  obligation  commits  her  to  the  use  of  armed  force. 
Her  reservation  to  Article  10  goes  much  further  than  our 
Senate's  reservation  does,  for  the  United  States  agrees  to 
use  force  as  well  as  economic  pressure  whenever  Congress 
so  authorizes. 

Article  16  requires  members  of  the  League  to  combine  to 
punish  a  covenant-breaking  State  both  through  economic 
boycott  and  through  military  pressure.  Members  agree  "to 
take  the  necessary  steps  to  afford  passage  through  their  ter- 
ritory to  the  forces  of  any  of  the  members  of  the  League 
which  are  cooperating  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League."  Switzerland,  besides  declining  to  furnish  military 
aid  against  an  offending  State,  declines  to  allow  the  passage 
of  foreign  troops  across  her  territory,  or  to  allow  her  terri- 
tory to  be  used  in  any  way  as  a  base  for  military  operations. 
She  gives  notice  that  she  will  defend  her  territory  in  any  cir- 
cumstances, even  against  the  League  of  Nations. 

Such  reservations  "cut  the  heart  out  of  the  Covenant,"  so 
far  as  Switzerland  is  concerned.  Yet  the  council,  while  ad- 
mitting this  fact,  has  yielded  to  the  constitutional  and  his- 
torical traditions  of  the  Swiss,  and  has  admitted  them  into 
a  limited  partnership  in  the  League. 

The  United  States  also  has  constitutional  limitations  and 
historical  traditions  to  live  up  to.  The  makers  of  the  Cove- 
nant did  not  sufficiently  realize  that.  The  council  seems  to 
be  more  open-minded.  Having  accepted  Switzerland's  strin- 
gent reservations,  it  has  debarred  itself  from  objecting  to 
much  more  moderate  reservations  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States. 


VIII 

THE  SENATE'S  RESERVATIONS  OF  MARCH   I9,  I92O 

Resolved  (two-thirds  of  the  Senators  present  concurring 
therein),  That  the  Senate  advise  and  consent  to  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany  concluded  at  Ver- 
sailles on  the  28th  day  of  June,  1919,  subject  to  the  follow- 
ing reservations  and  understandings,  which  are  hereby  made 
a  part  and  condition  of  this  resolution  of  ratification,  which 
ratification  is  not  to  take  effect  or  bind  the  United  States 
until  the  said  reservations  and  understandings  adopted  by 
the  Senate  have  been  accepted  as  a  part  and  a  condition  of 
this  resolution  of  ratification  by  the  allied  and  associated 
powers  and  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  allied  and  associated 
powers  to  make  objection  to  said  reservations  and  under- 
standings prior  to  the  deposit  of  ratification  by  the  United 
States  shall  be  taken  as  a  full  and  final  acceptance  of  such 
reservations  and  understandings  by  said  powers: 

1.  The  United  States  so  understands  and  construes  Ar- 
ticle 1  that  in  case  of  notice  of  withdrawal  from  the  League 
of  Nations,  as  provided  in  said  article,  the  United  States 
shall  be  the  sole  judge  as  to  whether  all  its  international 
obligations  and  all  its  obligations  under  the  said  Covenant 
have  been  fulfilled,  and  notice  of  withdrawal  by  the  United 
States  may  be  given  by  a  concurrent  resolution  of  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States. 

2.  The  United  States  assumes  no  obligation  to  preserve 
the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  other 
country  by  the  employment  of  its  military  or  naval  forces, 
its  resources,  or  any  form  of  economic  discrimination,  or  to 
interfere  in  any  way  in  controversies  between  nations,  in- 
cluding all  controversies  relating  to  territorial  integrity  or 
political  independence,  whether  members  of  the  League  or 
not,  under  the  provisions  of  Article  10,  or  to  employ  the 

249 


250    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

military  or  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  under  any 
article  of  the  treaty  for  any  purpose,  unless  in  any  particu- 
lar case  the  Congress,  which,  under  the  Constitution,  has  the 
sole  power  to  declare  war  or  authorize  the  employment  of 
the  military  or  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  shall,  in 
the  exercise  of  full  liberty  of  action,  by  act  or  joint  resolu- 
tion so  provide. 

3.  No  mandate  shall  be  accepted  by  the  United  States 
under  Article  22,  Part  1,  or  any  other  provision  of  the  treaty 
of  peace  with  Germany,  except  by  action  of  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States. 

4.  The  United  States  reserves  to  itself  exclusively  the 
right  to  decide  what  questions  are  within  its  domestic  juris- 
diction and  declares  that  all  domestic  and  political  questions 
relating  wholly  or  in  part  to  its  internal  affairs,  including 
immigration,  labor,  coastwise  traffic,  the  tariff,  commerce, 
the  suppression  of  traffic  in  women  and  children  and  in 
opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs,  and  all  other  domestic 
questions,  are  solely  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States  and  are  not  under  this  treaty  to  be  submitted  in  any 
way  either  to  arbitration  or  to  the  consideration  of  the  coun- 
cil or  of  the  assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations,  or  any 
agency  thereof,  or  to  the  decision  or  recommendation  of 
any  other  power. 

5.  The  United  States  will  not  submit  to  arbitration  or  to 
inquiry  by  the  assembly  or  by  the  council  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  provided  for  in  said  treaty  of  peace,  any  questions 
which  in  the  judgment  of  the  United  States  depend  upon  or 
relate  to  its  long-established  policy,  commonly  known  as 
the  Monroe  Doctrine;  said  doctrine  is  to  be  interpreted  by 
the  United  States  alone  and  is  hereby  declared  to  be  wholly 
outside  the  jurisdiction  of  said  League  of  Nations  and  en- 
tirely unaffected  by  any  provision  contained  in  the  said 
treaty  of  peace  with  Germany. 

6.  The  United  States  withholds  its  assent  to  Articles  156, 
157,  158,  and  reserves  full  liberty  of  action  with  respect  to 
any  controversy  which  may  arise  under  said  articles. 

7.  No  person  is  or  shall  be  authorized  to  represent  the 
United  States,  nor  shall  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  be 


DOCUMENTS  251 

eligible,  as  a  member  of  any  body  or  agency  established  or 
authorized  by  said  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany,  except 
pursuant  to  an  act  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  pro- 
viding for  his  appointment  and  defining  his  powers  and 
duties. 

8.  The  United  States  understands  that  the  reparation 
commission  will  regulate  or  interfere  with  exports  from  the 
United  States  to  Germany,  or  from  Germany  to  the  United 
States,  only  when  the  United  States  by  act  or  joint  resolu- 
tion of  Congress  approves  such  regulation  or  interference. 

9.  The  United  States  shall  not  be  obligated  to  contribute 
to  any  expenses  of  the  League  of  Nations,  or  of  the  secre- 
tariat, or  of  any  commission,  or  committee,  or  conference,  or 
other  agency,  organized  under  the  League  of  Nations  or 
under  the  treaty  or  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the 
treaty  provisions,  unless  and  until  an  appropriation  of  funds 
available  for  such  expenses  shall  have  been  made  by  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States :  Provided,  That  the  foregoing 
limitation  shall  not  apply  to  the  United  States'  proportionate 
share  of  the  expense  of  the  office  force  and  salary  of  the 
secretary  general. 

10.  No  plan  for  the  limitation  of  armaments  proposed  by 
the  council  of  the  League  of  Nations  under  the  provisions 
of  Article  8  shall  be  held  as  binding  the  United  States  until 
the  same  shall  have  been  accepted  by  Congress,  and  the 
United  States  reserves  the  right  to  increase  its  armament 
without  the  consent  of  the  council  whenever  the  United 
States  is  threatened  with  invasion  or  engaged  in  war. 

11.  The  United  States  reserves  the  right  to  permit,  in  its 
discretion,  the  nationals  of  a  covenant-breaking  State,  as 
defined  in  Article  16  of  the  covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, residing  within  the  United  States  or  in  countries  other 
than  such  covenant-breaking  State,  to  continue  their  com- 
mercial, financial,  and  personal  relations  with  the  nationals 
of  the  United  States. 

12.  Nothing  in  Articles  296,  297,  or  in  any  of  the  annexes 
thereto  or  in  any  other  article,  section,  or  annex  of  the  treaty 
of  peace  with  Germany  shall,  as  against  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  be  taken  to  mean  any  confirmation,  ratifica- 


252    AMERICAN  WORLD  POLICIES 

tion,  or  approval  of  any  act  otherwise  illegal  or  in  contra- 
vention of  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

13.  The  United  States  withholds  its  assent  to  Part  XIII 
(Articles  387  to  427,  inclusive)  unless  Congress  by  act  or 
joint  resolution  shall  hereafter  make  provision  for  represen- 
tation in  the  organization  established  by  said  Part  XIII,  and 
in  such  event  the  participation  of  the  United  States  will  be 
governed  and  conditioned  by  the  provisions  of  such  act  or 
joint  resolution. 

14.  Until  Part  I,  being  the  covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  shall  be  so  amended  as  to  provide  that  the  United 
States  shall  be  entitled  to  cast  a  number  of  votes  equal  to 
that  which  any  member  of  the  League  and  its  self-governing 
dominions,  colonies,  or  parts  of  empire,  in  the  aggregate 
shall  be  entitled  to  cast,  the  United  States  assumes  no  obliga- 
tion to  be  bound,  except  in  cases  where  Congress  has  pre- 
viously given  its  consent,  by  any  election,  decision,  report,  or 
finding  of  the  council  or  assembly  in  which  any  member  of 
the  League  and  its  self-governing  dominions,  colonies,  or 
parts  of  empire,  in  the  aggregate  have  cast  more  than  one 
vote. 

The  United  States  assumes  no  obligation  to  be  bound  by 
any  decision,  report,  or  finding  of  the  council  or  assembly 
arising  out  of  any  dispute  between  the  United  States  and 
any  member  of  the  League  if  such  member,  or  any  self-gov- 
erning dominion,  colony,  empire,  or  part  of  empire  united 
with  it  politically  has  voted. 

15.  In  consenting  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  with 
Germany  the  United  States  adheres  to  the  principle  of  self- 
determination  and  to  the  resolution  of  sympathy  with  the  as- 
pirations of  the  Irish  people  for  a  government  of  their  own 
choice  adopted  by  the  Senate  June  6,  1919,  and  declares  that 
when  such  government  is  attained  by  Ireland,  a  consum- 
mation it  is  hoped  is  at  hand,  it  should  promptly  be  admitted 
as  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  roll  call  having  been  concluded,  it  resulted — yeas  49, 
nays  35,  as  follows: 


DOCUMENTS 


253 


YEAS— 49 

Ashurst 

Gore 

Myers 

Spencer 

Ball 

Hale 

New 

Sterling 

Beckham 

Henderson 

Nugent 

Sutherland 

Calder 

Jones,  Wash. 

Owen 

Trammell 

Capper 

Kellogg 

Page 

Wadsworth 

Chamberlain 

Kendrick 

Phelan 

Walsh,  Mass, 

Colt 

Kenyon 

Phipps 

Walsh,  Mont, 

Curtis 

Keyes 

Pittman 

Warren 

Dillingham 

King 

Pomerene 

Watson 

Edge 

Lenroot 

Ransdell 

Wolcott 

Elkins 

Lodge 

Smith,  Ga. 

Fletcher 

McLean 

Smith,  Md. 

Frelinghuysen  McNary 

Smoot 

NAYS-35 

Borah 

Gronna 

McCormick 

Shields 

Brandegee 

Harris 

McKellar 

Simmons 

Comer 

Harrison 

Moses 

Smith,  S.  C. 

Culberson 

Hitchcock 

Norris 

Stanley 

Dial 

Johnson,  Cal. 

Overman 

Swanson 

Fernald 

Johnson,  S. D 

.  Reed 

Thomas 

France 

Kirby 

Robinson 

Underwood 

Gay 

Knox 

Sheppard 

Williams 

Glass 

LaFollette 

Sherman 

NOT  VOTING— 12 

Cummins 

Harding 

Nelson 

Poindexter 

Fall 

Jones,  N.  M. 

Newberry 

Smith,  Ariz. 

Gerry 

McCumber 

Penrose 

Townsend 

INDEX 


Adalia,  28 

Adriatic  question,  182 
/Egean  islands,  28 
Africa,  partition  of,  26 
Amendment  of  treaties,  105 
Americanism,  155 
American  Bar  Association,  165 
American    Society    of    Interna- 
tional Law,  165 
Arabia,  28 

Ararat,  republic  of,  28 
Arbitration,  31,  36,  37,  58 
Argentina,  47 
Armenia,  claims  to  parts  of,  26, 

27. 

Armistice,  the,  66,  69,  70;  corre- 
spondence concerning,  203-217 

Asia,  partition  of,  34 

Baker,  Ray  Stannard,  127,  128 

Balfour,  Mr.,  128 

Balkan  quarrels,  41 

Batum,  28 

Belgium,  invasion  of,  131,  160 

Bismarck,  146 

Bonaparte,  Louis,  168,  169,  175 

Brandegee,  Senator,  97,  180 

Brest-Litovsk,  treaty  of,  116 

British  Empire,  model  of  League 

of  Nations,  51,  52 
Bucharest,  treaty  of,  116 

Cecil,  Lord   Robert,   51 

Chile,  47 

China,  the  rights  of,  21,  22,  23, 

25,  31,  32,  50 
Clemenceau,  Premier  of  France, 

IT7. 
Coercion,  power  of  in  the  League 

of  Nations,  38,  46 
Columbia,  47 

Community  of  interests,  19 
Constitution   of   the  League   of 

Nations,  126;  in  conflict  with 


Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  130,  et  seq. 

Constitution  of  the  U  n  it  e  d 
States,  encroachments  upon, 
136-140;  wisdom  of,  155,  170, 
171 

Council  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, nature  and  powers  of, 
37,  4i,  52,  57,  59,  87,  92,  99, 
100,  102,  142,  144,  190,  197 

Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, complete  text.  218-232 

Czechoslovakia,  50 

Declaration    of    Independence, 

aim  of,  151,  152 
democracy,  the  mask  of,  46,  47, 

51  the  President's  repudiation 

of,  73,  74 
Denmark,  43,  47,  114 
Dillon,    Dr.    E.   J.,   quoted,    136, 

137,    139 
Direct  action,  184,  185 
Drummond,  Sir  Eric,  116 

Eastern   Inner   Mongolia,   31 
Entente,  the,   18,  44,  46,   57,  66, 

69;  of  Free  Nations,  91,  93,  197 
Erivan,  28 
Executive  power,  growth  of  in 

the  United  States,  135,  136 

"Fourteen  Points,"  President 
Wilson's,  referred  to,  39,  66, 
70,  121,  122,  124,  159;  text  in 
full,  199-202 

Franco-American  Special  Treaty, 
ir8,  119 

"Freedom  of  the  Seas,"  68,  159 

Garvin,  Mr.,  quoted,  49 
George,  Lloyd,  British  Premier, 
137 


255 


256 


INDEX 


Grey,  Sir  Edward,  now  Vis- 
count quoted,  41,  130,  131,  132, 

133,  137,  143 
Golden  Rule,  35 

Hague  Conventions,  the,  36,  162, 
197 

Haiti,  47 

Hedjaz,  34,  47,  "4 

Hitchcock,  Senator,  letters  of 
President  to,  Nov.  19,  1919, 
103,  107,  173,  174;  full  text, 
246;  March  8,  1920,  178,  182; 
proposal  of  amendment  by, 
179- 181 

Honduras,  47 

Hughes,  Hon.  Charles  E.,  opin- 
ion of,  60 

Imperialism,  150,  151 

India,  34 

International  court,  37,  163 

International  justice,  interrup- 
tion of  plans  for  organizing, 
40 

International  Law,  absence  of  in 
Covenant,  19,  36,  38,  42,  44,  49, 
55,  58,  61,  no;  improvement 
of,  7,  145,  147,  156,  157,  158, 
159,  163,  165,  166,  196 

Interpretation  of  treaties,  105, 
106,  175 

Intervention,  dangers  of,  18 

"Irreconcilables,"  the,  178 

Japan,  relations  of  to  China,  23, 
24,  25 ;  twenty-one  demands 
on  China,  31 ;  relations  of  to 
the  League  of  Nations,  50; 
Jugoslavia,  50 

Kars,  28 

Knox,  Senator  P.  C,  57 

Labor,  provisions  of  Covenant 
regarding,  142.  See  reservation 
13  on  pages  244  and  252 

League  of  Nations,  automatic 
character  of,  92;  conflicting 
elements  of,  90,  91 ;  defensive 
alliance,  44 ;  incompatibility 
with  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  89,  95 ;  imperial 


character  of,  51,  53;  military 
character  of,  48,  49,  51 ;  non- 
recognition  of  principles  by, 
19,  21,  38,  39;  super-govern- 
mental character  of,  91,  92,  93, 
94;  withdrawal  from,  59,  60. 
See  also  reservation  I,  pages 
pages  240  and  249 

League  to  Enforce  Peace,  16 

Liberia,  47 

Lodge,  Senator  Henry  Cabot, 
referred  to,  173,  233,  246 

London,  Pact  of,  28 

Louis  XIV,  President  Wilson 
compared  to,  139 

Lowell,  President,  quoted,  92,95 

Magna  Charta,  154 

Mandates,  26,  27,  33,  46,  52,  54, 

142.    See  also   reservation  on 

pages  242  and  250 
Mesopotamia,  28 
Monroe  Doctrine,  29,  30,  35,  59, 

60,  108,  142,  143,  188.    See  also 

reservation  5  on  pages  242  and 

250 
Moses,  Senator,  quoted,  115,  116, 

117 

"Natural  Rights,"  153,  154,  ISS 

Netherlands,  47 

Neutrality,   Swiss,  64.    See  also 

Document  VI,  page  247 
Neutral  rights,  36,  38,  42,  43,  158, 

159 
Nicaragua,  47 
Norway,  47 

Obligations,  "moral"  and  "le- 
gal" distinguished,  101 

Pacific  islands,  29 
Palestine,  28 
Paraguay,  47 

Paris  Conference,  referred  to, 
16,  17,  19,  20,  33,  49,  55,  70,  82, 

83 
Peace  commission  from  United 

States,  composition  of,  77 
Persia,  34,  47,  114 
Pichon,  French  Minister,  129 
Plebiscites  in  France,  169 


INDEX 


257 


Poincar6,  President  of  France, 
80 

Poland,  40,  50 

Preliminary  Peace,  127,  128 

President,  power  of  under  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, 102 

Provisional  treaty  with  Ger- 
many, 84 

Reed,  Senator,  180 

"Regional  Understandings."  See 
Understandings 

Reservation,  as  a  form  of  proce- 
dure, 61,  62,  63,  64,  106 

Reservations,  effect  of,  141,  142, 
143;  proposed  by  Mr.  Root, 
59,  6b,  61 ;  the  Senate's  of 
Nov.  19,  1919,  241-245,  of 
March  19,  1920,  249-253;  sum- 
mary of,  107-109;  Swiss,  247- 
248 

Root,  Hon.  Elihu,  quoted,  36,  38, 
58,  59,  165 

"Round   Robin"   of  the   Senate, 

139 

Sea-power,  British,  54,  73 

Secret  treaties,  21,  22,  26,  28,  78 

Self-determination,  30,  35,  91 

Shantung,  22,  25,  27,  29,  31,  33, 
104,  108.  See  also  reservation 
6,  pages  242  and  250 

Siam,  34,  47,  114 

Smith,  Senator  Hoke,  180,  181 

Smuts,  General,  51,  73 

Society  of  States,  the  League  of 
Nations  not  a  general,  42,  47, 
49,  55;  referred  to,  164,  166, 
195 

South  Manchuria,  31 

Spain,  47 

Spheres  of  influence,  63,  64 

States,  equality  of,  147,  148;  in- 
herent rights  of,  19,  36,  52,  91, 
197 

Supreme  Council,  19,  81,  134,  164, 
177,  183 

Super-government  established  by 
the  Covenant,  89,  93,  96,  97,  99 

Sweden,  43,  47,  114 

Switzerland,  38,  43,  47 

Syria,  26 


Taft,  ex-President,  41 
Treaty-making  power,  46,  56,  57, 

67,  77,  139,  143,  157,  194 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  nature  and 

ratification  of,  85,  105,  107,  114, 

115,  125,  175,  176,  179,  183,  195, 

197 
Treitschke,  149 
Turkey,  partition  of,  26,  29,  50 

Understandings,  secret,  21,  22, 
25,  26,  27,  28,  29,  30,  33,  34,  63, 
64,  103,  143 

Venezuela,  47 
Vienna,  Congress  of,  163 
Virginia,  reservation  of,  62 
Votes   of    British    Empire,    143. 

See  also  reservation  14,  pages 

244  and  252 

War,  provided  for  irt  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, 41,  96,  97;  by  the 
League,  99,  100 

War-making  power  of  Congress, 

83    . 
Washington,    President,   quoted, 

17 

William  II,  of  Germany,  160, 
177 

Wilson,  President,  appeal  to  the 
electorate,  71,  72;  challenge  to 
the  Senate,  84;  denunciation 
of  the  Senate,  83,  86,  87 ;  letter 
to  Chairman  of  Democratic 
National  Committee,  173,  174; 
letters  to  Hitchcock,  173-174 
and  246;  on  Article  X,  97,  98, 
118,  119;  on  Franco-American 
treaty,  118;  on  International 
Law,  158;  on  "New  Freedom," 
138 ;  on  peace  plans,  66,  67,  68, 
70,  71 ;  on  suppressing  the 
Senate,  74,  75;  message  on 
leaving  for  Europe,  first  time, 
76,  second  time,  84;  speech  at 
Boston,  82;  speech  at  Denver, 
140;  speeches  in  Europe,  80, 
81 ;  speech  at  Pueblo,  120,  121 : 
the  "solemn  referendum,"  174 

World's  Court  League,  16 

World  Law,  145,  147 


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